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NO 
PLANET B

EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY

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INTRODUCTION

Since the 1990s European Union has aimed at playing major role in international climate change policy development. This role taken by the EU was played more or less successfully and international climate change policy has heavily shaped domestic climate change policy of the EU. This demonstrated the commitment European Union has towards reversing climate change so far and also its will to “lead by an example”. While some may argue that it’s the feeling of guilt for the years of industrialization that formed the developed community that states of European Union surely are, that is fuelling this ignition for climate change policy and climate change mitigation. Others may say that it’s the visionary approach of leaders and the direction they are taking. One way or another, European Union cannot combat climate change only by its own engagement but needs to include all of the countries in ideal case scenario, or at least the countries that are the biggest polluters. Climate change is a global problem and therefore requires global resolution.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is an international platform endeavouring climate change to remain important issue discussed regularly on international level. To ensure that, they have established annual meetings known as COP, Conference of Parties, that have many ministers and heads of states participating regularly. The UNFCCC calls not only for better research, climate science and measuring of greenhouse gas emissions but their goal

is also reducing the greenhouse emissions internationally. The Conference of Parties have been important platform for the advocates of more ambitious, sometimes even drastic measures to obtain the climate change mitigation (such as the EU and its members) but they have to often face much stronger and more influential opponents (such as was often in the history of international climate change debates China, the US or India). This often leads to the final results of the conferences to be compromise and not the most ambitious proposal or one that would lead to the most fundamental changes.

The aim of this paper is to broadly describe existing international climate change policy and put it in the perspective with the European climate change policy.

The first part of the paper will firstly introduce International Climate Change Policy and its history, afterwards take a closer look on UNFCCC Conference of Parties 25 and its outcome. Subsequently we will take look at due to the world pandemic postponed Conference of Parties 26 and its existing or possible outcomes. Secondly this paper will analyse European Climate Change Policy, both existing one and prepared or one just being set in place. In conclusion there will be a discussion on European and International Climate Change Policy and the burning question of the EU’s leadership in this field with assessment of the possible future scenarios for the European climate change leadership.



Source: UN News, 2019

BRIEF HISTORY OF COP AND UNFCCC

1.1 Beginnings of the UNFCCC

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an international treaty initially signed by 154 states at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The aim of this treaty was to limit global warming, climate change and to cope with the impact that these processes have on environment. In 1997 so called Kyoto Protocol was adopted, which strengthens the Framework Convention by setting legally binding requirements for reduction of the emissions. Nowadays there are 196 parties to the Convention, and it's near universal membership of the states.¹

However, the initial international discussion on climate change started much earlier, in 1979, at the First World Climate Conference which was held to urge nations to prevent man-made changes on climate. This Confer-

ence led to overall discussion about climate change and more political and scientific climate conferences and declarations. Such as Villach Conference, Toronto Conference or the Second World Climate Conference held in 1990 in Geneva.²

Conference of Parties (COP) is the supreme decision-making body of the convention where all the states are represented. COP is held yearly, unless stated otherwise, and members review the implementation of the Convention as well as other legal instruments adopted by COP. The primary function of COP is reviewing the national communications and emission inventories. That are submitted by individual parties. This helps COP assess the effects of the measures that was taken by the parties and evaluate progress made by the parties in achieving the goals of the Convention.³

1.2 Kyoto Protocol

First Conference of Parties was held in Berlin in 1995, but it was only the third Conference of Parties held in Kyoto in 1997 that brought real legal commitment of individual parties. The output of COP 3, so called Kyoto Protocol operationalized the UNFCCC and committed industrialized countries and economies to targets to limit greenhouse gases. Kyoto protocol was considered as one of the most complex and comprehensive


pieces of international environmental legislation of modern times. However, it was clear from the start, that the targets of this protocol will need additional strengthening.⁴

¹ UNFCCC. What is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change? <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-convention/what-is-the-united-nations-framework-convention-on-climate-change>

² GUPTA, Joyeeta. 2010. „A history of international climate change policy“ pp.636-637 https://wires.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/wcc.67?saml_referrer

³ UNFCCC, 2019. Conference of the Parties (COP). <https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/supreme-bodies/conference-of-the-parties-cop>

⁴ YAMIN, F. (1998), The Kyoto Protocol: Origins, Assessment and Future Challenges. Review of European Community & International Environmental Law, 7: 113-127. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9388.00138>

Graf 1: Climate change legislation over time

Source: Flankhauser S., 2014

https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Climate-change-legislation-over-time_fig1_261870842

Key points of the Kyoto Protocol:

1. Stabilisation of Greenhouse gas in the atmosphere – reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 5,2% below 1990 levels
2. Safe food production
3. Sustainable economic development

The biggest achievement of Kyoto protocol is contained in its Article 3, that include legally binding targets. Kyoto protocol was mostly focused on developed countries, or so-called Annex I. parties. The developed countries were the ones under obligation under the Kyoto protocol, because they are the ones responsible for high levels of greenhouse gas emissions. The main goal was reducing greenhouse gas emissions 5.2% below the 1990 levels. Kyoto protocol brought two different kinds of commitments – Specific emissions commitments and General commitments and allowed Parties to achieve their Specific emissions commitments not only by reducing greenhouse emissions, Joint Implementation but also by so called flexibility mechanism, which consisted of three different actions. Undertaking, financing, or purchasing emissions reductions generated outside their territories.⁵


Key objective of the developing countries during the Kyoto protocol negotiations was to avoid new commitments for developing countries and simultaneously advance the implementation of commitments already existing of all Parties. What was brought by the Kyoto protocol specifically for the developing countries was so called Clean Development Mechanism. This mechanism allowed developing countries to participate on the emission trading. If developing country would have project that reduced emissions and/ or contributed to sustainable development, they could earn credits that can be sold to countries or companies and basically reduce their existing emissions.⁶ More on Clean Development Mechanism timeline and other key facts can be seen below.

Challenges. Review of European Community & International Environmental Law, 7: 113-127. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9388.00138>

⁵ YAMIN, F. (1998), The Kyoto Protocol: Origins, Assessment and Future

⁶ Ibid

Graf 2: Achievements of the Clean Development Mechanism



Source: UNFCCC, 2015.

<http://newsroom.unfccc.int/media/211881/kpinfographiconcdm.png?width=1165px&heighh=825px>

1.3 Doha Amendment

Kyoto protocol has entered into force in February 2005, and its commitment period started from 2008 to 2012. United States were signatories of the protocol however they have not ratified it. Despite the effort to reduce greenhouse emission by developed countries in 20 years from 1990 they have rose by a third. Subsequently with time passed Kyoto protocol is often viewed as flawed and as regressive. Either way the Kyoto Protocol needed an update.⁷

The 18th Conference of the Parties took place in Doha in 2012 and its output was so called Doha amendment to the previous Kyoto agreement.

Doha amendment established second commitment period, that was set from 2013 to 2020, updates list of greenhouse gases that is covered and also unilaterally strengthens commitments of individual parties. Critiques of the Doha amendment (and Kyoto protocol in general) would point out the weakening effect of the protocol. Doha amendment and more importantly the

second commitment period only affects about 14% of global emissions. Actually, most of the countries don't have any commitment including Russia, Japan, the US, Canada and also the developing countries.⁸

Some critiques of Kyoto protocol go as far as calling it a failure and arguing that the design itself contributed to it. According to them even if all parties committed to the protocol, it would still be a failure because the design itself didn't give it a chance to succeed and it was flawed from the start. Few of the "failed design" arguments were short time frame for action which led to the "easy choices" rather than fundamental changes, using net emission measuring of reduction rather than gross emission or open-ended scope of the agreement that foretold future commitment periods also promised repeating the same design flaws.⁹

8 ERBACH, G. (2015), Doha Amendment to the Kyoto protocol. EPRS. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-AaG-559475-Doha-Agreement-Kyoto-Protocol-FINAL.pdf>

9 ROSEN, A.M. (2015), The Wrong Solution at the Right Time: The Failure of the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change. Politics & Policy, 43: 30-58. <https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12105>

7 ROSEN, A.M. (2015), The Wrong Solution at the Right Time: The Failure of the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change. Politics & Policy, 43: 30-58. <https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12105>

Key points of the Paris Agreement:

1. Long- term temperature goal – limiting global temperature increase below 2 degrees Celsius
2. Global peaking and “climate neutrality” – peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible
3. Mitigation – Parties to develop nationally determined contribution and to pursue domestic measures to achieve said contribution
4. Sinks and reservoirs – conservation and enhancement
5. Voluntary cooperation/ Market and non-market-based approaches – voluntary cooperation is recognized and mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions is established
6. Adaptation – all parties should engage in adaptation and adaptation efforts of developing countries should be recognized
7. Loss and Damage – averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage that is associated with effects of climate change
8. Finance, technology, and capacity building support – obligations to support the efforts of developing countries and aim to achieve balance between adaptation and mitigation
9. Climate change education, training, public awareness, participation, and access to information
10. Transparency, implementation, and compliance – flexibility for different capabilities of Parties requires robust transparency and accounting system, mechanism to promote compliance and facilitate implementation is also included
11. Global Stocktake – to take place in 2023 and then every 5 years – aim is to assess collective progress made towards fulfilling the purpose of the Agreement¹¹

1.4 Paris Agreement

After the less than enthusiastic reception of Doha amendment which brought the second commitment period of Kyoto protocol there was clear desire for drastic change. The 21st Conference of Parties in Paris brought new legally binding international treaty on climate change. The Paris Agreement is supposed to follow up the Kyoto protocol but brings few new and more ambitious element to the mix. Representatives of 196 states agreed to adopt the Paris Agreement, which was considered a great success.¹⁰

First of all, Paris Agreement brought commitments to all states, didn't focus on so called developed states as Kyoto protocol did years before. Goal of the Paris Agreement is to switch to carbon neutral economy worldwide by 2050, limit global warming below at least 2 degrees Celsius, ideally 1.5 degrees Celsius in comparison to preindustrial levels. The Paris Agreement works in 5-year cycle of increasingly ambitious

climate action carried out by individual countries. Important part of Paris Agreement is inclusion of non-state actors and also the framework for financial, technical and capacity building support to countries that are requiring it.¹²

