

**NATO
WARSAW
SUMMIT**

TIME TO ACT



**New
Direction**

the foundation for european reform

SPRING/SUMMER 2016



**Anders Fogh
Rasmussen**

**A NATO FIT
FOR PURPOSE**

Antoni Macierewicz

**SECURITY IN
EUROPE - HOW
TO CHANGE THE
NEGATIVE TREND**

Peter Brookes

**A NEW NATO FOR
A NEW AMERICAN
ADMINISTRATION**



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Tomasz Poreba

NATO

THE FOUNDATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

Contrary to popular belief prevailing since the end of the Cold War, the end of the military stand-off between NATO and Soviet Union did not mark a new era of peace and safety. Under the rule of Vladimir Putin, Russia is trying to once again assert itself as a world power and regain lost influence and prestige by pursuing an increasingly aggressive and revanchist policy. This coincides with the fact that while doing so, the Kremlin is seeking to distract Russian citizens from the country's growing internal problems. Turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa, civil war in Syria, and conflicts in Yemen and Libya, has brought an unprecedented

wave of migrants and refugees towards Europe. Almost all of our neighbourhood is touched by open or frozen conflict, unrest and civil war, whilst exposed to the threat of terrorism.

Both Europe and NATO face unprecedented threats on many different fronts. These range from conventional warfare through the expansion of terrorist groups, radicalisation of our own citizens to information warfare and propaganda fuelled mainly by the Russia regime. Therefore, the Warsaw Summit is timely and should be used as an opportunity to decisively respond to these new forms of threats, which include hybrid warfare and cyber attacks.



THE “WEAPONISATION OF INFORMATION” BY THE KREMLIN IS A WELL-THOUGHT THROUGH AND WELL-FUNDED STRATEGY AND SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A THREAT EQUAL TO MORE TRADITIONAL ONES.



Despite predictions by numerous experts that future warfare will predominantly belong to special forces and not tanks and artillery, the situation in Eastern Ukraine (and to some degree in Syria) clearly shows that this is not the case, at least not yet. The threat posed by Russia is much bigger than it has been since the end of the Cold War. As Antoni Macierewicz, Polish Minister of Defence, underlined when talking about preparation for the NATO Summit in Warsaw, in August 2009, one year after the meticulously planned aggression against Georgia, Putin had said

that Moscow wanted to change the political configuration in Europe and move towards separate agreements between Russia and individual, chosen countries. However, Moscow's vision of *divide et impera* rule was much broader than just diplomacy. What has followed – including the annexation of Crimea, aggression against Ukraine and intervention in Syria on the side of Assad regime - clearly shows that the Kremlin is determined to pursue its goal of working on different fronts and using a variety of tools. Therefore the Warsaw Summit should be used as a key platform to strengthen

NATO's Eastern flank and to project stability beyond our borders. Today, not only Ukraine, but also Moldova and Georgia are under threat.

The second key challenge for the security of NATO countries is terrorist groups such as Daesh or Al Qaeda. NATO should be ready to militarily counter and fight terrorist groups which use partisan tactics and often melt into civilian populations or use human shields on their own soil. This requires a completely different way of thinking about warfare, especially in cities and densely populated areas. Another side of this coin is

the need to dismantle terrorist cells operating in our own countries.

Another directly linked threat is the spread of radicalisation amongst young people. Europe's population is suffering from terrorist attacks led by radicals and militants whom have been either trained abroad or have been recruited by terrorist organisations in Europe and America. These individuals often have European citizenship and are therefore much more difficult to track. We also have to remember that experienced radical Islamist fighters may - and almost certainly do - infiltrate the waves of refugees

coming to Europe.

Last but not least, we have recently witnessed the revival of a threat which has already been very creatively used by the Soviet Union before - information warfare targeting both NATO and the EU. The strategic communications employed by Russia are not only undermining security on Europe's Eastern border, it is also targeting our partners like Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. The “weaponisation of information” by the Kremlin is a well-thought through and well-funded strategy and should be regarded as a threat equal to more traditional ones.

NATO is aware of the problem and its Stratcom Centre of Excellence in Latvia does a great job at exposing Russian lies and manipulation.

In this publication, we have brought together key decision makers and security and defence experts, to provide their views ahead of the crucial Warsaw NATO Summit in Warsaw. The importance of this Summit should not be underestimated. Wales 2014, saw the Alliance change direction to face a more dangerous world. Warsaw 2016 will decide if the needed level of support and commitment to this change is fully carried out. ■



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


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
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
NATO MEMBERS & PARTNERS



HEADS OF STATE



NATO WORKING STRUCTURES



10 THINGS YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT NATO

1

An international Security Hub

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is one of the world's major international institutions. It is a political and military Alliance of 28 member countries from Europe and North America. The Alliance takes all its decisions by consensus. Every member country, no matter how large or small, has an equal say in discussions and decisions. Member states are committed to individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. These values are at the heart of NATO's transatlantic bond.

2

Collective Defence

The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend NATO's territory and populations. Article 5 of NATO's founding charter, the Washington Treaty, sets out the Alliance's collective defence commitment. It states that an attack on one shall be considered an attack on all. Article 5 has been invoked only once in NATO's history, on 12 September 2001, the day after the terrorist attacks on the United States.

3

NATO's Command Structure

NATO has a permanent, integrated military command structure where military and civilian personnel from all member states work together. The Alliance has two top-level Strategic Commands (Allied Command Operations, in Mons, Belgium, and Allied Command Transformation, in Norfolk, United States). Under these Strategic Commands are two Joint Force Commands (in Brunssum, Netherlands and in Naples, Italy) that can deploy and run military operations. The Command Structure also includes one air command (Ramstein, Germany), one land command (Izmir, Turkey) and one maritime command (Northwood, United Kingdom).

4

Standing forces

NATO has a number of standing forces on active duty that contribute to the Alliance's collective defence on a permanent basis. These include NATO's four standing maritime group fleets, which are ready to act when called upon. Additionally NATO has an integrated air defence system that links national air defence capabilities together and includes the Alliance's ballistic missile defence capabilities. The Alliance also conducts several air policing missions in which Allied fighter jets patrol the airspace of member nations who do not have fighter jets of their own. They defend NATO airspace over Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia on a 24/7 basis, 365 days per year.

5

Troops and Equipment

NATO benefits from being able to draw on the military expertise and capabilities of its members. This includes tanks, submarines or fighter jets. When the Alliance collectively decides to conduct an operation it asks Allies for troops and equipment to be placed under NATO command. While personnel serving in a NATO operation are often referred to collectively as "NATO forces," they are strictly speaking multinational forces from NATO member countries, and in some cases, partner countries or other troop-contributing countries. The only military equipment that NATO owns itself is a fleet of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control) aircraft. From 2018, NATO will also operate five Global Hawk surveillance drones. The procedure for requesting forces and equipment for an operation is often referred to as "force generation."

NATO funding

6

Member countries make direct and indirect contributions to the costs of running NATO and implementing its policies and activities. The greatest part of these contributions is indirect and comes through the Allies' participation in NATO-led operations. Member countries incur the costs involved whenever they volunteer forces to participate in a NATO operation. For example the cost for providing a fighter jet lies with the nation that makes it available. Direct contributions to NATO's common budgets are made by members in accordance with an agreed cost-sharing formula based on relative Gross National Income. These contributions finance the costs of NATO's integrated structures, collectively-owned equipment or installations.

Deterrence

7

In the five decades after World War II, the Alliance successfully prevented the Cold War from becoming "hot". Under the security umbrella provided by NATO, the people of Europe, Canada, and the United States enjoyed the benefits of democratic choice, the rule of law and substantial economic growth. The Alliance's deterrence is based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, which remain a core element of NATO's strategy. This is matched by Allies' commitment to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

Crisis Management

8

The Alliance has frequently acted to uphold international peace and security. In 1995, NATO helped to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and implemented the peace agreement. In 1999, NATO helped to stop mass killings and expulsions in Kosovo, and NATO troops continue to serve in Kosovo to this day under a United Nations mandate. Since 2003, NATO's UN-mandated presence has helped to ensure Afghanistan will never again become a safe haven for terrorists. In 2011, NATO enforced a UN mandate to protect the people of Libya. NATO ships are fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia and are conducting counter-terrorism patrols in the Mediterranean. On several occasions, NATO forces have also delivered relief supplies, including to the United States after Hurricane Katrina and to Pakistan after the October 2005 earthquake. NATO Defence Ministers took swift decisions on 11 February 2016 to deploy ships to the Aegean Sea to support Greece and Turkey, as well as the European Union's border agency Frontex, in their efforts to tackle the refugee and migrant crisis. NATO's Standing Maritime Group 2 arrived in the Aegean Sea within 48 hours of the Ministers' decision.

