




DEFENCE, FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY



New
Direction

the foundation for european reform



RUSSIA'S INFLUENCE AND PRESENCE IN ESTONIA

MARIITA MATTIISEN - PRZEMYSŁAW ŻURAWSKI VEL GRAJEWSKI - AGATA SUPINSKA

New Direction



A Brussels-based free market, euro-realist think-tank and publisher,
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We have satellite offices in London, Rome and Warsaw.

Mariita Mattisen

Prof Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski

Agata Supinska

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Tomasz Poręba

Tomasz Poręba is a Member of the European Parliament and President of New Direction – The Foundation for European Reform.

These three reports by New Direction on the Russian regime's influence in the Baltic States come in a very important time period, especially in light of the current debates on lifting sanctions against Russia, the increase in polls of political parties being neutral towards Russia, and the never-ending hybrid war in Ukraine led by President Putin. Using its old divide et impera tactics, Russia is challenging the unity of the EU Member States by taking full advantage of different factors, including economic links and support from political parties with especially strong ties to the Kremlin.

It is time we look closer at Putin's game, a big part of which is a conflict in the East of Ukraine, and react before it is too late. As stated in these New Direction studies, 'at the heat of the fighting in Donbass in early 2014, 87 per cent of Lithuanians admitted fear that Russia might again occupy their country'.

If Ukrainian conflict teaches us something, it is that the Russian regime has recently diverted much of its resources and focus from mobilising hard power in protecting its interests to soft power, including funding media outlets and political parties.

The Baltic cases precisely identify this new aspect of Putin's influence across the EU. These studies describe in detail the ongoing game played by the Russian regime and neatly sums up its current policy towards

its former 'soviet republics' and its attempts to undermine European unity through energy interests, political funding, and media (dis)information.

Similar to its efforts in Bulgaria, the Russian regime is using gas exports as a political weapon in the Baltic States in order to undermine European solidarity by creating political and economic rifts. As the Baltic States form an energy island, traditionally heavily reliant on Russian imports, they have little manoeuvring space to lead an autonomous and independent energy policy.

With regard to (dis)information, Russia exerts a firm influence by 'generously' funding Baltic media outlets at both the local and national levels. Ethnic minorities still use Russian media (mainly TV channels) as their main source of information. There is a strong correlation between time spent watching Russian TV channels and perception of Putin's policies in a more positive light. The recent propaganda multimedia project called Sputnik poses a threat to the Baltic States' information security and challenges their sovereignty.

Moreover, due to historical ties, it is much more difficult to grasp the Russian regime's influence in Baltic States than it is to grasp its influence in other EU Member States. The Kremlin can play the Soviet nostalgia card as a way to influence public opinion. The same logic is behind the funding of political parties which are mostly supported by Russian-speaking populations.

Last but not least, the Baltic States' vulnerabilities in the case of military aggression should not be treated as purely hypothetical. The last NATO summit held in Warsaw drew special attention to the Suwalki gap, a key weakness in the area's military defence.

After the study on Russia's influence in Bulgaria, this new research by New Direction should be used by policy advisers and politicians to better understand the Russian regime's behaviour and reshape their policy towards Russia. Before we are able to compete externally, we must first establish internal sovereignty. •

Tomasz Poręba

Tomasz Poręba

INTRODUCTION

RUSSIA'S PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE IN ESTONIA



Estonia has always considered itself as a Nordic and Baltic country. Over the centuries Estonian culture and religion has always been leaning more towards the West than linked to Russia. A small country both in terms of area (45,000 km²) and population (1,3 million inhabitants) Estonia did not always had a chance to make its own way. During the history, the present Estonia's territories had been taken over by the Danes, Germans, Swedes and only in the 18th Century under the reign of tsar Peter the Great, Estonia became a part of the Russian Empire. In the early 20th century, after the breakup of the empire, Estonia existed as an independent nation state in 1920s and 1930s until it was seized by the Soviet Union in 1940s. Most of the Western states had never recognized *de jure* the annexation of Estonia

by the USSR. Over the five decades of the Cold War period Estonians maintained their language, history, literature, folk music and other traditions.

Thus, in 1991, after the collapse of the USSR Estonia was not founded as a new state but it was re-established with the knowledge and experience of the previous independence period. In its foreign policy, at first, Estonia focused on joining various international institutions (UN, Council of Europe, CBSS, OSCE etc.) and also set a goal to become a member of the EU and NATO. Despite different contradictory opinions and debates over the membership, the overall policy was consistent and Estonia was admitted to both organizations in 2004 and continued its Western-oriented policy. •

1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF RUSSIAN-ESTONIAN RELATIONS



Russian-Estonian relations can be traced back to the beginning of the 11th century, when prince Yaroslav the Smart occupied Estonian city Tartu. In the year 1710, Estonian authorities surrendered to the Russian tsar, but under his auspices a self-governing Baltic *Landestaat* was formed within the empire remain with its own legal system and preference to Lutheran church. It lasted till the end of the Russian Empire in the WWI. The collapse of the Russian Empire resulted for Estonia with independence, which was declared on 24 February 1918. It was followed by the Estonian Independence War ended by the Tartu Peace Treaty signed in February 1920. By this act Russia became the first state to recognize Estonia's independence *de jure*.

When the WWII began, Estonia declared neutrality but it continuously faced Soviet military. In August, 1939 Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed the notorious Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with its secret dividing the countries located between the Soviet Union and Germany to their respective spheres of interests. As a result, the mutual assistance pact between Estonia and the Soviet Union was signed in September 1939 which allowed the Soviets to establish its military bases in Estonia. In 1940 the Soviet Union occupied Estonia and began to destroy its independent nation state institutions. The Soviets forced rigged elections (under military presence) in occupied Estonia that resulted with the establishment

of the Soviet order in the country. With some exceptions, the Western world never recognized Estonia as a lawful part of the USSR, claiming it to be under the occupation until Estonia regained independence in the early 1990s.