The Paris Agreement is a long-term strategy for tackling the climate change but similarly to its predecessor, the Kyoto protocol it has several weak points and obstacles that will have to be overcome. Firstly, the Paris Agreement represents shift of responsibility from international to national actors – therefore the success is greatly dependent on national political situation and some political trends – like right-wing populism represent a challenge (for example Trumps hostile attitude towards climate change and policies and withdrawal of the USA). Second challenge of Paris

¹⁰ Tørstad V.H. (2020) Participation, ambition and compliance: can the Paris Agreement solve the effectiveness trilemma?, *Environmental Politics*, 29:5,761-780, DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2019.1710322

¹¹ UNFCCC, 2018. Key aspects of the Paris Agreement. <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement/key-aspects-of-the-paris-agreement>

¹² UNFCCC. The Paris Agreement. <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement>

Table 1: Comparison of main features of Kyoto Protocol x Paris Agreement

Feature	Kyoto Protocol	Paris Agreement
Main objective	Reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 5,2% below 1990 level	Limit global warming below at least 2 degrees Celsius, ideally 1.5 degrees Celsius in comparison to preindustrial levels
Countries with commitments	Developed countries in 1997	All countries
Greenhouse gases targeted	Selected greenhouse gases	All anthropogenetic greenhouse gases
Timeframe	Two commitment periods, 2008-2012 and 2013 -2020 (second under the Doha Amendment)	Goals primarily achieved by 2025-2030, however remains valid indefinitely

Source: Author

Agreement is very prosaic, it's simply the capacity shortage that can lead to non-compliance or failed targets. This will affect the developing countries more as they have smaller access to measuring and projecting their emissions, therefore also are less advanced in planning their targets. The last but not least potential obstacle is finances. It is closely linked to capacity shortage. This can again be problem mainly for developing countries, as shortage of climate finance will obstruct their access to expertise and technical capacities. This could be partially resolved by the engagement of already mentioned framework for technical, financial, and capacity building framework

less ambitious targets or non-compliance. There are also aspects of the Paris Agreement that promise positive development. Promising is the universality of the agreement, which defines common, long-term goal compared with Kyoto protocol, which did not and only demanded mitigation commitment from industrialized countries. The Paris Agreement engages and also sends signal to all countries, that climate change is not just issue of developed countries, also it remains valid indefinitely for all the states. This is connected to already mentioned inclusion of non-state actors and collaboration with them, which is also one of the qualities of the Agreement.¹³

- however some argue that this isn't sufficient assistance for some developing countries and may lead to

¹³ Tørstad V.H. (2020) Participation, ambition and compliance: can the Paris Agreement solve the effectiveness trilemma?, *Environmental Politics*, 29:5,761-780, DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2019.1710322



CONFERENCE OF PARTIES 25

The COP25 was held under the presidency of Chile in Madrid, Spain in December 2019. The COP 25 was an important Conference as the stakes were high and finalization of the “rulebook” for the Paris Agreement was on the table. Over the last months climate change has become much more debated topic for the govern-

ments as well as for the businesses and public. Public involvement was most noticeable during protests led by movement called Extinction Rebellion or world-wide student strikes most known for their campaigner Greta Thunberg.

2.1 Anticipation

The motto of the Conference of Parties under Chile’s presidency Madrid of 2019 was “Time to act” and most of the science community, civil society and activists couldn’t agree more. Many organizations, think tanks and NGOs have prior to the conference published their concepts and ideas about what should be the outcome of Conference of Parties 25.

The International Institute for Environment and Development have published their Briefing stating the main policies that are anticipated by them. Think tank marks the conference as a “critical touchstone” to achieve the targets of Paris Agreement and according to the Briefing it is essential for the next development of international the climate policy.¹⁴

According to the Institute, progress on key areas of the operational guidelines for Paris Agreement is crucial. Most importantly loss and damage from climate change, market and non- market approaches, and common timeframe for Nationally Determined Contributions. Authors are also stressing the fact, that to meet 1,5 Celsius degrees target a 45% reduction in emission must be made as soon as by 2030.

There needs to be a clear pathway that is going to be consistent with the goals and aligned with the scientists. Importance should be enhanced also on loss and damage mechanism, loss and damage from climate change hugely affects the most vulnerable countries that’s why the Least Developed Countries urgently call for more ambitious climate action and agreement.¹⁵

Many other organizations, think tanks and NGOs hinted beforehand that the bar for COP 25 is set low and that we cannot expect any cataclysmal actions towards resolving or at least significant mitigation of climate change and mostly everybody will agree that they have agreed on the Paris Agreement. On the other hand, some anticipated raise of climate ambitions in the reflection of the climate crisis. But also stated that making progress needed towards fulfilling the goals of the Paris Agreement would be celebration worthy.

World Wildlife Fund also articulated their expectations where they have stated three main objectives that they consider the most important. Firstly, closing the 1.5 Celsius degree gap through sectoral actions and

¹⁴ Kpaka, G. et al. 2019. Ensuring COP 25 delivers increased ambition in 2020. The International Institute for Environmental Development, <http://pubs.iied.org/17734IIED>

¹⁵ Ibid

enhancing the National Determined Contributions. Secondly mobilization of state and non-state actors that will begin rapidly reducing emissions in all sectors

2.2 Results

Conference of Parties 25 was the longest on record yet, it was also preceded by turbulent events. Conference was supposed to take place in Santiago, the capital of Chile, however just over a month before the actual conference president Sebastian Pinera announced that Chile is not going to be able to host the COP25. This unpredictable situation was caused by violent protests and growing unrest in the country. To shuffle the cards even more, the COP 25 was originally supposed to be hosted by Brazil, which pulled out just two months after being announced as the host, officially due to change of government and budgetary restrictions, however as Bolsonaro's view on climate change is not a secret it's obvious that these were only official reasons.¹⁷ In this situation Spain stepped in and offered to organise conference in Madrid, under the presidency of Chile.

Overall COP25 demonstrated very little ambition, first of all very few countries committed to stepping up their commitments under the Paris Agreement- so called Nationally Determined Contributions. This was pushed primarily by island states and least developed countries who emphasized the gap between current situation and the Paris agreement goal of keeping the global temperature rise below 2 Celsius degrees above the preindustrial levels and in best case scenario within 1,5 Celsius degrees. This was behind the urge to stepping up the ambitions however only as few as 79 countries have shown interest in enhancing their commitments under the Paris Agreement, these countries represent just over 10% of global greenhouse emissions.¹⁸ This could be partially overcome by European Green Deal which promises climate neutral economy in EU by 2050.

Article 6 was expected to be one of the key topics during COP25 as it was the last remaining part of

and finally strengthening the multilateral response – finishing the Paris Agreement rulebook – agreeing rules for “Article 6”.¹⁶

Paris Agreement “rulebook” that needed to be sorted. Article 6 should contain rules for carbon market and several other forms of international cooperation. Article 6 would create new international carbon market, govern bilateral cooperation via internationally traded mitigation but also would offer a formal framework for bilateral cooperation in climate such as development and technical aid. It is said to “make or break” the entire Paris Agreement and represents a very high-stakes situation. At COP25 parties were not able to find a consensus and finishing the Paris Agreement “rulebook” was pushed to COP26. The draft lacked strong language mainly concerning sustainable development.¹⁹

Resolution of the Mechanism for Loss and Damage, created in 2013 was important part of COP25 for vulnerable states such as the island states and least developed countries, that are affected on large scale by climate change and have less resources to deal with the aftermath. Outcome of COP25 negotiations was creation of expert group that is going to explore how to enhance action and provide support. Decision was also made on establishing Santiago Network on Loss and Damage that is going to be in charge of technical support. Discussion on financial aspect of the mechanism was largely bypassed, especially one on increasing funds and especially by the United States.²⁰

Climate change affects all the states globally, however the least developed countries have much more aggravated starting point for the resolution of losses and damages caused by climate change as they lack financial and technical resources that are available in developed countries. As seen below, the losses and damages could be both economic and non-economic (for example environmental, individual, or societal).

¹⁶ WWF. 2019. Responding to the Climate Crisis: WWF expectations for COP25. https://wwfint.awsassets.panda.org/downloads/wwf_cop25_expectations_paper___final.pdf


¹⁷ Shukman, D. 2019. Chile cancels climate and Apec summits amid mass protests. BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-50233678>

¹⁸ Dagnet, Y. 2019. COP25: What We Needed, What We Got, What's Next. World Resources Institute. <https://www.wri.org/insights/cop25-what-we-needed-what-we-got-whats-next>

¹⁹ Kachi, A. et al. 2020. Indicators for sustainable development under Article 6 of Paris Agreement. German Environment Agency. <https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/publikationen/indicators-for-sustainable-development-under>

²⁰ Dagnet, Y. 2019. COP25: What We Needed, What We Got, What's Next. World Resources Institute. <https://www.wri.org/insights/cop25-what-we-needed-what-we-got-whats-next>

Graf 3: Selected Significant Climate Anomalies and Events in 2016



Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2017. <https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/service/global/extremes/201613.gif>


On the programme was also tricky topic, finances. Ireland decided to increase its pledge to the Green Climate Fund to 16 million euro. The goal was that rich countries make additional pledges and offer reassurance to the poorer, developing countries. Some countries like Sweden or Spain increase their pledges earlier that year, other joined during the COP25 negotiations like Germany, Belgium, or Norway. But other countries made no new pledges which raised questions and concerns whether the 100 billion dollars target is even reachable. Also, there was no agreement reached on the long-term climate finance. Concerning capacity building the function of the Paris Committee on capacity building was extended, however countries didn't reach an agreement on terms of reference for the expert group which deals with transparency related topics.²¹

Some breakthrough was made concerning people centred climate action. Enhanced Gender Action plan was adopted, plan acknowledges different impact of climate change on men and women. Also, rights of indigenous people are now more protected thanks to work plan that was agreed at COP25. Important work plan for just transition was adopted – six-year workplan deals with the impact of climate action on workers and communities.²²

21 Dagnet, Y. 2019. COP25: What We Needed, What We Got, What's Next. World Resources Institute. <https://www.wri.org/insights/cop25-what-we-needed-what-we-got-whats-next>

22 Dagnet, Y. 2019. COP25: What We Needed, What We Got, What's Next. World Resources Institute. <https://www.wri.org/insights/cop25-what-we-needed-what-we-got-whats-next>

Graf 4: Examples of types of Climate Change Loses and Damages



Source: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2017. https://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/groups_committees/loss_and_damage_executive_committee/application/pdf/online_guide_on_loss_and_damage-dec_2017.pdf

2.3 Reception

The COP25 didn't bring any major deals or positive surprises, even the tasks set from the previous Conference of Parties like finishing "rulebook" for the Paris Agreement, more specific the Article 6 weren't adopted. Therefore, it was no surprise that COP25 negotiations results didn't get very enthusiastic welcome.