Cooperative Security

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
Threats like terrorism, piracy, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and cyber warfare know no borders. That is why NATO has developed a global network of security partners that includes over 40 countries from around the globe, as well as international organisations including the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the African Union. The Alliance's Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan includes 14 partner countries. NATO's operation in Kosovo includes 10 partners. Other than partners taking part in NATO missions and operations, the Alliance has developed a wide network of partnerships since the early 1990s, including the Euro-Atlantic Partnerships Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and many partners across the globe, including Australia, Japan and South Korea.

The "Open Door"

10

Any European state which can contribute to the security and principles of the Alliance can be invited to join. It is up to the country concerned to decide if it wishes to seek membership. On six occasions, between 1952 and 2009, a total of 16 European countries chose to seek membership and were admitted. This process has contributed to peace and security in Europe. Following the December 2015 decision by NATO Foreign Ministers to start accession talks, Montenegro is currently an invitee. At the moment, three further countries aspire to NATO membership: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.¹ Allies assess each applicant country according to its own merits. A wide range of political, economic and security reforms need to be implemented before any country can join.

1. Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.



Antoni Macierewicz,
Defence Minister of
Poland

SECURITY IN *Antoni* *Macierewicz* **EUROPE**

HOW TO CHANGE THE NEGATIVE TREND

DISTURBED SECURITY IN EUROPE

Within just two years, the security of Europe dramatically deteriorated. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in Crimea and Donbas in 2014 led to major violations of international law and international order. Then mass-scale migration crisis occurred, only partially related to the humanitarian disaster in the Middle East. So far, Europe was unable to find an effective solution to them. Unfortunately, more and more events suggest that this still may not be the end of problems, as the tensions in international relations are rising even above the Cold War levels. The NATO Summit in Warsaw should be an important step to tackle these challenges effectively.

First, we have to identify reasons for which all of this occurred. Sadly enough, it has to be stated that the analysts and policy planners either underestimated or ignored some of the dangerous processes that have been taking place for several past years. Before the present migration crisis started, Spain experienced the crisis of the cayucos in the Canary Islands back in 2006, whereas Italy has had permanent problems with Lampedusa since at least 2011. In the same time, the conflicts that caused the massive inflow of migrants in 2014-2015 were already brewing. Millions of refugees from Syria have been living in refugee camps in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan since at least 2011.

On the other hand, before the terrorists also known as “the little green men” invaded Crimea and led to the annexation of the peninsula by Russia, and to the outbreak of war in Donbas, Russia performed a mass-scale cyberattack on Estonia in 2007 and militarily invaded Georgia in 2008. We saw two mysterious air crashes: of the Polish Tu-154 in Smolensk in April 2010 and the Malaysian Airlines flight MH-17 in



WITHOUT COOPERATION OF THE TWO ORGANISATIONS, WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PROPERLY RESPOND TO THE EXISTING AND EMERGING THREATS. THE MIGRATION CRISIS CAN ONLY BE STOPPED BY SOLVING THE PROBLEMS THAT CAUSED THEM.

July 2014. Circumstances of both bear characteristics typical to acts of terror. For several years, the West experienced increasingly frequent provocative behaviours of the Russian military, especially air forces, as well as verbal threats, propaganda, disinformation and intensified espionage. In fact, the present crisis has been developing for years and what we see now is merely a consequence of the past negligence.

■ MORE TO COME

Spring 2014 marked an end to the fairly peaceful period of European history. Hybrid war launched by Russia and the subsequent

annexation of Crimea brought to mind some of the most dreadful historical memories of Europe. It was frequently compared to Anschluss of Austria by Germany in 1938, Munich Agreement of 1938 and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Having said that, how can anyone deem any scenario impossible? If we already experienced a cyber and hybrid war, why would we disregard the possibility of a conventional one? We cannot close our eyes or turn our heads away from the manoeuvres of the Russian army that exercises the possible conflict with NATO, including preventive nuclear attacks. We cannot disregard the increasing Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) means adopted by Russia. The

deployment of missile systems in Syria, Kaliningrad and other places significantly reduces NATO defensive potential. What is more, the irresponsible provocations, border incidents and air space violations increase the tension to a hardly bearable level.

In the same time, the migrations from the East and South bring social changes to Europe that are difficult to analyse and predict. About a million migrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region entered the EU through Greece and Italy and another wave from Ukraine came to Poland only. Regardless of political correctness, which to a large extent is a reason of the present troubles, it has to be noticed that there is a strong correlation between the wave of Muslim migrants and the terrorist attacks and acts of sexual violence in Western Europe (Paris, Brussels, Germany). It also must be stated openly that not all the migrants are genuine refugees, that they are penetrated by radical Islamists, organized crime and that the entire phenomenon is used to achieve political purposes by the third parties.

■ WHAT SHALL WE DO?

Europe has to realize that the threats mentioned above should be treated as one complex peril and challenge. They are interdependent and they

are a part of a wider geopolitical scheme. There is one long frontline along the EU/NATO borders from Norway to Spain. The division on Eastern and Southern flank is not much relevant. Therefore, the foremost necessity is the unity of the EU and NATO members in designing an applicable solution to the problem. Internal conflicts between the members of the Western community may only decrease the resilience of them to the threat. In particular, this Summit needs to show the world that we are united and stand as one.

Situation awareness is another factor of effective response to the challenges faced by the West. We need an increased intelligence cooperation which would help to paint a better picture of what is actually taking place around us. But we need also a realist analysis, taking under consideration all kinds of perils, even those that may not seem very probable at the moment. Hardly anyone could predict Crimea and the migrant crisis back in 2013. Just a year later they became reality.

However, there is one exception to that. The late President of Poland Lech Kaczyński and his party (Law and Justice, now ruling in Poland) argued during the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008 that this kind of expansion of Russia could have taken place and that Ukraine and

Georgia should become members of the NATO. As we know, this concept was rejected. The war in Georgia broke in August 2008.

The EU and NATO have to cooperate in a complementary way. They have unique competences and capabilities that combined together may bring the necessary solutions to the problems defined above. The concepts of the EU Global Strategy and the 360-degree NATO defence will have to be effectively implemented.

Without cooperation of the two organisations, we will not be able to properly respond to the existing and emerging threats. The migration crisis can only be stopped by solving the problems that caused them. This requires both terminating the armed conflicts in the MENA region as well as the economic aid in reconstruction of countries affected by them. As far as the aggressive and hawkish attitude of Russia is considered, only the combination of economic sanctions and military deterrence may bring back stability and ensure security of Eastern Europe. Speaking of the latter – it has to include real reinforced presence of military force, not just declarations. This is why the NATO Summit in Warsaw is so important. It simply has to bring answers to the arising questions about the future of our security. ■



THE EU AND NATO HAVE TO COOPERATE IN A COMPLEMENTARY WAY.

Geoffrey Van Orden MEP

TIME FOR NATO TO GET MORE SERIOUS



The Presidents and Prime Ministers of the 28 NATO members, the NATO allies, are gathering in Warsaw on 8 July 2016 for one of the most vital Summits in the history of the Alliance. Not since the tensest moments of the Cold War has the international security scene been so fraught. A full spectrum of threats to the security of our democracies has emerged - nuclear, cyber, terrorist and conventional - all requiring a united, effective and credible response. Yet the Summit is in danger of being side-tracked by inopportune efforts by the EU to breathe more life into its defence ambitions.

The NATO Alliance needs a single-minded focus on the part of all allies if it is to be revitalised and made ready to deal with the immediate challenges and the threats that will develop in the coming years. The United States cannot be expected to continue to bear a disproportionate share of the military burden. At the same time, European allies must not be distracted from their NATO responsibilities by the divisive ambitions among a few to create some separate European Defence Union which will bring no additional military capability. NATO cannot continue to respond to crises in piece-meal fashion. It is time for some hard-headed strategic thinking

about the role of the Alliance. Someone needs to have the courage to spell it out, thoughtfully, to the assembled political leaders.