During the opening of the COP25 UN officials called for "leadership" and "decisions" but also how time sensitive the issue is and also pointed out action for the most vulnerable, such as refugees, displaced and stateless people. UN Climate Change Executive Secretary Patricia Espinosa said that the decisions are urgent as "we are out of time".²³

As any major deals were postponed and only few commitments were made the UN secretary general, Antonio Guterres voices his disappointment with the

results. According to him important opportunity was wasted. Same aftertaste was palpable from Chilean Conference president and delegates. The COP25 didn't deliver and was full of empty messages.²⁴

There are also opinions that concerning mainly the debate on Article 6, that "no deal" is a better option than a "bad deal". This was for example opinion of Claire Perry O'Neill, former UK climate minister and president of oncoming Conference of Parties in Glasgow. According to O'Neill UK would "pull no punches" in making the scheme work at COP26.²⁵


The World Wildlife Fund expressed their disappointment and stating that COP25 was "staggering failure of leadership by some countries". Scientists call for

²³ UN News. 2019. Deliver significant results now, US General Assembly tells COP25 climate conference. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/12/1053141>

²⁴ Bargués-Pedreny, P. 2019. The Hopes and frustrated Expectations of COP25. Carnegie Europe. <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/80614>

²⁵ Vaughan, A. 2019. COP25 climate summit ends in „staggering failure of leadership“ New Scientist. <https://www.newscientist.com/article/2227541-cop25-climate-summit-ends-in-staggering-failure-of-leadership/>

Key results of COP25



Source: IEMA, 2020. <https://transform.iema.net/article/cop25-outcomes>

the next Conference in Parties to be a turning point as minimum compromise and no deal on important pressing issues is not in line with climate emergency presented by them.²⁶

Both climate activists and scientists were present at the COP25. Climate activists have been drawing attention to the topic of climate change months prior to the conference by protesting, like for example Extinction Rebellion or school strikes. Scientists were presenting their findings and urging the stakeholders to take action. Both groups have been left disappointed and according to them it was a monumental failure. The USA, Russia, China or India and many other of the biggest polluters have been accused of obstructions and some of them were also trying to find loopholes to meet their Paris Agreement commitments.²⁷

2.4 What's next?

Conference of Parties 26 was scheduled for November 2020 and was supposed to be held in Glasgow with the UK as the presiding country, however it was postponed for November 2021 due to the worldwide pandemic crisis. After the disappointing outcomes of COP25 many voices rose up asking, if there is even need for conference and talks, when they are unable to bring decisions and leadership in time of crisis. But

To protest the lack of action taken by the representatives hundreds of people occupied the main plenary hall of the COP25. Activists made common cause together with Indigenous leaders and other civil society groups and demanded rich developed countries to take action. Security pushed out all of the members of civil societies out of the venue and some were stripped of badges.²⁸

This was not the first protest action during Conference of Parties held in Madrid. Tens of thousands of people gathered in Madrid during first days of the conference. Organisers even estimated that half a million people were present. Their goal? More ambitious climate change policy. Simultaneously there was protest held in Santiago, Chile – this year's presidency country of Conference of Parties. Protests were joined by speakers like Javier Bardem or Greta Thunberg, who was also a speaker at the conference.²⁹

if in 2019 it was necessary to deliver and finalize the Paris Agreement rulebook, in 2021 it is inevitable. COP26 will most importantly have to catch up with the unfinished tasks of COP25 and only after it can focus on anything else. The conference would also need to deal with the aftermath of the coronavirus pandemic and the way to make the recovery plans sustainable.

²⁶ Ibid

²⁷ John, T. et al. 2019. COP25 was meant to tackle the climate crisis. It fell short. CNN <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/15/world/cop25-climate-change-intl/index.html>

²⁸ Leonard, N. 2019. Protesters kicked out of CO25, stripped of badges. 350.org. <https://350.org/civil-society-kicked-out-of-cop25/>

²⁹ BBC. 2019. COP25: Thousands gather for change climate protest in Madrid. BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50694361>

With the conference date approaching the faith of the event is still uncertain, as there are some discussions about whether the conference is going to take place or will be again postponed due to the pandemic situation. The approach of this year's event president, the United Kingdom, will actually determine the nature of the whole conference. If the UK is going to take the presidency over the event and its substance serious it may give it some chance of success, however, ambivalent approach from the presiding country can bury the conference before it even begun. The path the UK decides to take is still uncertain similarly to the answer on whether the event is going to be postponed again or not. Some have pointed out that the representatives of the UK government, especially the Foreign Secretary and the chancellor of the Exchequer are not taking the issue seriously and are not exuding enough of a sense of urgency. On the other hand, the government insiders insist that it is the highest priority, and everything is being arranged. UK government even offered to provide vaccines against the corona virus for the delegates.³⁰ There are also other possible plans in motion, such as partially relaxing the travel restrictions and strict UK vaccination rules to allow thousands of delegates and attendees to travel to the UK. This information was released as the UNs Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change releases a report that warns about the ticking clock that are on the decision making concerning the control of global warming. Report urges the world leaders to adopt ambitious plans at the upcoming conference of parties and not to delay any longer, not the conference and not the decision as the climate change is still happening even during world-wide pandemic.³¹

The 2020 was meant to be a year of climate ambition and the COP26 in Glasgow was supposed to be culmination point of intense diplomatic debates. Plan undone by the world-wide pandemic and its impacts meant that governments had to respond with economic relief and recovery packages, while still immense funds are needed to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, and there is a menace that states, already in deficit from the pandemic aid are not going to deliver. However, the global response to the pandemic will partially determine the future of climate policy, it may either direct it, with the help of the recovery package, towards a more sustainable

way, or make it even more rigid and cemented in the old high-emission pathways. The upcoming COP26, and UK as the presiding country of the conference should urge its partners to not only provide stimulus packages, but provide them in sustainable form – for example support sustainable businesses or provide bigger stimulus if business is willing to “go green”.³²

Key goals to be achieved at COP26 are according to the presidency primarily securing global net zero by 2050 and keeping 1.5 Celsius degree within reach. This should be reached by ambitious 2030 emission reduction targets that should be proposed by the means of individual countries. These proposals should also bear in mind the net zero by 2050. The main focus should be on phase-out of coal, major investments in renewables and faster switch to electric vehicles. Another key feature of the COP26 should be finalising the Paris Agreement “rulebook”, which means development with the Article 6. Under Adapt to protect communities and natural habitat is hiding Loss and Damage mechanism, as UK presidency points out that changing climate has affected communities already and will continue to do so. Final key goal of COP26 focuses on money, as they are urging countries to deliver on their promise to raise at least one hundred billion dollars a year.³³

COP26 is expected to be the most important climate conference since 2015 meeting in Paris, and there are huge expectations to be met. More than 100 developing countries have set out their demands in the form of position paper and according to them, without significant progress on these points the conference will end in failure.³⁴

30 Parker, J. 2021. COP26: How serious is the government about climate conference? BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-58107010>

31 Kirka, D. 2021. UK vows maximum attendance at the COP-26 summit as COVID lingers. The Washington Post.

32 Obergassel W., Lukas Hermwille & Sebastian Oberthür (2020) Harnessing international climate governance to drive a sustainable recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, Climate Policy, DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2020.1835603

33 COP26 EXPLAINED, 2021.UN Climate change conference UK 2021. <https://2nsbq1gn1rl23zol93eyrcj-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/COP26-Explained.pdf>

34 McGrath, M. 2021. Climate change: „No more excuses“ at COP26 climate summit- poor nations. BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-57839368>

CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN THE EU

EU shaped international climate policy since the first Climate Change convention in 1991, where EU not only provided leadership but pushed for stronger international commitments. During Kyoto protocol negotiations EU showed its leadership in the field of climate change politics as it accepted the highest emission reduction target among the major developed countries. However, the impact of the EU is still weaker as for example the influence of the US. EU's influence accelerated during 2001, when US under Bush Administration declared opposition to the Kyoto Protocol, EU was key player in saving the protocol. The EU is using

mostly “soft power” to accomplish their climate policy goals on international level. It is using its economic and political power as well as acting as a role model and leading by example.³⁵

Not only in view of the EU has been the UNFCCC process slow in delivering the outcomes necessary to start the path towards stable climate. That's why EU is trying to lead with a good example, however it is more than obvious it cannot succeed on its own. Without other major economies (and major polluters) joining in its impossible to achieve goals set in Paris Agreement.

3.1 European Green Deal

The European Green Deal was presented on 11th December 2019 by a European Commission. This was happening at the same time as the COP25 took place in Madrid. It was a flicker of light and hope for many in a quite bleak mood caused by unsatisfying course of ongoing climate conference.