EU AMBITIONS ARE A DANGEROUS DISTRACTION

There are no uniquely “European” threats, challenges or military requirements and the EU has no additional military capabilities or other “instruments”, which are not available to the Alliance as a whole - if all NATO allies were so minded. It is no excuse to hang the EU ambition on its so called ‘neutrals’ - Sweden, Finland, the Irish Republic and

Austria. All have engaged at some stage with NATO. There is not a sub-set of soft military tasks which let some armies off the hook or which require a different, cheaper organisational approach.

International intervention in the Bosnian conflict should have taught the lesson that professional troops equipped for high intensity conflict could be flexible enough to deal with non-combat situations while the reverse was not the case. There isn’t some training or advisory mission which doesn’t require rigorous military experience or which might not morph into something more serious. The rightful concerns of

France about its former colonies in the Sahel should not be an excuse for inventing some faux EU military role.

In the Adriatic in the 1990s we had a situation where two separate naval task forces, drawing ships from the same navies, were deployed simultaneously - one under NATO command and the other under European (at that time, the WEU). Even France came to realise that this was a farce. But memories are short. Nearly 20 years later, when France thought it would be a good idea to have a maritime dimension to EU defence policy using its facilities in Djibouti, Operation Atalanta, was invented while a NATO maritime



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force was already operating in the Red Sea area. Now we are repeating the same folly with the EU using naval vessels to haul economic migrants and refugees out of the Mediterranean with NATO persuaded to join in with a maritime surveillance effort.

It makes no sense for two different organisations comprising more or less the same countries, facing the same security threats, drawing on the same, limited, national military assets, and often operating in the same geographical area, to develop separate military capabilities.

The solution to the refugee crisis is political. Meanwhile, NATO should be considering how it will deal with the real military threats to its East and South. The Russian threat has temporarily abated but needs credible deterrence. The Daesh threat is extending its reach. Certainly there needs to be political action to restore proper government to Libya and other ungoverned spaces, but Daesh power needs to be destroyed in its heartland. That is an urgent task for NATO in close partnership with Arab allies.

THE EU AND NATO

Some imagine the EU is some sort of useful adjunct to NATO. Maybe it could be if it focused on getting its civil capabilities right. But the EU has other ambitions and there are key differences between the two organisations. NATO of course includes the United States and Canada among its 28 allied nations; it has well tried military structures binding the United States to the security of Europe - this is what gives it enormous and overwhelming military credibility. Secondly, and crucially, NATO has no supra-national powers. Its powers are entirely inter-governmental. Even its vital mutual defence clause, Article 5, leaves it to each member nation to respond with whatever action it deems

necessary in the face of an armed attack on one of their number. NATO does not leach powers from its members, it empowers them with allied muscle.

The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is precisely the opposite. It is predicated on the EU's decision-making autonomy. It is specifically designed to exclude the USA and does not recognise NATO primacy in terms of crisis management. It has tried weakly to copy NATO - even to the extent of having a "mutual defence" clause (Article 42.7) which it is palpably unable to back up. In trying to create its own set of defence institutions, replicating in pale imitation what is already in existence in NATO, it wastes scarce resources, diverts intellectual energy, sends a confusing message to both friends and potential enemies, and seeks gradually to increase the powers of central EU structures, thereby eroding the powers currently exercised by national capitals.

EU DEFENCE POLICY - CSDP

Under David Cameron, the British government has rejected the EU's ambition for "ever closer union" and for a "European Army". So far, it has managed to restrain the EU's separatist defence aspirations but its involvement in many of the EU's defence structures gives tacit encouragement to their development.

The EU ambition therefore remains and there are indications that Berlin, Paris and Brussels will seize on a British 'remain' vote to push ahead with their ideas. Once the British referendum is safely out the way, the German Defence White Paper will be published, closely coordinated with the EU's new Security Strategy which will appear a few days later. Both will call for more defence integration within the EU. Three years ago,

THERE ARE NO UNIQUELY "EUROPEAN" THREATS, CHALLENGES OR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND THE EU HAS NO ADDITIONAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES OR OTHER "INSTRUMENTS", WHICH ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE - IF ALL NATO ALLIES WERE SO MINDED.

the Foreign Ministers of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain stated: "In the long term, we should seek more majority decisions in the [foreign policy] sphere, joint representation in international organisations, where possible, and a European defence policy. For some members of the Group this could eventually involve a European army".

CSDP needs therefore to be understood for what it is - a political project to take forward European integration and equip the EU as a state-like global actor, separate from the United States. Some may want this. If so they should make it clear so that others may position themselves accordingly.

Ostensibly, defence remains a matter for national governments. However, there has been a gradual accretion of defence powers by the EU institutions using the favoured Monnet tactic of "small steps". The Maastricht Treaty's "firewalls," whereby the European Commission was excluded from any role in defence policy, were done away with by the Treaty of Lisbon. EU structures have been created that duplicate NATO; defence ministers and officials now meet under EU auspices; and there is a narrative of EU-badged military activity. The justification for EU involvement in defence has varied over the years. The current fashion

is to describe CSDP in terms of a "comprehensive approach" with the EU claiming unique ability to combine political, financial and military instruments in dealing with crises. The reality is that such an approach is used by all democratic governments and organisations in their crisis management. NATO's 'Provincial Reconstruction Teams' in Afghanistan are a good example. In any case, the EU only has financial assets at its disposal provided by its member states.

Over the years there have been various attempts to create armed forces at the EU's disposal. "EU Battlegroups" were invented in 2004 following the failure of the more ambitious project of a 60,000-man rapid reaction force. Theoretically, the battlegroups have been operational since January 2007 but they have never been used in spite of efforts to find somewhere to deploy them in order to justify the concept.

The important point is that none of the troops involved are new. They are just the same national units but with an EU tag, facing the possibility of deployment under an EU command structure. The EU does not add one extra tank, aircraft or soldier to the forces already available for national or NATO use.

Worryingly, even the United States now seems to be taken in. It has been persuaded of the utility of some EU missions, in the Sahel region, for example. None stand up to scrutiny. They have very limited effect and are only useful through the collaboration of a limited number of countries, some not even EU members. The EU as an institution is irrelevant to what are effectively coalitions of the willing - and those willing also happen to be NATO members.

It is worth taking a moment to look at military involvement in Africa. There is consensus that African

countries need to take primary responsibility for the security of their continent. Where large-scale intervention beyond the military and political resources of an individual country is concerned, then the African Union is being endowed with the necessary capability for multi-national operations, particularly through its incipient African Standby Force. The United States has been as committed as the Europeans in support for this. If indeed there is a serious military-terrorist threat coming from the Sahel then concerted action is required and NATO should be engaged with the African Union and African partners in this. It is beyond being a matter of policing, border management, or training.

THE PESCO DILEMMA

Germany and Belgium, in particular, want to push the idea of a "European Defence Union", separate from NATO, using EU Treaty



powers to create a permanent EU military headquarters and integrate military assets using EU budget enticements. German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen endorsed Commission President Juncker's call for a European Army in March 2015, saying that: "This interweaving of armies, with the perspective of one day having a European Army, is, in my opinion, the future."

The particular device for all this is Article 46 of the Treaty on European Union which deals with "permanent structured cooperation in defence" or PESCO for short, a mechanism for defence co-operation within the framework of the EU. While this was originally intended to encourage improved

military capabilities, as so often, it is seen by others as the means of integrating armed forces under EU auspices. The decision to do so can be taken by Qualified Majority Voting - in other words, without a veto.

The British government has so far been able to resist movement towards PESCO by expressing its informal objection, safe in the knowledge that the EU had little military capability at its disposal without Britain.

Germany has just announced a modest increase in its defence expenditure. After 23 June a number of governments may wish to flex their politico-military muscles. Germany, France,

Belgium, Spain and others will be tempted to make use of PESCO and Britain will be under pressure to participate.

THE BURDEN SHARING QUANDARY

In the NATO context, a long-standing concern has been the imbalance in transatlantic burden-sharing between the North Americans and their 26 European allies. Whoever becomes the President of the United States will show less willingness to subsidise the security of rich allies and European countries will therefore need to spend more money, wisely, on defence. It is not enough for them just to be 'rearranging the deckchairs'; more deckchairs are needed.

A primary objective of the Europeans must surely be to ensure that the United States remains fully committed to their security and they will do this only by demonstrating willingness as reliable, capable allies, sharing risk and shouldering more of the defence burden. This requires enhanced military capabilities, political will, and an informed and supportive public.