Key points of the European Green Deal:


1. Climate neutral Europe – aim to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emission by 2050.
2. Circular Economy – more sustainable product policy, reusing and recycling of materials and less new materials used for production
3. Building renovation – “at least double or even triple” renovation of buildings
4. Zero- pollution – pollution free environment by 2050
5. Ecosystem and biodiversity – leading by example

6. Farm to fork strategy – “Green and healthier agriculture” system reducing pesticides, fertilisers, and antibiotics
7. Transport – supporting electric vehicles, sustainable alternative fuels and updating CO2 emission standards for cars
8. Money – “leave no-one behind”
9. R&D and innovation – 35% of EU's research will be reserved for climate-friendly technologies.
10. External relations – EU is expecting “rest of the world to play a role” – diplomatic efforts to global support of the Green Deal³⁶

³⁵ Oberthür, S. & Roche Kelly, C. (2008) EU Leadership in International Climate Policy: Achievements and Challenges, *The International Spectator*, 43:3,35-50, DOI: 10.1080/03932720802280594

³⁶ Simon, F. 2019. EU Commission unveils “European Green Deal”: Key points. Euractiv.com <https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/eu-commission-unveils-european-green-deal-the-key-points/>

Graf 5: The European Green Deal



Source: European Commission, 2019. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=comnat:COM_2019_0640_FIN_ENG.xhtml.COM_2019_0640_FIN_ENG_12002.jpg

Aim of European Green Deal is to make Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050. This should be done while boosting the economy, improving health of citizens and their quality of life, preserve nature and leaving no one behind. European Green Deal was presented by president of the commission Ursula von der Leyen as well as executive Vice-President Frans Timmermans, von der Leyen Commission declared climate policy their top priority since the beginning of their mandate. The European Green Deal provide a roadmap, it outlines needed investments and explain how to ensure a just and inclusive transition. It covers all sectors of the economy and also thinks about the most vulnerable ones with so called Just Transition Mechanism – this mechanism will support regions that rely heavily on activities linked intensively with carbon.³⁷

The European Green Deal is drafted a way, so it has both short-term and medium-term goals until 2030 and long-term goals till 2050. The most ambitious one being climate-neutral continent by 2050. Article 2.1 states that *“Union-wide emissions and removals of greenhouse gases regulated in Union law shall be*

balanced at least by 2050, thus reducing emissions to net zero by that date”.³⁸ The European Green Deal contains many initiatives and mechanisms which together aim to achieve that climate neutrality by 2050. Some of them are for example European Climate Law whose role is to enshrine the 2050 climate-neutrality into EU law, European Climate Pact that should engage citizens and other parts of society in climate action, 2030 Climate Target Plan, one of the mid-term goals according to which greenhouse gas emissions should be further reduced at least 55% by 2030 and EU Strategy on Climate Adaptation to make Europe a climate-resilient society by 2050, one that is fully adapted to unavoidable impacts of climate change.³⁹


Assessing progress made by the member states towards the climate neutrality and other goals on both national and Union measure will be Commission. Even if it may seem that enforcement of the outlined goals and commitments is relatively weak, the proposed authority of the Commission is quite strong. The

³⁷ European Commission, 2019. The European Green Deal press release. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_6691

³⁸ European Commission, 2019. The European Green Deal. COM(2019) 640 final. Brussels, 11 December 2019.

³⁹ Siddi, M. 2020. The European Green Deal: Assessing its current state and future implementation. Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Pp.14. https://iris.unica.it/retrieve/handle/11584/313484/457281/WP114_European%20Green%20Deal.pdf

Graf 6: The EU will



Source: European Commission, 2019.

Commission should review targets in five years period by delegated acts, without having to go through European Parliament negotiations or member states. This would strengthen the position of the Commission and allow it to be more flexible and act faster, however it also could be deal breaker for some member states. Commission tried to overcome this by self-regulating and by putting strict limits on power to adopt delegation act.⁴⁰

As for today all 27 EU member states have committed to the European Green Deal and agreed to follow the roadmap to turning the EU into the first climate neutral continent by 2050. Actions are divided into several subcategories such as Research and innovation, Climate, Energy, Agriculture, Industry, Transport, Environment and oceans, Finance and regional development.

The European Green Deal has also geopolitical aspects. For a start such dramatic structural change will affect economic partners of EU, such as Russia, where in 2019 more 60 percent of EU imports from Russia were energy products. This will alert EU relationship with this energy suppliers but also, because the EU is relatively large buyer it might affect the energy market in general – the EU for example accounts for 20 percent of global crude oils. On the

other hand, the EU will be importing more products that serve as inputs for clean energy and technologies, which will also account for bigger dependency of the EU. The European Green Deal and switch to clean energy will also impact the EU's competitiveness. Companies will be obligated to take on regulation related costs, which will make it harder for them to compete as on the European market as well as on the global one. The EU is trying to solve this problem, at least on its own market by imposing tariffs on carbon rich products. This however will not solve the ability of products to compete on global market and also puts the EU in the danger of being accused of distorting international trade. Last but not least, activities of the EU are not done in a bubble, the climate change is a global problem and can only be solved globally. Some even go as far as saying, that that Europe's transition to zero carbon economy would not do much in mitigating climate change, because Europe represents less than 10 percent of world's greenhouse gas emissions. Green deal might displace Europe's greenhouse gas emissions to other countries and in the end, it will have no effect on the climate. The EU, in the light of these threats in order for The Green Deal to work, has to become much stronger negotiator on the international climate change policy field and push for multilateral agreements on containing global warming.⁴¹

3.2 Future of the European Green Deal


The European Green Deal is an ambitious project that requires the utmost attention and effort. However, the outburst of coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) epidemic

and connected public health crisis will probably drive away some part of attention and also finances. When the European economies finally enter the recovery phase the urgency of resolving the climate crisis and

40 Siddi, M. 2020. The European Green Deal: Assessing its current state and future implementation. Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Pp.14. https://iris.unica.it/retrieve/handle/11584/313484/457281/WP114_European%20Green%20Deal.pdf

41 Leonard, M. et al., 2021. 'The geopolitics of the European Green Deal', Policy Contribution 04/2021, Bruegel <https://euagenda.eu/upload/publications/pc-04-greendeal-2021-1.pdf>

Graf 7: What will we do?



Source: European Commission, 2019.

mitigating climate change will not disappear. However, there is a risk that states will mostly focus on resolving the aftermath of coronavirus lockdown and crisis, and neglect the climate action, which will resolve into not meeting the mid-term commitments of the European Green Deal.⁴²

Some of the member states are already voicing their concern and calling for moderation of climate measures and commitments. It seems like climate policy is no longer first priority of the EU, at least of its members. Some on the other hand see the European Green Deal as a way out from the pandemic crisis. It could be an opportunity to accelerate the transition towards carbon neutrality while supporting the return to the prosperity, also the pandemic crisis is crisis of public health care, just transition away from fossil fuel will be

42 Elkerbout, M. et al. 2020. The European Green Deal after Corona: Implications for EU climate policy. Policy Insights, No 2020-6. <https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/the-european-green-deal-after-corona/>

not improving only planetary health but also public health and consequently the health system.⁴³

In a short-term measure, which is already visible, the emissions are declining due to the pandemic crisis. The extent of the decline will be depending on the restriction imposed by governments and their duration, also on the magnitude if the consequent economic contraction. This will be very likely by just short time decline of emissions, for example after economic crisis between 2008 and 2009 emissions declined by nearly 10 percent but jumped right back by 2013. In a long-term measure it's going to be crucial that the economic recovery and stimulus measures will be compatible with Green Deal priorities. To ensure that the EU's climate action is not going to be undermined by the crisis and following recovery it is at the utmost importance that climate issues and decarbonisation will not mean opportunistic jumps on board of any fiscal stimulus available.⁴⁴

The opportunity in the coronavirus crisis is also to in the financial, stimulus measures, in the way to favour the climate -neutral alternatives to the carbon-intensive ones. The crisis will provide an accidental experiment in “degrowth” as a climate strategy. The coronavirus crisis tests the abilities of the Green Deal but also the will of the member states to commit to it. The crisis will require the EU to think big and “out of the box” to make full use of the opportunities that crisis brings while avoiding easy and popular short-term measures that are going to backfire in the future.⁴⁵



43 Sanches Nicolás, E. 2020. Will coronavirus torpedo the Green Deal? EUOBSERVER. <https://euobserver.com/coronavirus/147815>

44 Elkerbout, M. et al. 2020. The European Green Deal after Corona: Implications for EU climate policy. Policy Insights, No 2020-6. <https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/the-european-green-deal-after-corona/>

45 Ibid



EUROPEAN UNION AS A LEADER IN CLIMATE POLICY

4.1 Development of the leader

The European Green Deal is a next step for the EU to become leader in international climate policy. Its goal is to lead by an example; however, it's going to take much more than a draft of an ambitious law to truly lead in international circles. The EU has taken voluntarily role of becoming a laboratory for environmental governance. Goal of the EU to play first fiddle in matter of international climate policy was obvious already in the late eighties. The goal of the EU was in the beginning of development of international climate policy to take a "strong leading role" particularly in the relation to the United States. Although the EU was trying to enforce more ambitious goals already in the last decade of the 20th century it was rolled over by the US constraint to relent their proposal and accept compromise. Proclaimed leadership of the EU in the early years of the international climate policy can be seen more or less as ambivalent.⁴⁶

During the Kyoto negotiations EU's role as a leader was mere symbolic status as it didn't bring significant measures and road maps to the table to back up its rhetoric. After the 2001 announcement of the President of the United States, George W. Bush, that the US will not ratify the Kyoto protocol it seemed that the effort of the last years is destroyed. However unfortunate this may have looked after the US announcement; this situation brought the opportunity for the EU to step up and become an actual leader. The Environmental Council agreed that the EU should still pursue the ratification process of the

Kyoto Protocol and after strong lobbying from the EU, both Japan and Russia finally ratified Kyoto Protocol. During the phase of Kyoto Protocol implementation and follow-up negotiation period meeting of the European Council affirmed the leadership of the European Union in climate policy when it adopted so called "20-20-20" climate and energy package. This package contained binding CO₂ reduction targets, renewable energy target and non-binding target of improved energy efficiency.⁴⁷

COP 15 took place in 2009 in Copenhagen and two working groups were supposed to finish their work on post-2012 climate change action. This brought extremely high expectations for the COP 15 and the meeting was held to a very high standard. However serious negotiations didn't start until the very last days of the meeting. The resulting document, so called The Copenhagen Accord, was rather political than legal or legally binding document and was extremely vague, leaving many gaps to be filled in later. The Copenhagen Accord was seen as a weak document and was negotiated without direct involvement of the EU at the crucial stage of the negotiations. This often marked as a low point of the ambition of the EU's climate policy leadership. During the following conferences of parties (COP16, COP17, COP20) EU tried to recover its status as a leader in the climate change policy and basically made it possible for the follow up agreement.⁴⁸