All Europe's major military contributors are NATO allies. But their single-minded commitment to the NATO Alliance is distracted by the political pressure from other European capitals to promote an EU role. For many European countries which spend little on defence, the prospect of an "EU army" is an opportunity to do even less.

It is also noteworthy that only four European countries are currently engaged with the United States and its other allies in military operations against ISIL, regarded as the most immediate threat to European security.

THE BRITISH ROLE

The UK is caught in an ambivalent position. It is Europe's most capable military power and has the strongest commitment to the transatlantic alliance. Yet ever since 1998, when Prime Minister Blair took the British foot off the EU defence brake and did a deal with President Chirac in St Malo, the UK has been fighting a rear-guard action to protect NATO and constrain CSDP. It is dismissive of EU defence pretensions but anxious to play the good European and to prevent others assuming a leading role in an area which it claims as its own. Hence the dilemma that PESCO will present.

Some have seen the St Malo agreement as a "constructive misunderstanding": viewed by the British as "an instrument designed to improve European

military capabilities and that would also revitalize NATO" but by the French in particular "as a tool with which to further the construction of a Europe politique." This fundamental difference of view characterises and confuses the whole discussion of CSDP.

In defence terms, the UK is doing its bit. It is one of only five allies that is currently meeting the NATO obligation to spend 2% of GDP on defence but this figure is only a guide. What matters is deployable, sustainable military capability backed by political will. Britain is one of only three, possibly four powers that has global reach with full spectrum military capabilities.

As the British Prime Minister made clear in his speech on 9 May 2016, "Britain's unique position and power in the world is not defined by our membership of the EU". He saw Britain as once again a country that is advancing, not retreating. The East of Suez policy has been reversed with the construction of permanent military bases in the Gulf. The independent British nuclear deterrent is being renewed. Two new aircraft carriers will be operational by 2020, the biggest warships the Royal Navy has ever put to sea. Membership of the EU is seen as one of the tools - just one - which Britain uses, along with its role as one of the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, membership of NATO, the Commonwealth, the Five Eyes Intelligence Agreement with Australia, New Zealand and other allies, and, if course, its special relationship with the United States.

CONCLUSIONS

The EU is determined, step by step, to take forward defence integration for political purposes.

The consequence will be even less military capability, a dangerous lack of strategic credibility, and a fracturing of the transatlantic

Alliance at a time when solidarity is essential.


At the moment Britain has a veto over EU defence arrangements. But it still allows British forces to be involved in some EU military activities, often playing a leading role. This merely encourages further steps by the EU.

At some stage, the UK must come to terms with the fact that its view of CSDP developments is not shared by other nations in Europe. Britain takes a pragmatic military view; the continentals have an ideological intent - European integration.

Under a Conservative Government, the UK will continue to veto an "EU Army". But PESCO is a dangerous stepping stone to this which David Cameron has said he will also block. But it is not clear that he can - and where will that leave the UK. There may well be a case for adopting the Danish approach, opting out of CSDP, or the French approach at NATO from the mid-60s to the 1990s - sit at the military table but remain detached.

Certainly the UK should take the lead in revitalisation of NATO. This means encouraging increased defence expenditure by European allies and creation of additional, highly capable and rapidly deployable forces for NATO and other use; rehearsal of reinforcement of Europe by United States follow-on forces; improved public education in defence; and political willingness by all allies to take on difficult and dangerous tasks, such as the defeat of Daesh.

The forthcoming NATO Summit in Warsaw should focus on the creation of military capability, to match an emergent Russian threat and deal with the new threat from the South. The EU should be encouraged to focus its efforts on civil capabilities, which, where appropriate, could complement NATO's military power. ■



THE FORTHCOMING NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW SHOULD FOCUS ON THE CREATION OF MILITARY CAPABILITY, TO MATCH AN EMERGENT RUSSIAN THREAT AND DEAL WITH THE NEW THREAT FROM THE SOUTH.

NATO ON DUTY


NATO MISSIONS & DEPLOYMENTS



- 1 ICELAND**
Since 2008, fighters aircraft have been deployed to provide a quick-reaction capability.
- 2 AWACS**
NATO maintains a fleet of AWACS aircraft as a deployable air command and control capability. These aircraft have been deployed to enhance NATO's situational awareness over Poland and Romania in the light of the Ukraine crisis.
- 3 AIR POLICING BALTIC STATES, SLOVENIA AND ALBANIA**
Aircraft from NATO Allies are assisting the Baltic States, Albania and Slovenia to preserve the integrity of their sovereign airspace in peacetime, and to ensure their collective security.
- 4 KFOR**
The NATO-led Kosovo Force is helping to maintain a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all people in Kosovo.
- 5 ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR**
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, NATO launched Operation Active Endeavour as an expression of the Alliance's collective defence against terrorism. NATO ships patrol the Mediterranean and monitor shipping to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist activity.
- 6 NATO SUPPORT TO TURKEY**
On 4 December 2012 Patriot missiles batteries have been deployed to augment Turkey's air defences to defend the population and territory of Turkey in response to the Syrian crisis.
- 7 RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION (RSM)**
RSM is a non-combat mission which provides training, advice and assistance to Afghan security forces and institution which was launched on 1 January 2015.
- 8 SUPPORT TO THE AFRICAN UNION**
Since 2005, NATO has been providing different forms of support to the African Union at its request, including strategic air- and seallift, and providing expert and training support.
- 9 OCEAN SHIELD**
Operation Ocean Shield was launched in August 2009 to contribute to global efforts to fight piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa and build the capacity of countries in the region to combat piracy.
- 10 NATO DEPLOYMENT TO AEGEAN SEA 2016**
NATO has deployed ships to the Aegean Sea to support Allies Greece and Turkey, as well as the EU's border agency Frontex, in their efforts to tackle the migrant and refugee crisis.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen

A NATO FIT FOR PURPOSE



Anders Fogh Rasmussen is the founder and Chairman of Rasmussen Global. He is the former Secretary General of NATO and Prime Minister of Denmark

Russia's aggression against Ukraine and its ambition to revive the Cold War conflict have reminded us that the West needs to protect its societies and values against tyranny and oppression. The peace, security, and democratic stability we have enjoyed since the end of the Cold War, can no longer be taken for granted. The key objective at the Warsaw Summit should be to revert this alarming trend and deliver a clear strategy for a Europe whole and free.

At the Warsaw Summit NATO should face the new security environment imposed by Russia and agree policies that can enhance deterrence and defence. We in the West should hold no illusions about Russia's intentions and its willingness to apply raw force. We have seen that in Georgia and Ukraine. Unfortunately, Russia is no longer a partner, but a revisionist state determined to create a new Iron Curtain. One can only wonder why the leaders in Kremlin want to revive an old conflict, when they could offer their public a peaceful and prosperous future with the Western world as a trusted partner. Instead Russia has opted for a competitive relationship. Western inaction would in the Kremlin be interpreted as an open invitation for Russia to continue its assertive policies toward NATO members and partners.

The key question to be asked at the Warsaw Summit is whether the present NATO deployment and deterrence can prevent a Russian attack on allies that border Russia? I think this is a big question mark. I fear a scenario where Russia could use the cover of a snap exercise to create a small invasion of NATO territory. NATO allies would face the choice of surrendering territory and credibility or risk a costly escalation involving a Russian military with highly sophisticated, layered air defences. As is always the case, prevention is less expensive and more effective than treatment.

After a decade of divestment, NATO's reduced defence posture of the post-Cold War era is not sufficient to deter the Russian threat. I am hopeful that the Alliance has reached a turning point with regard to its military spending. In Central Europe alone, spending was up 13 percent in 2015, and the United States has sent an important message with its decision to quadruple its military budget for Europe in 2017. The UK, France, and Germany have all announced plans for modest spending increases in the coming years. In total this will help deter Russian aggression.

The NATO decision to create a spearhead force and rotate military forces in its Eastern allies on a permanent basis has been an immediate and necessary step taken following Russia's illegal actions in Ukraine, but they are unlikely to be sufficient. In order to create credible deterrence, the West should establish a more permanent presence in Eastern Europe, for as long as necessary. One could question whether NATO's military bases would be of greater use in the Eastern than the Western part of Europe.

At the Warsaw Summit allies would also have to agree on a strategy to boost NATO's hybrid warfare capabilities. In Ukraine, Russia demonstrated the efficacy of 'hybrid warfare' and unveiled how ill-prepared NATO was to grapple with a military action below the threshold of overt invasion.