46 Wurzel, R.K.W., Connelly, J., & Liefferink, D. (Eds.). (2016). *The European Union in International Climate Change Politics: Still Taking a Lead?* (1st ed.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315627199>

47 Ibid

48 Bodansky, D. 2010. The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem. *The American Journal of International Law*, 104(2), 230-240. doi:10.5305/amerjintlaw.104.2.0230

The follow up agreement, known as the Paris Agreement, was adopted in December 2015 in Paris and it was viewed as a marvellous success. Countries committed themselves to achieve peak of global greenhouse gas emission in the very near future, or as soon as possible. The inclusion of quite ambitious goals came as a surprise even to the EU policy makers and negotiators and it was very well received by the environmental NGOs. The Paris Agreement has brought different approach compared to the Kyoto Protocol, the new agreement included bottom-up approach, where states would voluntarily bring to the table national reduction pledges. The original top-down approach of the Kyoto Protocol was initially favoured by the EU representation and consisted of legally binding reduction targets that were accredited beforehand. The EU however later accepted the new, bottom-up tactics after it became more and more apparent that other strong players such as India, China or the United States are not going to accept the previous top-down approach. Small victory could be assigned to the EU during the negotiations of the Paris Agreement, as the EU succeeded in its demands that these voluntary pledges are going to be enshrined in a legally binding treaty which stipulates a five-yearly review and other transparency measures. The EU acted both as a leader and as a mediator in the Paris Agreement negotiations, these tactics helped the EU to restore its status of international climate policy leader that had suffer greatly during the Copenhagen climate conference of 2009⁴⁹

Even though the COP21 and resulting Paris agreement was viewed as an unexpected success, both by the participants of the conference and by the observers from the public and the non-profit organizations the actual negotiations about the “rulebook” of the Paris Agreement were, as we know now, far from over. The so-called rulebook wasn’t finalized during the following conference of parties, and it was still a stumbling-block during the COP25 that took place in 2019. The unfinalized rulebook of the Paris Agreement was the main reason why was this conference viewed as unsuccessful and this issue is still to be resolved during the upcoming conference of parties that is to be held in the UK. There is enormous pressure to finalize the “rulebook” during the upcoming conference and some even go as far as saying that if it is not finalized the Paris Agreement would end in vain. This means even higher expectations from the COP26, which was

already postponed due to the coronavirus pandemic as it is also viewed as the last chance to mitigate the effects of the climate change.

There was however one flash of hope for the observers of the unfulfilled COP25, during the last days of the conference, the European Commission announced its new climate change policy, the Green Deal. European Green Deal is an ambitious climate policy by means of which EU is planning to “lead by an example”. The development of EU’s climate policy and climate governance reaches as far back as its aspiration to be a global leader in international climate change policy. There are several important milestones that are worth mentioning, such as 2002/2003 adoption of greenhouse gas emissions across member states and establishment of the emission trading scheme or subsequently the Climate and Energy Package for 2020. This was followed by the Climate and Energy Policy framework for 2030 and all of climate targets included in these proposals gradually strengthened. The climate change aspect is slowly spilling over into other policies and fields, some of the examples are transport, industry, construction and measures predominantly focus on climate change mitigation, while the adaptation for climate change policies are often rather neglected on the EU level.⁵⁰

Ambitious Green Deal is designed to fulfil one of the main goals of the new European Commission led by the President Ursula von der Leyen, which was proclaimed to be energy transition. The Green Deal is focused predominantly on the member states but has fragments that are overlapping into the international politics and by all means will have an effect on states outside the EU as well. The EU is also trying to pursue range of direct and indirect resources to influence non-members and their behaviour towards mitigating the climate change. The EU is not only trying to exert the so-called leadership by example, but also planning to imply other models of leadership such as “leadership by assistance”, “leadership by power” or “leadership by multilateralism”.⁵¹

One of the most controversial parts of the international aspects included in the Green Deal is so called car-

49 Wurzel, R.K.W., Connelly, J., & Liefferink, D. (Eds.). (2016). *The European Union in International Climate Change Politics: Still Taking a Lead?* (1st ed.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315627199>

50 von Homeyer, I. & Sebastian Oberthür & Andrew J. Jordan 2021 EU climate and energy governance in times of crisis: towards a new agenda, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 28:7, 959-979, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2021.1918221

51 Grimm, S. et al 2020. *The Global Dimension of the European Green Deal: The EU as a Green Leader?* DIE - German Development Institute. https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/The_Global_Dimension_of_the_European_Green_Deal_-_The_EU_as_a_Green_Leader.pdf

bon boarder tax. Carbon boarder tax would simply be a tax imposed on the products entering the EU that are produced unsustainably, their production have substantial carbon footprint. This step exasperated many partners of the EU, most predominantly Russia. This tool, also known as anti-climate-dumping tool, should ensure that products that doesn't fulfil sustainable manufacturing criteria have additional levies added to them. This should protect domestic products that are going to be manufacture sustainably under the new Green Deal and give them kind of a head start and advantage. At the same time, it's an effort to somehow motivate companies located outside the EU to voluntarily comply new sustainability EU rules. Carbon boarder tax however may be in a conflict WTO rules which was pointed out by the Russia's economic development minister, Maxim Reshetnikov. Russian even went as far, that they threatened to sue the EU for prepared carbon tax.⁵² Other countries with similar objections and complaints concerning the Green Deal or at least some of its parts will probably follow.

4.2 Leadership in times of crisis

The EU has achieved so far all of its climate and energy targets, sometimes even well before set deadlines. This happened despite of not always the most suitable circumstances often referred to as "polycrisis".⁵⁴ This would include for example the economic and financial crisis of the late 2000s. It is widely known that during political or any other crisis, especially crisis of economic and financial character the environmental and climate change policies (same goes for example for the department of culture and its policies) are usually derailed and are not a priority for the government anymore. The EU still managed to fulfil their environmental obligations, even though the financial crisis wasn't the only one that the EU had to deal with. Connected to the financial crisis was also decline of the popularity and also it was hit by the UKs vote to leave and its subsequent abandonment of the union. This only plays into the cards of ones

With the Green Deal the external climate policy of the EU became more assertive, focusing especially on the international trade, therefore it didn't come as a great surprise that this has received mixed reactions. The EU could be looking for new partners among the emerging economies – as the global economic power is shifting the number of potential new partners is rising.⁵³ Although the Green Deal is predominantly matter concerning the member states to fulfil its greater sentiment means to cooperate with external partners outside the EU as well. Climate change is a global problem that affects all off the states and all of its citizens. Unfortunately impacts of the climate change will be first experienced by the most vulnerable states and by the most vulnerable groups in the population. To interact with the emerging economies and somehow to get them on board can be decent first step for the EU, but it needs to get as many states involved for it to have any significant impact on the climate change.

saying that the EU is going through some kind of disintegration or dismantling of its structures and that member states will not be willing to cede any more of their competences, more likely the other way round, the member states would demand some of the competences already submitted to the EU. Other scientist and environmental activists oppose that the aftermath of crisis, especially the economic one, presents unique opportunity to remodel the existing model of the dominant neoliberal paradigm and impose strict changes and reforms that would lead low growth model or ideally to no-growth model⁵⁵

However, there were several crisis trends that the EU had to deal with. Socio-political divisions or an identity cleavage that changed the predominant left-right political cleavage has emerged. This change can be attributed to the transfer of state powers into the hands of the EU, growing globalization, generational changes and connected change of values but also significant repudiation of the liberal and cosmopolitan values. This could be also explained by the rising economic inequality, shift towards knowledge economy and the accelerating progress and changes.

52 Morgan, S. 2020. Moscow cries foul over EU's planned carbon boarder tax. Euractiv https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/moscow-cries-foul-over-eus-planned-carbon-border-tax/?_ga=2.22905842.856753218.1596552551-290821978.1545145170

53 Grimm, S. et all 2020. The Global Dimension of the European Green Deal: The EU as a Green Leader? DIE – German Development Institute. https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/The_Global_Dimension_of_the_European_Green_Deal_-

54 von Homeyer, I. & Sebastian Oberthür & Andrew J. Jordan 2021 EU climate and energy governance in times of crisis: towards a new agenda, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 28:7, 959-979, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2021.1918221

55 Burns Ch., Peter Eckersley & Paul Tobin (2020) EU environmental policy in times of crisis, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 27:1, 1-19, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2018.1561741

This meant that in the EU we have noted increase of Eurosceptic, populist, and nationalistic parties or party fractions. These trends have already been noted during the 1990s but have grown considerably after the year 2000. This had led to certain disinclination to further integration. The best example of this effect could be Brexit, but it has buried also other policies, most notably ones concerning migration crisis. This also enhanced cleavages and differences across the continent, East-West (migration) division as well as North-South (Euro crisis). It is suggested that these new socio-political divisions have affected the climate-change policy, for example the new emerged nationalistic and populist movements have tendencies to be sceptical towards environmental and climate change policies.⁵⁶

Connected to the already mentioned movements and parties of the nationalistic and populist character, is the post-factual times, or more accurately the post-factual forms of political communication. Post-factual form of political communications represents the tendency of purposely disregarding facts, obscuring reality, questioning scientific methods, and presenting some kind of alternative truth. This type of politically motivated dissemination of information and disregarding of facts has an aim of shaking the role of the establishment and introduce new role models, especially the political ones that are presenting such a “truth”. This tactic is undermining trust of citizens in established leadership and also expert-based policymaking. The post-factual political communication has risen especially with growing popularity of social media and their perception as a media outlet or some source of information. It has definitely had its impact on the EU and its policymaking, as it is relying mostly on expert-input and expert-based policy making to design and substantiate its policies. This has already affected the course of Brexit, as well as the 2019 European Parliament elections, as the misinformation and conspiracy theories had spread through the internet, most predominantly through the social media shortly before the vote took place. This can have overwhelming effect on the climate change policy because it relies on expertise and scientific information it is vulnerable towards the post-factual political communication.⁵⁷