However, Russia's threatening tactics are not confined to conventional weapons or hybrid warfare. Under President Putin, Russia has enhanced its reliance on nuclear weapons and is engaged in dangerous nuclear brinkmanship and threats. Nuclear deterrence is a taboo among NATO allies. And rightly so, it is weapon we should never seek to use. But in the current security environment

THE KEY QUESTION TO BE ASKED AT THE WARSAW SUMMIT IS WHETHER THE PRESENT NATO DEPLOYMENT AND DETERRENCE CAN PREVENT A RUSSIAN ATTACK ON ALLIES THAT BORDER RUSSIA?

we have to keep all options open. NATO needs to use the full spectrum of tools at its disposal to create an effective deterrence.

Russia will do whatever it can to dilute the outcome of the Warsaw Summit. It will argue fiercely that NATO presence in Eastern Europe is in violation with the 1997 NATO - Russia Founding Act. We should remind Russia that this is a self-inflicted wound. Their illegal actions in Ukraine have dramatically changed the European landscape and forced NATO to respond in defence of its allies.

Russia's actions have unveiled its real intentions. Moscow aims to undermine the law-based principles of European security and the liberal world order that the United States established following World War II. NATO reacts to Russia's assertive behavior because its member countries have an interest in the preservation of the international system – which has secured peace and prosperity on the European continent since World War II. I find it quite apprehensible as democracies and law-based societies have a natural stake in preserving this global security order.

Russia will play a long game, and NATO allies and partners in cooperation with the EU and key international players should be ready to do the same thing. The Warsaw Summit comes at a crucial time in history. The Summit should send a clear message about the resilience of the Alliance and agree on concrete steps to counter threats to our way of life. ■



Anna Fotyga is Member of the European Parliament, Chair of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence.



Anna Fotyga MEP

INDIVISIBLE SECURITY

In the second half of the 1940s, major steps were taken to finally consolidate the West in both military and economic terms. The creation of NATO on the 4th April 1949 and provision of the 'Marshall Plan' for Europe are considered to be milestones on this path. During the same period, in Poland, armed partisan groups were engaged in combatting communist regime imposed on us by the Yalta agreements. The last of those protesters were captured and killed by the communists in October 1963. Our future was bleak despite the huge contribution Poland gave in fight against Nazi Germany. In almost all of Central and East European

(CEE) countries, rebellions erupted throughout the decades of the Cold War.

We saw prospects for a better future with the victory of Polish Solidarity and the subsequent collapse of the Berlin wall.

Nations of my region were jubilant not only after regaining sovereignty, but also after the reaffirmation of this status by joining the NATO Alliance. We were naturally aware of the ongoing diplomatic efforts vis-a-vis Russia. However, it was important that no third country was granted a veto right in NATO decisions. The principle of self-determination of sovereign nations as stipulated

in fundamental UN and OSCE documents is still valid.

After years of meandering policies, despite Western efforts, Russia finally decided to go its own way. Russia openly disregarded international obligations, threatened territorial integrity of certain neighbouring countries such as - Ukraine and Georgia, as well as being engaged in social, economic or political destabilisation of many other countries. Most recently, this dubious activity is visible also in the place of our utmost concern - Syria.

Despite many years of NATO's existence, due to Russia in the East and radical Islam from the South, we still face challenges to

our security. During his recent visit to Warsaw (30 May 2016), Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary General of NATO underlined that during the Warsaw Summit, the Alliance will take decisions to strengthen its deterrence and defence, as well as step up efforts to project stability beyond its borders. Effective deterrence requires greater financial efforts, in particular in Europe. We have to dedicate even more than required by already agreed expenditure goals. The cooperation between NATO and the EU may bring real added value, provided we, the Europeans, focus on the use of existing tools at our disposal. We are capable of preventing

conflicts and introducing effective post-conflict rehabilitation by use of diverse development measures.

We, the NATO and EU countries must stand united in combatting terrorism, as after the Paris and Brussels terrorist attacks have shown, the menace seems to be as palpable as ever.

Unity, both in practical and ideational terms, is necessary to tackle the challenges, as common perception of threats is still an important target for our societies. The Russian aggression in Ukraine changed geopolitical situation in CEE. The people of this region have become sensitive to security issues and therefore support

both political and budgetary endeavours furthering military security. One by one, countries of my region have launched national programs aimed at fulfilling NATO requirements. Countries of my region like Poland and Estonia have already reached the NATO defence expenditures target. We are aware of the necessity to engage in peacekeeping and stabilisation operations in the South, deployed within NATO, UN or EU formats. We modernise armies, we train people in the territorial defence tasks, nevertheless, to be able to maintain this ambitious program we need a NATO presence in our part of Europe. Such measures enable real empowerment of Europe in defence matters. ■

WORLD DEFENCE BUDGETS 2014


TOP 15 DEFENCE BUDGETS (BILLION US\$)




Source: Prof Malcolm Chalmers, RUSI/BBC (2015) 'Can the UK afford to defend itself'

NORTH AMERICAN VS EUROPEAN EXPENDITURE LEVELS IN NATO

DEFENCE EXPENDITURES (BILLION US\$)



World military spending, while falling for the third year in a row should not hide the increase in Eastern Europe. However, current US military spending is still 45 per cent higher than in 2001, just before the 11 September terrorist attacks on the USA. Within the EU, the conflict in Ukraine is prompting central European countries, the Baltics states and the Nordic countries to increase military spending, reversing downward trends in military budget. However, Western Europe is not following a similar trend despite the fact that NATO is asking its member states to spend 2 per cent of GDP on military spending.



Source: NATO (2016) Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2008-2015)



Peter Brookes

A NEW NATO FOR A NEW AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION



It seems almost a certainty that the next American President will face a large number of foreign policy and national security challenges. It is arguable that one of those will be working to reinvigorate and strengthen NATO.

There is, of course, a significant debate in Washington, D.C. and elsewhere within NATO about this issue. Not everyone agrees that NATO needs to make any adjustments at all. I differ with that assessment.

Consequently, the purpose of this short essay, written in advance of the upcoming Warsaw summit, is to present some ideas that the next American Presidential Administration should consider for the purposes of bolstering transatlantic security.

I LOSING OUR WAY

The reason for NATO's existence is well-known: the defence of Europe from aggression. This is its core mission. But since the end of the Cold

War it has slowly drifted away from that central purpose. It is time to return to NATO's founding principle.

It is understandable why and how NATO got to where it is today after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Its long-standing, driving purpose disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The post-Cold War period was thought to be, perhaps, the 'end of history', as some posited.

That is not to say that NATO has failed to accomplish important missions within and without Europe since then, but due to the resurgence of Russia, it is time to unwaveringly return to the task of defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its member states.

I RESURGENT RUSSIA

Russia's seizure of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 and the ensuing insurgency in Eastern Ukraine is a geostrategic 'wake-up call' that NATO cannot ignore. Russian President Vladimir Putin intends

to try to return Russia to its former Soviet glory if at all possible.

This strategic ambition could come at NATO's expense in the Baltics and or Central/Eastern Europe.

While global oil and natural gas prices may hinder Russia's planned military modernisation and political adventurism abroad, Moscow has not given up on recapitalising the Russian armed forces as a means of advancing the Kremlin's perceived national interests.

Indeed, Russia is developing and or fielding some of the most advanced weapons in the world today, including fighter aircraft (e.g. Su-35), air defenses (e.g. S-400), ballistic missiles (e.g. RS-26 and -28) and offensive cyber capabilities, among others.

The Cold War-like return of Russian nuclear-capable bomber flights along NATO's periphery, unprofessional airmanship by its pilots around NATO patrol



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aircraft and warships and reported submarine incursions are all deeply troubling.

Moscow's violations of the conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaties, continued occupation of Georgia and build-up of forces in its exclave of Kaliningrad should not be of comfort to NATO members.

Today, NATO must ask itself: Is Russia deterred?

THE WAY FORWARD

There is no shortage of possible paths for NATO to follow in the coming years, but a new American President would be well advised to consider implementing the following suggestions in order to ensure NATO meets its core mission in the years to come.

THE NEW AMERICAN PRESIDENT SHOULD:

- *Publicly state that the United States will resolutely live up to its treaty obligations to NATO, reaffirming our commitment to defend it from aggression and, if necessary, liberate its member states from occupation;*
- *Conduct an internal U.S. Government and external expert review of the threat NATO faces to determine if U.S. and NATO forces are ready for that challenge;*
- *Help allies develop military capabilities and capacity so that NATO members can better take responsibility for their own defence and national security;*
- *Strongly encourage NATO allies to increase their defence expenditures to two percent of gross domestic product (GDP), if not more;*



- *Take steps to build and or recapitalize the capabilities and readiness of American ground, air and naval forces, including complementary cyber and space forces;*
- *Undertake a comprehensive inside- and outside-government review of the direction of U.S.-Russia relations and develop effective policies in light of recent events;*
- *Reinvest in its political, economic and military relationships with allies and partners in the Baltics and in Central and Eastern Europe;*
- *Improve our security relationship with Finland and Sweden so that NATO would have access to necessary airfields, ports, bases and logistics support should NATO need to be defended;*
- *Base appropriate levels of NATO troops — permanently - in the Baltics and in Central and Eastern Europe;*
- *Shift NATO military training from counterterrorism/counterinsurgency operations towards large-scale force-on-force and collective security operations focused on the European theater;*
- *Pursue regular, small-scale and large-scale NATO training exercises in order to ensure high-levels of cohesion, interoperability and the readiness of*

NATO forces for military operations;

- *Restore American and allied intelligence resources and collection and analysis operations that focus on the Russian threat to NATO;*
- *Promote increased investment in allied military technology, the NATO defence industrial base, and weapons systems development across NATO;*

IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE WHY AND HOW NATO GOT TO WHERE IT IS TODAY AFTER THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL. ITS LONG-STANDING, DRIVING PURPOSE DISAPPEARED WITH THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD WAS THOUGHT TO BE, PERHAPS, THE "END OF HISTORY," AS SOME POSITED.

- *Encourage increased focus on ballistic and cruise missile defence programs to meet the existing and evolving ballistic and cruise missile threat to NATO countries;*
- *Conduct more high-level, high-visibility, political-military engagement with NATO partners both in Europe and in the United States as a demonstration of solidarity and assurance;*
- *Continue efforts to enlarge NATO, develop candidate countries for membership*

and continue security engagement with regional non-NATO states as appropriate;

- *Ensure robust U.S. troop presence and capabilities for NATO, including basing at least four Brigade Combat Teams in Europe and providing for appropriate levels of prepositioned stockpiles of equipment and materiel;*
- *Focus defence deterrence efforts on potentially vulnerable frontline NATO states, which face aggression most directly and immediately.*

NATO is as important to peace and stability in Europe in the 21st century as it was in the 20th century. As such, the Alliance needs to return to its basic task of providing for the security of its membership. Without question, NATO must be able to resolutely meet its core political and military mission in Europe.

While NATO's willingness to operate outside Europe should be lauded, it does not need to be everywhere, especially if it is not able to meet its fundamental mission tasking. If everything is important, then nothing is important.

The next American President should take steps with America's NATO allies to return the Alliance to its founding principles of deterring aggression and defending member states' sovereignty and territory if necessary.


Fighting and winning in Europe is NATO's key mission—and it must be determinedly ready and able to do so. ■

Dr Peter Brookes wishes to acknowledge that this essay was deeply informed by the thoughtful research of Heritage colleagues, but the views ultimately expressed here are his own.

NATO DEFENCE

ALLIANCE EXPENDITURE OVERALL 1990-2014

DEFENCE EXPENDITURES
NATO EUROPE (BILLION US\$)





The cuts to defence expenditures, deepened by the financial crisis, diminish the options available to the Alliance and reduces the extent to which Allies equitably share responsibilities. The defence investment pledge is an important signal that Allies are committed to addressing the mismatch between challenges faced and resources available.

In Wales, NATO leaders pledged to stop the cuts to defence budgets, to increase investment as economies recover, to make the most effective use of available funds, and to strive for a more balanced sharing of the costs and responsibilities of their common defence. This is the first time NATO Heads of State and Government have made this kind of commitment.

Source: NATO (2015) 'The Secretary General's Annual Report 2014, Chapter 2


SPENDING AS GDP

NATO DEFENCE SPENDING AS GDP



Source: NATO (2016) Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2008-2015)


ALLIANCE REAL GDP DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AND CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS YEARS 2007-2013



Source: NATO (2014) 'Secretary General's Annual Report 2013', Economic pressures on defence spending

DEFENCE EXPENDITURES AS GDP VS SPENDING ON EQUIPMENT

BASED ON 2010 PRICES - ESTIMATES FOR 2015







DEFENCE EXPENDITURES AS GDP VS SPENDING ON EQUIPMENT

ANNUAL REAL CHANGE

2013 2014 2015



Source: www.nato.int



NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS

NATO began reaching out to Russia in 1990. Over the following two decades, the Alliance proposed to Russia an unprecedented series of partnership initiatives and practical cooperation activities against common security challenges.

However, in March 2014, in response to Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine, NATO suspended practical cooperation with Russia. At the same time, NATO has kept channels for communication with Russia open. This fact sheet sets out the key dates and events in the relationship.



1990

LONDON SUMMIT: "NO LONGER ADVERSARIES"

On 5-6 July 1990, the NATO Summit in London proposed to the countries of the then Warsaw Pact a joint declaration stating that:

"We are no longer adversaries and reaffirm our intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."

In this spirit, the Alliance invited President Mikhail Gorbachev and representatives of Central and Eastern European countries to address the North Atlantic Council.

The London Declaration emphasised the need to conclude arms control agreements and reduce reliance on nuclear weapons following the full withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central and Eastern European states. The Declaration stated NATO's determination to begin a major transformation and work with all the countries of Europe to create enduring peace on the continent.



1994

THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

In June 1994, Russia became the first country to join NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), a programme of practical bilateral cooperation between NATO and partner countries.

The Brussels Summit Declaration defined the goals of PfP as expanding and intensifying political and military cooperation in Europe, increasing stability, diminishing threats to peace and building strengthened relationships by "promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance."



1997

THE NATO-RUSSIA FOUNDING ACT

On 27 May 1997, NATO leaders and President Boris Yeltsin signed the Founding Act, expressing their determination to "build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security."

The Act established the goal of cooperation in areas such as peacekeeping, arms control, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and theatre missile defence.

In the Founding Act, NATO and Russia agreed to base their cooperation on the principles of human rights and civil liberties; refraining from the threat or use of force against each other or any other state; respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security; prevention of conflicts and dispute settlement by peaceful means.

THE BACKGROUND



2002-2008

COOPERATION THROUGH THE NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL

On 28 May 2002 in Rome, NATO leaders and President Vladimir Putin signed a declaration, "NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality," establishing the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) as a consensus-based body of equal members. Russia was the only NATO partner offered such a privileged partnership. NATO and Russia declared to open a new page in relations aimed at "enhancing our ability to work together in areas of common interest and to stand together against common threats and risks to our security."

The NRC led to stronger cooperation in areas including counter-terrorism, crisis management, arms control and theatre missile defence. NATO and Russia cooperated to support the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The joint work included Russian provision of transit routes for ISAF, counter narcotics training for police and customs officers from the region and support for the Afghan army's helicopter fleet.



2008

THE GEORGIA CRISIS

NATO found Russia's military action in Georgia to be "disproportionate and inconsistent with its peacekeeping role, as well as incompatible with the principles of peaceful conflict resolution set out in the Helsinki Final Act, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration."

At the Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl on 4 April 2009, NATO leaders recognised disagreements with Russia over Georgia but decided to resume practical and political cooperation. They also expressed readiness to make the NATO-Russia Council a more efficient vehicle for cooperation.



2010-2014

SEEKING A NEW STAGE OF COOPERATION

At a NATO-Russia Council held during the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO leaders and President Dmitry Medvedev agreed to embark on "a new stage of cooperation towards a true strategic partnership", based on the goals and principles of the Founding Act and the NATO-Russia Rome Declaration.

NATO met its commitment to cooperation. The Alliance invited Russia to explore the potential for cooperation on missile defence. NATO and Russia agreed to reinforce cooperation against terrorism and piracy.

In the following years, NATO and Russia worked together in support of the Afghan army's helicopter fleet, conducted joint counter-piracy and submarine-rescue exercises, and discussed a joint military mission to help dispose of Syria's chemical weapons in 2013 and early 2014.