Another crisis trend is connected to the growing legitimacy challenges, reliance on output legitimacy at the expense of input legitimacy has led to vulnerability of many liberal democratic institutions. This trend is supported by delegating of partial tasks to the independent bodies which are in eyes of citizens lacking legitimacy as they haven't been elected. This is placing established parties under the burden of vulnerability and on the contrary giving the new often protest parties, often abusing already mentioned post-factual rhetoric and new socio-political division, the benefit and advantage. This crisis has most definitely materialised in the EUs politics, as the EU is heavily relying on the output legitimacy and famously lacking the input one. This is the matrix structure for Eurosceptic voices who portray the EU as an elite institution torn from the reality that only serves the rich and powerful elite. The EU and its institutions are often referred to as Eurocrats, Brussels officers, “the west” or “Germans”, and their policies are snidely called the “Brussels dictate”. Studies however show that environmental and climate change policy is in all likelihood immune to the legitimacy challenges surrounding the EU policies and still enjoys quite a good deal of output legitimacy and public support.⁵⁸

Additional crisis trends are linked to the international politics, firstly we are experiencing geopolitical shifts. The politics is becoming multipolar, there are emerging economies and more and more evident competition between the US and China. Emerging economies are competing with the already emerged ones and they are adopting more and more aggressive stances and tactics to outpace their competitors. This affects the EU greatly, as the one of traditional powers it is losing its influence and its weight is declining. This makes it harder to influence other actors to join in on climate change laws proposed (for example the Paris Agreement). Contrariwise this has also somehow strengthened the EU, because the member states are relying on the union more than ever to pursue their international objectives and goals, as they can do it more effectively via the union in the multipolar world. Concerning the EU climate change policy and climate governance, the declining influence of the EU means also declining leadership in the climate change governance, this is only supported by the marginal fact that because of emerging economies and the EUs success in hitting the emission targets global emissions

56 von Homeyer, I. & Sebastian Oberthür & Andrew J. Jordan 2021 EU climate and energy governance in times of crisis: towards a new agenda, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 28:7, 959-979, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2021.1918221

57 Ibid

58 von Homeyer, I. & Sebastian Oberthür & Andrew J. Jordan 2021 EU climate and energy governance in times of crisis: towards a new agenda, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 28:7, 959-979, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2021.1918221

of the EU have diminished which have also had some influence on the diminution of its influence. Globalisation and technological advances have reduced the effectiveness of governance on national level and international cooperation cannot fully substitute for it. While the EU can be understood as an attempt to increase governance capacity, however the transfer of competences from the national level to the EU has faced remonstrance from the national level. Even though specifically the climate change policies and climate governance has not had issue with this type of crisis and has experienced quite steady growth it may struggle with this in the future when its goals are even more ambitious.⁵⁹

Crisis that could not have been predicted was the world-wide pandemic that hit Europe in 2020. It has not only affected the health of citizens but also the economics and healthcare. The EU has proposed major funds for the post corona recovery, which is at this time nowhere near, as numbers and scientist predict third wave to peak sometime in the autumn of 2021.⁶⁰ Pandemic meant not only great loses of lives but brought also immense strains on the national budget. This can mean, that the countries, already in the deficit from the excessive expenditures will not be willing to invest additional finances required to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement. However, the packages and the whole crisis can be also seen as an opportunity and the way out of this crisis can be seen as a crossroad as the recovery packages can have a long-lasting impact. They could either be in accordance with the goals of Paris Agreement or can hinder its fulfilment. This is also a chance for the international governance, and the EU as leading power in climate change governance, to step in and help to manage situation that originated from the pandemic crisis.⁶¹

The international governance, and the EU as a main subject and leader of climate change policy, have several options how to promote sustainable recovery from the crisis. First could be summarized as a guidance, as the governments are dealing with unprecedented situation, they are actually looking for a model that works and they can copy, international

institution should help by sending them signal on the urgency and providing guidance in sustainable action plan for the post pandemic recovery. For example, the UN Secretary-General Guterres have several times called out for the countries to “build back better”. This has to be heavily advertised and debated especially on the upcoming COP26 in Glasgow. This conference brought considerable expectations even before the pandemic, and the pressure only got higher. Guidance provided by the international governance could be supported by a clear set of rules and standards, more in form of recommendation than in a form of legally binding regulation, of how to create sustainable stimulus packages for post pandemic recovery. This set of “good practices”, if agreed by a broad consensus, could secondhandedly pressure states to follow these practices. Some institutions have already developed their set of rules; however, they lack broad international consensus, they are not officially negotiated documents, but rather papers developed by technical staff that have little to no weight and have no political backing.⁶²

Another path of how to motivate countries, to opt for the sustainable stimulus package and overall post pandemic recovery, is to back it up with a data and science. Collecting and analysing data to show the states that are “the best” and to what extent they are designing and implementing sustainable recovery packages can motivate the less successful countries in sustainable recovery to do better. Means of implementation (financial, technical...) can be considered as a very successful motivator, if not the most successful one. In this specific case however with the pandemic crisis still not in its final days as well as economic burden connected to that, as well as potential economic crisis following it is going to be extremely difficult to persuade even the biggest supporters of sustainable policies and climate neutral future to commit funds for this goal. Also, the post pandemic recovery would drain a lot of funds from one and every country hit by the pandemic and the recovery, sustainable or not, is going to be a priority and probably even reach for funds initially meant for the climate change policies. The money shortage is going to be connected not only to the recovery stimulus packages but will be also caused by the loss of income from various spheres. This would especially hit countries that are relying on tourism, as this sector is stricken the most and will continue to be such for several more months.

59 von Homeyer, I. & Sebastian Oberthür & Andrew J. Jordan 2021 EU climate and energy governance in times of crisis: towards a new agenda, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 28:7, 959-

60 UN News. 2021 „Early stages“ of COVID third wave, amid Delta surge: WHO chief. United Nations. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/07/1095882>

61 Obergassel W., Lukas Hermwille & Sebastian Oberthür (2020) Harnessing international climate governance to drive a sustainable recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, *Climate Policy*, DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2020.1835603

62 Ibid

The international governance could also provide policy learning experience for individual countries – help to identify what kinds of recovery policies have advanced the climate transition and by this promote mutual learning.⁶³

The worldwide pandemic crisis created shock for the global economy, this will for sure affect the progress on the climate change, the way how it will affect it is still under construction and can be worked with. The most important component of this being fiscal recovery packages, that have the biggest long-term impact on climate. If the pandemic crisis is taken as an opportunity funds can be invested in productive assets for the long-term climate goals. Green, sustainable fiscal recovery packages can be seen as a resolution for two problems, they can not only help to revive the

economy, but also can decouple economic growth from the green house emissions. We have witnessed short term greenhouse gas emission reduction due to the lockdown, however their long-term effect is marginal. While it is saddening that many workers lost their livelihood due to the pandemic, it can be also looked at as a stepping-stone for their retraining and adaptation for the new, sustainable positions as well as an opportunity to reduce existing inequalities. Ones that existed before the pandemic as well as the ones emerging during it. If the pandemic crisis is taken as an opportunity it may lead to an actual fulfilment of the Paris Agreement goals. Finally, according to scholars recovery packages that are sustainable and try to find synergies between the climate and economic goals have better long term prospects as in the economic, environmental, but also social field.⁶⁴

4.3 Future of the European climate leadership

Walker and Biedenkopf have proposed 4 scenarios for the future of EU climate leadership in their 2018 article. First scenario is, that the internal collapse curtails the EU's international role. In this scenario authors develop theory that affected by the internal crisis, result of Brexit, the internal motivation and ambition of the EU as a leader will disappear. Authors support this theory by Polish led group which is advocating for lower internal climate ambitions of the EU. Second scenario predicts internal domino effect that would create unsurmountable hurdles. This scenario predicts that EU climate leadership is threatened, both by internal implosion and explosion of external dynamics creating too challenging situation for the EU to hold its leadership without external strong allies. This is supported by the US initial withdrawal from the Paris Agreement that was done by President Trump (later overturned by President Biden). This situation would, according to the authors, disrupt the international environment so much that it would have an impact on the behaviour of other actors that would subsequently lower their climate ambition. Third scenario describes opposite outcome of the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. In this scenario the EU would rise to the opportunity and take on the role of true leader, something along the line of the previous saving of the Kyoto Protocol. According to the authors this would act as a push and the EU would rise to the challenge

and use all available resources to successfully deliver ambitious international climate policy as the one on the national, in this case European level. The last, fourth scenario, prognosticates strengthening of the partnership between the EU and China. Because singlehanded climate leadership is the most ambitious and probably the least likely scenario the EU is going to search for a partner. In this scenario the EU and China will join their powers to fill up the original position of the US.⁶⁵

Now, just three years later seem all of these scenarios rather unlikely. Since then, the U.S. re-joined the Paris Agreement under the President Biden, the EU introduced Green Deal, extremely ambitious plan to reach carbon neutrality by 2050, recent conferences of parties have not led to finalization of the rulebook for the Paris Agreement and its success hangs in the balance and, not to forget, global COVID 19 pandemic that postponed COP26, but also led to countless national quarantines.


As mentioned, several times, the Green Deal is extremely ambitious, the content is more or less somewhere along the same lines as the Paris Agreement,

63 Obergassel W., Lukas Hermwille & Sebastian Oberthür (2020) Harnessing international climate governance to drive a sustainable recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, *Climate Policy*, DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2020.1835603

64 Hepburn, C. et al. 2020: Will COVID-19 fiscal recovery packages accelerate or retard progress on climate change?, *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, Volume 36, Issue Supplement_1, Pages S359–S381, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/graa015>

65 Walker, H., & Biedenkopf, K. (2018). The historical evolution of EU climate leadership and four scenarios for its future. Pp 33–46

Graf 8: China leads the world in solar power



Source: BBC, 2021. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-57483492>

in some aspects it goes further than the Paris Agreement, and its more ambitious. The Green Deal differs in comparison to the Paris Agreement in one important thing, even though it was announced and approved several years later, than the Paris Agreement it is already in running, while the Paris Agreement still doesn't have its rulebook finalised. It is obvious that it is much easier to negotiate in the smaller number of participants, especially when they have similar view on the issue. Other aspect that differentiates these two cases may be the method of voting used, while most of the international bodies require unanimous voting, most of the voting done in the EU is so called qualified majority voting. Problematic for the Conferences of Parties and therefore for the Paris Agreement rulebook finalization is also process of the meetings, the COP meetings take place once a year, if not postponed as the COP26, and the meetings take place on different levels and for limited time. The opportunity to negotiate is therefore limited and it is strongly influenced by current global political situation. COP negotiations also often lacks continuity that can be found on the national or European level. The Green Deal is maybe quite ambitious, but for now it looks

that it has stepped in the right direction and that it will be a success. More problematic is the global issue of the topic, climate change is a global issue and fact that the EU would become carbon neutral by 2050 will not mitigate climate change. This global issue requires global resolution and the time frame in which this resolution is possible is getting smaller.