2014-2016

RESPONDING TO THE UKRAINE CRISIS

In March 2014, Russia illegally and illegitimately annexed Crimea, part of Ukraine's sovereign territory. In response, NATO Foreign Ministers decided to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia on 1 April 2014. Since then, Russia has continued its aggressive actions against Ukraine, including through continued and deliberate destabilisation of eastern Ukraine. As a result, our cooperation remains suspended. However, channels for dialogue remain open. The NATO-Russia Council has met three times since the suspension of practical cooperation, most recently on 20 April 2016. The Secretary General and Deputy Secretary General also engage regularly with their Russian counterparts.

At the Wales Summit in September 2014, NATO Heads of State and Government made it clear that the nature of the Alliance's relations with Russia and our aspiration for partnership will be contingent on us clear, constructive change in Russia's actions which demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities.

Dr Roberts Zile MEP

WISHFUL THINKING VERSUS REALITY

NATO'S INCREASED PRESENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE IS A NECESSITY, NOT PROVOCATION



Dr Roberts Zile,
Member of the
European Parliament,
Member of the ECR
Bureau

NATO's Wales Summit in 2014 was a positive event for Eastern Europe and especially so for the three Baltic States. Back then NATO's member countries agreed to enhance the deterrence capabilities of the Alliance – a set of measures called the Readiness Action Plan (RAP). The core feature of RAP would see the creation of a five thousand-strong Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). This new, yet very significant element within the broader 40,000 strong NATO Response Force (NRF) would insure that the Alliance had a new tool to counter Russia's newfound reliance on hybrid warfare.

Russia's tactics and actions within the context of the illegal annexation of Crimea and, more generally, the "internal conflict" in Ukraine were a surprise to some.

Not so for Latvia and its two Baltic neighbours Estonia and Lithuania which were not naive enough to believe that there is such a thing as a "softer" or "more pragmatic" Russia. The Baltic States have suffered under the Soviet Union for long enough to build an immunity against the lies of the giant neighbour to their East. It might be a different matter for those inhabitants of Latvia who are still living pre-independence memories which includes a large daily dose of Russian TV news and thereby belonging to a different society – notwithstanding their failure to becoming fully-fledged citizens.

Despite all the progress achieved thus far, there is still work to be done to increase the defence capabilities of Eastern Europe. The measures agreed in Wales did not include a plan to station NATO

troops in the Baltic States and Poland. Yet that is precisely what is needed to ensure real security for Eastern Europe. This is all the more necessary as recently two NATO generals were quoted in the news, stating that the VJTF, whilst an important step forward, is "too vulnerable" and would be at risk of being overrun by Russia given the country's substantial military infrastructure along its borders.

One could also add that the Baltic States, particularly Latvia, are still reliant on Russian gas as well as being partly incorporated in the ex-Soviet electricity grids and rail market – thus already being involuntary integrated in the wrong region to some degree. Given the slow and painful progress of the Rail Baltica railway project that aims to connect the region with the rest of Europe, the situation is even gloomier still.

DESPITE ALL THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED THUS FAR, THERE IS STILL WORK TO BE DONE TO INCREASE THE DEFENCE CAPABILITIES OF EASTERN EUROPE.

More importantly, there is the weak spot of Suwalki corridor – a 100-kilometer-long land gap connecting the two NATO Member States, Lithuania and Poland. By controlling the gap, Russia can literally cut the Baltic States off not only from Poland, which is one of the most important NATO partners of the three countries, but the rest of Europe too.

On the other hand, it needs to be understood that NATO is made up of a number of countries whose interests are somewhat divergent. For that reason it should not be

assumed that there is a unified voice within NATO that lists the security of the Baltic States and Poland as its number one priority.

Understanding all of the above and in order to overcome the current risks, NATO's Warsaw Summit in July provides the perfect opportunity to hammer out the details for stationing of four battalions in Poland and the Baltic States. This would show that the Alliance is serious about its commitments and provide the Eastern EU States with greater peace of mind. More practically, the stationing of troops would enable the Alliance with a capacity to actually defend the territories of Eastern Europe, not just deter the risks.

As NATO's presence in Eastern Europe increases, there are voices calling for this to be reversed. The argument goes that Russia feels threatened and should not be

provoked. Such claims are unfounded and the opposite is in fact true. It was indeed a lack of opposition and a credible threat that enabled Russia's annexation of Crimea. Baltic States are no different. Russia's imperial ambitions have not diminished whilst the wishful thinking of certain people in the West only plays into Russia's hands. In a way one can hope that people advocating a "dialogue" with Russia are at least benefiting from this because otherwise one has to conclude that Putin's propaganda war has also gained an audience in the West.

I believe in the right of every country to choose its own foreign policy, including mine. I am certain that the Baltic States and Poland choose security. If we do not, Russia will choose for us. The sooner the wishful thinkers understand this, the better for everyone. More NATO means more security. ■

ALLIED LAND COMMAND IN EUROPE





Dr Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski

RUSSIA AS AN EXPORTER OF INSTABILITY

RUSSIA HAS ADVANCED SPECIALLY BECAUSE NOBODY OBSERVED, WATCHED AND UNDERSTOOD WHAT SHE WAS DOING. EXPOSE HER PLANS, AND YOU HALF DEFEAT THEM. RAISE PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST HER AND YOU DOUBLE HER DIFFICULTIES... DEPEND UPON IT, THAT IS THE BEST WAY TO SAVE YOU FROM THE NECESSITY OF MAKING WAR AGAINST HER. LORD HENRY PALMERSTON'S (FOREIGN MINISTER) LETTER TO LORD WILLIAM LAMB MELBOURNE – THE PRIME MINISTER - OCTOBER 1835 R.



Dr Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski, Professor at the University of Lodz, Poland

Churchill was wrong. Russia is not “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma”, and “the key” to it for sure is not the “Russian national interest”. Everybody knows millions of people were killed in the struggle for power inside Kremlin in the 20th century, very few remember that the Russian political class was able to dissolve the USSR for the same reason in 1991. It is the struggle for the Kremlin among post-soviet *siloviks* mafias that shapes Russia’s internal politics. According to Russian sociologist Olga Krishtanovskaya, 78 per cent of the Russian political elites have their roots in either KGB or GRU (Military Intelligence) where they were taught how to manipulate people and how to kill them. There is only one ultimate goal for all of them – to be in power, to derive profits from that and to remain unpunished. That was the core of the deal between Yeltsin and Putin while the latter was taking over Russia. What he needed to take power was effectively war and destabilisation and he created this with the terrorist bomb attacks on his own compatriots in Moscow, Volgograd and Buynaksk to launch the second Chechen war in 1999. Alexandr Litvinenko who revealed the truth behind this was poisoned.

Putin has ruled Russia since 1999 and the exporting of instability is the main tool of his foreign policy. It is not his invention but has been for a long time a Russian historical tradition. He inherited this modus operandi from the past both directly in the frozen conflicts in Transnistria, Nagorno Karabakh, South Osetia and Abkhazia and more remotely from the plethora of historical conflicts that Russian has been part of. In the 17th and 18th centuries Russia was destabilising Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in order to conquer it. In the 19th century it did the same to Turkey and to the Habsburg Monarchy to dominate the Balkans and

Balkanisation is still a synonym of disorder. In the 20th century Russia destabilised the entire world by plotting with Hitler to blow up the international order hoping for a worldwide revolution. Today Russia continues this tradition by warming up the frozen conflicts in the Caucasus (Georgia 2008), inspires new ones in Ukraine (2014-?), gives fuel to the on-going ones (Syria) and prepares future conflicts (perhaps in the Baltic basin?).

The only region in Europe having been affected by wars and then being effectively stabilised after the cold war was the post-Yugoslavian area where peace was restored not in the cooperation with Russia but in spite of its support for the main source of troubles (the Milošević dictatorship) and in spite of its desperate efforts to maintain the tension (for example the Russian battalion involved in the Priština airport seizure).

Russia sponsored terrorism in the Soviet times. Putin was a Colonel in the KGB then. Today while portrayed by Kremlin’s propaganda as a “leader of the civilised world in the struggle against Islamist terrorism” and a “defender of the traditional Christian values against decadent ‘Gayropa’ ” he should provoke nothing but mockery – a KGB officer as a “Christian knight” – come on.

Russia exports four goods: oil, gas, corruption and destabilisation. Raw materials are the main source of money in Russian budget spent on armaments (used to blackmail other countries or to invade them) and to corrupt the European political class (Schröder) or to support radical parties in the West.

The Russians made ‘gas wars’ destabilising the supply of energy raw materials to Europe with its climax in 2009 must be mentioned too in order to complete the image.

Lord Palmerston said to show what the Russian goals are for the world, half the job is to prevent Russia from achieving them. What are therefore the Russian goals today?


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
IN EUROPE

- *to turn Ukraine into a failed state. The potential success of Ukrainian reforms (as well as the Georgian ones in Shaakashvili’s government) constitutes an existential challenge for Putin’s ‘suzerain democracy’ and “must be prevented with all the means”.*
- *to destroy transatlantic ties – to get rid of American presence in Europe and to destroy the EU system turning it into the 19th century type concerto of the powers with Russia as a major player and the countries between Russia and Germany as non-existing factors. This is why Russia supports all radicals from the left and from the right, manipulates the migration crisis, provokes new waves of refugees to flee from Syria and undermines the prestige of European Governments such as the German Government attacked with the story of the Russian-German repatriate teenager allegedly raped by immigrants.*

Russia inspires disorder in its neighbourhood in Norway and Finland (Russian sponsored immigration route to Europe), Sweden (air and submarine intrusions) the Baltic states (Russian minority riots – 2007 and citizens kidnapping – the Kohver case) in Poland, Hungary and Romania (the propaganda war aimed at the revitalisation of the memory of historical conflicts

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ACCORDING TO RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGIST OLGA KRISHTANOVSKAYA, 78 PER CENT OF THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL ELITES HAVE THEIR ROOTS IN EITHER KGB OR GRU (MILITARY INTELLIGENCE) WHERE THEY WERE TAUGHT HOW TO MANIPULATE PEOPLE AND HOW TO KILL THEM.

between Poland and Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, Hungary and Ukraine, Hungary and Slovakia, Romania and Ukraine, Romania and Hungary etc. The best example of this is the Russian official proposal of March 2014 for Poland, Hungary and Romania to partition Ukraine).

IN THE MIDDLE EAST

- to maintain Russian influence by having military bases in Tartus and Latakia and therefore maintaining its relationship with the Assad regime by supporting the Alawite stronghold on the coast.
- to have a never ending war in the interior (in Syria and Iraq) – in a conflict that

would consume Western resources and political attention by drawing them away from Europe. Russia also wants the oil price to increase (due to its financial reliance on this resource) and to prevent the building up of gas and oil transit route from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean – a way to supply energy to Europe out of Russian control.

The only real goal of Putin and his siloviks is to stay at power. The Russian raw material exporting economy is declining in an irreversible way. The decreasing standard of living for ordinary Russians is causing his government a serious problem.

Putin has ruled the country since 1999 – long enough not to be able to blame his predecessor. The only way to manage this internal crisis is to blame the “Americans and their European puppets”.

When the war started in Ukraine a deputy from the Russian Parliament said of the West “They will scold and scold and then they will stop scolding”. Putin needs “small victorious wars”. War and destabilisation abroad is his only instrument to manage the internal crisis and to stay in power. Acknowledging the Russian perception of “Western weakness” and Russia having international impunity will result in more aggressive behaviour by Russia in the future. ■

RUSSIA'S TOP 5 MYTHS ABOUT NATO

MYTH 1: NATO is trying to encircle Russia.

MYTH 1

FACT

This claim ignores the facts of geography. Russia's land border is just over 20,000 kilometres long. Of that, 1,215 kilometres, or less than one-sixteenth, face current NATO members.

Claims that NATO is building bases around Russia are similarly groundless. Outside the territory of NATO nations, NATO only maintains a significant military presence in three places: Kosovo, Afghanistan, and at sea off the Horn of Africa. All three operations are carried out under United Nations mandate, and thus carry the approval of Russia, along with all other Security Council members. Before Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine began, Russia provided logistical support to the Afghan mission, and cooperated directly with the counter-piracy operation, showing clearly that Russia viewed them as a benefit, not a threat.

NATO has partnership relationships with many countries in Europe and Asia. Such partnerships, which are requested by the partners in question, focus exclusively on issues agreed with them, such as disaster preparedness and relief, transparency, armed forces reform, and counter-terrorism. These partnerships cannot legitimately be considered a threat to Russia, or to any other country in the region, let alone an attempt at encirclement.

MYTH 2: NATO has tried to isolate or marginalise Russia.

MYTH 2

FACT

Since the early 1990s, the Alliance has consistently worked to build a cooperative relationship with Russia on areas of mutual interest.

NATO began reaching out, offering dialogue in place of confrontation, at the London NATO Summit of July 1990. In the following years, the Alliance promoted dialogue and cooperation by creating new fora, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), open to the whole of Europe, including Russia.

In 1997 NATO and Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, creating the NATO Russia Permanent Joint Council. In 2002 they upgraded that relationship, creating the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). They reaffirmed their commitment to the Founding Act at NATO-Russia summits in Rome in 2002 and in Lisbon in 2010.

Since the foundation of the NRC, NATO and Russia have worked together on issues ranging from counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism to submarine rescue and civil emergency planning. We set out to build a unique relationship with Russia, one based not just on mutual interests but also on cooperation and the shared objective for a Europe whole, free and at peace. No other partner has been offered a comparable relationship, nor a similar comprehensive institutional framework.

EUROPE'S FASTEST GROWING POLITICAL MOVEMENT

NATO missile defence targets Russia and the Iran agreement proves it.

MYTH
3

FACT

NATO's missile defence system is not designed or directed against Russia. It does not pose a threat to Russia's strategic deterrent.

As explained by NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow, geography and physics make it impossible for the NATO system to shoot down Russian intercontinental missiles from NATO sites in Romania or Poland. Their capabilities are too limited, their planned numbers too few, and their locations too far south or too close to Russia to do so.

Russian officials have confirmed that the planned NATO shield will not, in fact, undermine Russia's deterrent. Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, Russia's missile defence envoy, said on January 26, 2015, that "neither the current, nor even the projected" missile defence system "could stop or cast doubt on Russia's strategic missile potential." Finally, the Russian claim that the framework agreement on Iran's nuclear programme obviates the need for NATO missile defence is wrong on two counts.

The Iranian agreement does not cover the proliferation of ballistic-missile technology which is an issue completely different from nuclear questions. Furthermore, NATO has repeatedly made clear that missile defence is not about any one country, but about the threat posed by proliferation more generally. In fact, over 30 countries have obtained, or are trying to obtain, ballistic missile technology.

The Iran framework agreement does not change those facts.

NATO exercises are a provocation which threatens Russia.

MYTH
4

FACT

Every nation has the right to conduct exercises, as long as they do so within their international obligations, including notifying the actual numbers and providing observation opportunities when required.

In order to promote mutual trust and transparency, OSCE members are bound by the Vienna Document to inform one another in advance of exercises which include more than 9,000 troops, unless the exercises are snap tests of readiness.

NATO and Allies have consistently stood by the terms and the spirit of the Vienna Document. Those exercises which crossed the notification threshold were announced well in advance. This is why Russia was invited to send observers to the NATO exercise Trident Juncture in October- November 2015.

Russia, on the other hand, has repeatedly called snap exercises including tens of thousands of troops, with some of them taking place close to NATO territory. This practice of calling massive exercises without warning is a breach of the spirit of the Vienna Document, raising tension and undermining trust. This is especially the case because Russia's military takeover of Crimea was masked by exactly such a snap exercise.

It is therefore Russia's exercises, not NATO's, which are a threat to stability.

NATO's Open Door policy creates new dividing lines in Europe and deepens existing ones.

MYTH
5

FACT

NATO's Open Door policy has helped close Cold War-era divisions in Europe. NATO enlargement has contributed to spreading democracy, security and stability further across Europe.

By choosing to adopt the standards and principles of NATO, aspirant countries gave their democracies the strongest possible anchor. And by taking the pledge to defend NATO, they received the pledge that NATO would protect them.

NATO membership is not imposed on countries. Each sovereign country has the right to choose for itself whether it joins any treaty or alliance.

This fundamental principle is enshrined in international agreements including the Helsinki Final Act which says that every state has the right "to belong or not to belong to international organisations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance." And by signing the NATO-Russia Founding Act, Russia agreed to respect states' "inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security."

Over the past 65 years, 28 countries have chosen freely, and in accordance with their domestic democratic processes, to join NATO. Not one has asked to leave. This is their sovereign choice. Article 13 of the Washington Treaty specifically gives Allies the right to leave should they wish to.





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