The EU's tendency to lead the debate on international climate policy is evident from the beginning of the international conversation itself. The EU has constantly brought ambitious plans to the table and exhorted its partners to pursue more sedulous commitments; however, it was mostly rolled over by stronger players with bigger power and influence. Even though the EU stepped up to the challenges several times, played the role of mediator as well as the leader or helped to save Kyoto protocol in the last minute, even without the participation of the U.S. The international arena is changing, and the distribution of power is regrouping. There are new emerging economies that are gaining power and as a result, the EU is becoming weaker and its influence is declining. To achieve its goal the EU has to find new partners, probably among the emerg-

ing economies and persuade them to integrate their economic expansion with sustainable growth. It has to integrate and apply all of its diplomatic powers and leader powers to persuade other countries to create similarly ambitious plans, develop further sustainably and support its proposals on the on the floor of the Conference of Parties. To make it even more complicated it needs to be done as soon as possible. Time to mitigate the climate change impacts is running up and

the EUs influence is weakening by the growing influence of emerging economies. As if this wasn't complicated enough the global pandemic is still not over and the way of resolving the crisis will probably shape the following years of climate policy. The best thing that can be done is to treat the crisis as an opportunity to introduce more sustainable solutions to the crisis and incorporate the sustainability into the existing ones.



CONCLUSION

The aspiration of the EU to play the major role in international climate policy was not always successful one, however steady, and long term it was. The EU was trying to play prime role in the UNFCCC negotiations from its start, and actively pursue bigger commitments which was not met with understanding from the other partners, mostly developed states. This slightly changed after the year 2000, when the EU was one of the major actors in saving the Kyoto Protocol after the U.S. withdrawal. However, the Kyoto protocol was with the passage of time viewed as a failure. The Paris Agreement was seen as major step in the international climate policy and was greatly celebrated. Sobering period came after the Conference of Parties in Madrid in 2019, where the parties involved were not able to finish the desired Paris Agreement rulebook that was necessary for the agreement to deliver its objective. Some countries even purposely obstructed the negotiations or tried to incorporate loopholes that would make it easier for them to fulfil the commitments at the expense of common goal.

At this time the EU presented its ambitious plan called the European Green Deal which has a goal of turning Europe into first climate-neutral continent till 2050. This brought at least some hope after the unsatisfactory proceeding of the COP25. The EU officials have to resolve plenty of obstacles connected to the Green Deal before we can call it a success, but all 27 EU countries have committed to its terms. The biggest obstacle and opportunity in one may be the coronavirus pandemic that has struck world in the 2020 and the following crisis. Fate of the European Green deal now depends on the way how the EU and its member states recover from the crisis and if the measures are going to be in line with the Green Deal goals.

The challenge that the EU is facing at the moment is not an easy one. It has to solve its own internal crisis, caused by the global pandemic, the solution of the crisis should be aligned with its sustainable development plans. The EU has to also work at the international governance level to defend its leading position and also eventually finalize the Paris Agreement rulebook. However, it has to also hold in mind its weakening position in the global arena so it should carefully find partners that would support the EU and join it behind common goal.

We will be able to evaluate the success of the European Green Deal in year 2050, but today we can at least say that it is a revolutionary and ambitious project in the field of climate change policy, which has no equivalent in the world. However, for the climate change to be reversed or at least its consequences to be mitigated it cannot be only the EU, who is making an effort. The EU doesn't exist in a bubble and climate change is a global problem that needs to be solved globally. The EU's strategy to lead by an example unfortunately seems to not work sufficiently and didn't have desired effect on other global actors for now. That's why the EU needs to step up its game as in its climate policy as well as in the negotiations and probably abandon the "soft power" measures and exercise all of its diplomatic power to accomplish their international climate policy goals.

The international community will be focused in the following months will be on the COP26 taking place in Glasgow later this year as it will direct the international climate policy for the foreseen future. Most likely the conference and its outcomes will even decide on the future of the Paris Agreement. High expectations surrounding the conference of the parties are putting

organizers as well as the participants under great deal of stress and pressure. This year's conference is supposed to be the biggest climate event since the 2015 Paris conference and its mission is caught up with tasks neglected or shifted by the previous conferences. This neglecting and shifting was however caused, by the fact, that these specific points are viewed as a problematic one and it's hard to find consensus on them. As if it wasn't enough that most of the points on the agenda are going to be probably problem-

atic and difficult to find broad support for there is also time pressure playing into the whole mix and the fact that this is also effected by the unforeseen global pandemic, that has to be also on the agenda as the solving of this crisis needs to be aligned with the sustainable principles. If this conference with its difficult negotiations however is a success, the Paris Agreement and climate change mitigation still have a chance to achieve success.



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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS AND UPDATED INDICATORS

1. Future Climate Scenarios (from IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report, 2021)¹

IPCC considers changes in global surface temperature, which are assessed based on multiple lines of evidence, for selected 20-year time periods and the five illustrative emissions scenarios considered.

Global surface temperature will continue to increase until at least mid-century under all emissions scenarios considered. Global warming of 1.5°C and 2°C will be exceeded during the 21st century unless deep reductions in CO₂ and other greenhouse gas emissions occur in the coming decades.

Many changes in the climate system become larger in direct relation to increasing global warming. They include increases in the frequency and intensity of hot extremes, marine heatwaves, heavy precipitation, and, in some regions, agricultural and ecological droughts;

an increase in the proportion of intense tropical cyclones; and reductions in Arctic sea ice, snow cover and permafrost.


Continued global warming is projected to further intensify the global water cycle, including its variability, global monsoon precipitation and the severity of wet and dry events.

Under scenarios with increasing CO₂ emissions, the ocean and land carbon sinks are projected to be less effective at slowing the accumulation of CO₂ in the atmosphere. Many changes due to past and future greenhouse gas emissions are irreversible for centuries to millennia, especially changes in the ocean, ice sheets and global sea level.

Tab. A: Five scenarios considered by IPCC in 2021

(°C)	Near term (2021–2040)		Mid term (2041–2060)		Long term (2081–2100)	
	Best estimate	Very likely estimate	Best estimate	Very likely estimate	Best estimate	Very likely estimate
SSP1-1.9	1.5	1.2 to 1.7	1.6	1.2 to 2.0	1.4	1.0 to 1.8
SSP1-2.6	1.5	1.2 to 1.8	1.7	1.3 to 2.2	1.8	1.3 to 2.4
SSP2-4.5	1.5	1.2 to 1.8	2.0	1.6 to 2.5	2.7	2.1 to 3.5
SSP3-7.0	1.5	1.2 to 1.8	2.1	1.7 to 2.6	3.6	2.8 to 4.6
SSP5-8.5	1.6	1.3 to 1.9	2.4	1.9 to 3.0	4.4	3.3 to 5.7

¹ IPCC (2021): AR6 Climate Change 2021: Summary for Policymakers, available at <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/#SPM>

Fig. A: Share of pollutants in the five IPCC scenarios


Natural drivers and internal variability will modulate human-caused changes, especially at regional scales and in the near term, with little effect on centennial global warming. These modulations are important to consider in planning for the full range of possible changes.

With further global warming, every region is projected to increasingly experience concurrent and multiple changes in climatic impact-drivers. Changes in several climatic impact-drivers would be more widespread at 2°C compared to 1.5°C global warming and even more widespread and/or pronounced for higher warming levels.

Low-likelihood outcomes, such as ice-sheet collapse, abrupt ocean circulation changes, some compound extreme events, and warming substantially larger than the assessed very likely range of future warming, cannot be ruled out and are part of risk assessment.

From a physical science perspective, limiting human-induced global warming to a specific level requires limiting cumulative CO₂ emissions, reaching at least net zero CO₂ emissions, along with strong reductions in other greenhouse gas emissions. Strong, rapid and sustained reductions in CH₄ emissions would also limit the warming effect resulting from declining aerosol pollution and would improve air quality.

Scenarios with very low or low GHG emissions (SSP1-1.9 and SSP1-2.6) lead within years to discernible effects on greenhouse gas and aerosol concentrations and air quality, relative to high and very high GHG emissions scenarios (SSP3-7.0 or SSP5-8.5). Under these contrasting scenarios, discernible differences in trends of global surface temperature would begin to emerge from natural variability within around 20 years, and over longer time periods for many other climatic impact-drivers (high confidence).

Fig. B: IPCC's estimated contribution of different pollutants to climate change

2. Currently expected common regional changes in Europe (from IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report, 2021)²

Regardless of future levels of global warming, temperatures will rise in all European areas at a rate exceeding global mean temperature changes, similar to past observations. **(high confidence)**

The frequency and intensity of hot extremes, including marine heat waves, have increased in recent decades and are projected to keep increasing regardless of the greenhouse gas emissions scenario. Critical thresholds relevant for ecosystems and humans are projected to be exceeded for global warming of 2°C and higher. **(high confidence)**

The frequency of cold spells and frost days will decrease under all the greenhouse gas emissions scenarios in this report and all time horizons, similar to past observations. **(high confidence)**

Despite strong internal variability, observed trends in European mean and extreme temperatures cannot be explained without accounting for anthropogenic factors. Before the 1980s, warming by greenhouse gases was partly offset by anthropogenic aerosol emissions. Reduced aerosol influence in the recent decades has

led to an observable positive trend in shortwave radiation. **(high confidence)**


Observations have a seasonal and regional pattern consistent with projected increase of precipitation in winter in Northern Europe. A precipitation decrease is projected in summer in the Mediterranean extending to northward regions. Extreme precipitation and pluvial flooding are projected to increase at global warming levels exceeding 1.5°C in all regions except the Mediterranean. **(high confidence)**

Regardless of level of global warming, relative sea level will rise in all European areas except the Baltic Sea, at a rate close to or exceeding global mean sea level. Changes are projected to continue beyond 2100. Extreme sea level events will become more frequent and more intense, leading to more coastal flooding. Shorelines along sandy coasts will retreat throughout the 21st century. **(high confidence)**

Strong declines in glaciers, permafrost, snow cover extent, and snow seasonal duration at high latitudes/altitudes are observed and will continue in a warming world. **(high confidence)**

² IPCC (2021): AR6 Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis, available at <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/#Regional>

Fig. C: Projected changes in seasonal (Dec–Feb and Jun–Aug) mean temperature and precipitation at 1.5°C, 2°C, and 4°C global warming relative to 1995–2014.³



Multiple climatic impact-drivers have already changed concurrently over recent decades. The number of climatic impact-driver changes is expected to increase with increasing global warming (**high confidence**)

NORTHERN EUROPE

- Observed increase in pluvial flooding attributed to human influence and projected to further increase at global warming of 1.5°C (medium confidence) and 2°C and above (high confidence).
- Projected decrease in river flood at global warming of 2°C and above (medium confidence).
- Projected increase in severe wind storms at global warming of 2°C and above (medium confidence).

WESTERN & CENTRAL EUROPE

- Projected increase in pluvial flooding at global warming of 1.5°C (medium confidence) and 2°C and above (high confidence).

- Observed increasing trend in river flooding and projected further increase at 2°C and above of global warming (high confidence).
- Projected increases in hydrological, agricultural and ecological droughts at mid-century warming levels of 2°C or above, regardless of the greenhouse gas emissions scenario (medium confidence).

EASTERN EUROPE

- Projected increase in pluvial flooding at global warming of 1.5°C (medium confidence) and 2°C and above (high confidence).
- Projected decrease in river flood at global warming of 2°C and above (medium confidence).
- Projected increase in fire weather at global warming of 2°C and above (medium confidence).

THE MEDITERRANEAN

- Observed increase in hydrological and agricultural and ecological droughts (medium confidence), projected increase in aridity and fire weather conditions at global warming of 2°C and above (high confidence).

³ Based on EURO CORDEX (40 models) using the SSP5-8.5 scenario to compute the warming levels.

- Projected combination of climatic impact-driver changes (warming, temperature extremes, increase in droughts and aridity, precipitation decrease, increase in fire weather, mean and extreme sea levels,

snow cover decrease, and wind speed decrease) by mid-century and at global warming of at least 2°C and above (high confidence).

3. COP26 Glasgow Conference Achievements (November 2021)⁴

MITIGATION: SECURED NEAR-GLOBAL NET ZERO, NDCS FROM 153 COUNTRIES AND FUTURE STRENGTHENING OF MITIGATION MEASURES

Over 90% of world GDP is now covered by net zero commitments. 153 countries put forward new 2030 emissions targets (NDCs). The Glasgow Climate Pact accelerates the drumbeat and puts in place the underpinning rules and systems. In Glasgow, countries agreed to come back next year with new strengthened commitments, a new UN climate programme on mitigation ambition, and they finalised the Paris Rulebook. To deliver on these stretching targets, the Presidency has driven commitments to move away from coal power, halt and reverse deforestation, reduce methane emissions and speed up the switch to electric vehicles.

ADAPTATION & LOSS AND DAMAGE: BOOSTED EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH CLIMATE IMPACTS

80 countries are now covered by either Adaptation Communications or National Adaptation Plans to increase preparedness to climate risks, with 45 submitted over the last year. The Glasgow - Sharm el-Sheikh Work Programme on the Global Goal on Adaptation was agreed, which will drive adaptation action. Record amounts of adaptation finance have been pledged, including committing to doubling 2019 levels of adaptation finance by 2025. This is the first time an adaptation specific financing goal has ever been agreed globally. Nations have announced new partnerships to improve access to finance, including for Indigenous Peoples. A new Glasgow Dialogue on Loss and Damage funding arrangements was created. The Santiago Network on Loss and Damage was brought to life through clear functions and funding.

FINANCE: MOBILISED BILLIONS AND TRILLIONS

Developed countries have made progress towards delivering the \$100 billion climate finance goal and

will reach it by 2023 at the latest. 34 countries and five public finance institutions will stop international support for the unabated fossil fuel energy sector next year. Private financial institutions and central banks are moving to realign trillions towards global net zero. In Glasgow, countries agreed the way forward for the new post-2025 climate finance goal. Developed countries committed significantly increased funding to vital funds such as the Least Developed Countries Fund.

COLLABORATION: WORKED TOGETHER TO DELIVER

The Glasgow Breakthroughs will accelerate collaboration between governments, businesses and civil society to deliver on climate goals faster, whilst collaborative councils and dialogues in energy, electric vehicles, shipping and commodities will help deliver on commitments. At COP26, we finalised the Paris Rulebook - agreeing the 'enhanced transparency framework' (common reporting of emissions and support), a new mechanism and standards for international carbon markets, and common timeframes for emissions reductions targets.

COAL

International partners have mobilised over \$20 billion for a just and inclusive transition from coal to clean energy. This includes:

- The \$8.5 billion South Africa Just Energy Transition Partnership
- The \$2 billion Climate Investment Funds Accelerating Coal Transition and Renewable Energy Integration programmes, which will also leverage additional finance via multilateral and private partners
- A new \$10 billion energy fund, the Global Energy Alliance for People and Planet, which will bring reliable renewable electricity to a billion people by 2030 and avoid 4 billion tonnes of CO₂ emissions

⁴ COP26 (2021): COP26 Outcomes, <https://ukcop26.org/the-conference/cop26-outcomes/>

- The Asian Development Bank Energy Transition Mechanism to support Indonesia and the Philippines to accelerate early coal power retirement and the clean energy transition

DEFORESTATION

International partners have pledged extensive new nature and land use-related climate finance packages and commitments including:

- 137 countries committed to halt and reverse forest loss and land degradation by 2030 in the Glasgow Leaders' Declaration on Forests and Land Use
- 28 countries launched a roadmap to protect forests through a global shift to sustainable development and trade of agricultural commodities
- 12 developed countries pledged to provide \$12 billion (£8.75 billion) of public climate finance from 2021 to 2025 to new Global Forest Finance Pledge
- 12 country and philanthropic contributors pledged at least \$1.5 billion (£1.1 billion) to protect the forests of the Congo Basin.
- 14 country and philanthropic donors pledged at least \$1.7 billion from 2021 to 2025 to advance Indigenous Peoples' and local communities' forest tenure rights and support their role as guardians of forests and nature
- In addition, at least £5.3 billion (\$7.2 billion) of private sector funding has been mobilised

ELECTRIC VEHICLES

In the run up to and at COP26, extensive commitments were made to speed up the switch to electric vehicles, including:

- The COP26 Declaration on Accelerating the Transition to 100% Zero Emission Cars and Vans brought together over 35 countries, 6 major carmakers, 43 cities, states and regions, 28 fleet owners and 15 financial institutions and investors, all committing to work together to achieve this goal
- Vehicle manufacturers representing more than 30% of the global market now have commitments to

phase out fossil fuelled vehicles, up from almost zero two years ago

- General Motors, Jaguar, Fiat, Volvo, Audi, Ford and Volkswagen in Europe have all committed to 100% zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) production by 2035
- More than 110 companies have signed up to the EV100 pledge, committing to fully zero-emission vehicle fleets by 2030

METHANE

Much attention focuses on CO₂. But methane is a powerful greenhouse gas and no other COP in recent history has held a major event on methane.

- At COP26, over 100 countries signed up to the Global Methane Pledge to reduce global methane emissions by 30% by 2030. This includes six of the world's top 10 methane emitters: the United States, Brazil, EU, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Argentina.
- This equates to a potential of 46% of global methane emissions and over 70% of global GDP, playing a critical role in keeping 1.5°C within reach.

ADAPTATION

New UK funding announced at COP26 will support vulnerable countries to adapt to these impacts and address, minimise and avert loss and damage, including through:

- £274 million to support communities across Asia and the Pacific to better plan, invest in and fund climate change action, improve conservation and deliver low carbon development
- Over \$27 million in additional support from the UK, India and Australia for the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI), which aims to make people safer from climate-linked disasters
- The £100 million Climate Adaptation & Resilience research framework programme (CLARE). This is jointly funded by the UK and Canada and will conduct research to deliver innovative solutions to enable five million of the most vulnerable people to adapt to the impacts of climate change

- £10 million UK, \$3.5 million US and continued levels of funding from Ireland for the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Initiative For Effective Adaptation and Resilience (LIFE-AR) – supporting this group to reduce their vulnerability to climate change
- \$67 million for the Community Resilience Partnership Program (CRPP), including \$45 million UK, EUR6 million Nordic Development Fund (NDF), EUR2 million AfD
- \$150 million to Financing Locally-Led Climate Action (FLLoCA) through contributions from International Development Association (IDA), and Sweden and GoK
- The detailed tables for the Enhanced Transparency Framework, so that everyone is working to a common approach for tracking and communicating their emissions, support and action

At the COP26 World Leaders Summit, over 40 countries accounting for over 70% of global GDP endorsed the Breakthrough Agenda, committing to work together to make clean and sustainable solutions the most affordable, accessible and attractive option in each of the emitting sectors before the end of this decade. They will work together to deliver:

COLLABORATION

At the previous Conference, the Parties held such strongly held different views that they had been unable to agree completely. At COP26 we resolved those differences and agreed:

- The three constituent parts of Article 6, covering voluntary cooperation, a new carbon crediting mechanism, and non-market approaches
- Common timeframes for emissions reductions targets (NDCs)
- Power Breakthrough: making clean power the most affordable and reliable option for all countries to meet their power needs efficiently by 2030
- Road Transport Breakthrough: making zero-emission vehicles the new normal - accessible, affordable, and sustainable in all regions by 2030
- Steel Breakthrough: making near-zero emission steel the preferred choice in global markets, with efficient use and near-zero emission steel production established and growing in every region by 2030
- Hydrogen Breakthrough: ensuring affordable, renewable and low carbon hydrogen is globally available by 2030



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