During the WWII and Soviet times Estonia lost around 20 percent of its population mainly due to deportations to Siberia and other parts of the Soviet empire. After Stalin's death in 1953, there came a degree of softening in the political climate

described as restructuring of the Communist Party. It offered a bit more freedom for local ruling elites. The idea was never meant to end the communist rule and command economy but rather to make it work better. Eventually it ended up with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

At that time, public protests started in Estonia. At first they were related to the non-political issues like the natural environment but gradually grew into political demonstrations with massive participation



in Estonia, which ended with the new Soviet period of regime tightening under the leadership of Brezhnev. This period (1978-1985) is known as the Russification aimed at the assimilation of the non-Russian communities under the Soviet rule. It meant not only continuing influx of the Russian-speaking population from other parts of the Soviet Union but also preference for the Russian language in public life and schools. Whereas in 1934 Russians constituted 8,2 percent of the Estonia's population in 1989 it was 30,3 percent with the share of ethnic Estonians falling to 61,3 percent.

When Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the USSR a perestroika period started which can be

of 300,000 people at a time. In 1988 the "Singing Revolution" began, which was a massive peaceful protest against the Soviet occupation. In August, 1989 the "Baltic Way" was organised on the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. It was a hand-in-hand human chain from Tallinn to Vilnius in which all together around two million people participated. On 20 August 1991 Estonia restored its independence as the continuation of the pre-war Republic of Estonia. The first country to recognize Estonia's re-independence was Iceland. Russia, at that time Russian Federation within the defunct USSR headed by president Boris Yeltsin recognized Estonia's re-independence four days later.

Even though Estonia was an independent country, the Russian armed forces withdrew from the country not until 1994. Relations between two countries have been complex since. Estonian accession to the EU was not seen as a positive step by Russia, while the accession to NATO in 2004 was clearly perceived as a negative development.




However, the most problematic issue between the two countries in the first period of their relation was the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia. When in 1991 Estonia laid down its citizenship policy, most of the country's ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking minority were declared non-citizens. They could be naturalized as Estonian citizens and indeed majority of them did (150,000 individuals) but the process was lengthy especially in the early 1990s. It included Estonian language and constitution tests and the pledge of allegiance. On the other hand, the non-citizens had the same civil and social (although not political) rights. All these factors made the group of the people without Estonian citizenship relatively high in the 1990s. Today 84,2 percent of Estonia's inhabitants are Estonian citizens, 9,7 percent holds other citizenship (mostly Russian) and 6,1 percent is stateless (98,000 individuals).

During the 1990s the Russian State Duma adopted several resolutions condemning Estonian legislation on citizenship, language, naturalization and aliens and accepted various support programs for the compatriots abroad. These programs, however, have never been realized. The Russian government officials have regularly raised "the Russian minority question", equated with the alleged human rights violations and it has been a solid item on Russia's agenda towards Estonia.

There was relatively quiet time in Estonian-Russian relations between mid 1990s and 2007 when the Estonian government decided to move the so called "Bronze Soldier", a Soviet-time WW II memorial, from the Tallinn city centre to a military cemetery. The removal caused a real rebellion on the streets of Tallinn, mainly by the Russian-speaking minority, with accusations that the Estonian government supports fascism. It stirred an attack on the Estonian embassy in Moscow and Estonian government and private sector websites experienced cyber-attacks for many months, causing significant service disruptions to websites, servers, banking, media etc. These attacks captured international media attention. Mainly due to these events, Estonia has taken a leading role on cyber security, both in the EU and in NATO. Next year after the attacks, in 2008, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence was established in Estonia. •

2

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS



Diplomatic relations between Estonia and Russian Federation nowadays are mainly focused on practical issues. There has not been a high-level official meeting between the two countries for a while now, mainly due to Russia's on-going actions in Ukraine.

One of the main topics in Estonian-Russian diplomatic relations is the border treaty, signed but not ratified. The treaty negotiations started shortly after Estonia regained its independent and lasted until 2014 when the latest version of the document was signed by both parties. The main issue with the border treaty is that Estonia stresses in its constitution that the border is delineated by the

Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920. Russia does not want to accept this statement as it does not accept Estonia's independence on the basis of continuity but as a new state created in 1991. In 2005 the treaty was signed but it mentioned in the preamble the Tartu Peace Treaty and Russia took back its signature. The corrected treaty was finally signed in 2014 and Estonia agreed in it to give up a small part of its territory to have the border secure in terms of the international law. The treaty is still not in force however because it has not been ratified. Estonia expects the Russian Federation to ratify it first. In October 2016 Russia informed that the treaty might get ratification by the end of the year but otherwise the situation did not change. •

3


ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Russia has always been an important trade partner for Estonia but its importance is decreasing. In 2014, sanctions were introduced against Russia by the EU due to Russian actions in Ukraine. Under these circumstances economic relations between Estonia and Russia were restricted. Russia introduced counter-sanctions, their impact however was of minor importance for the Estonian economy. Unlike in previous decades Russia is not even a top five trade partner for Estonia. It is not only a result of the sanctions but also Estonia's continuous search for alternative markets. The exports to Russia have decreased almost by half during last eight years while import has been more stable (see table below).

Many former Soviet republics and other Central and Eastern European countries are more or less dependent on Russia's energy sources supplies. Cutting-off the dependence on the Russian oil was

one of the first steps in the re-independent Estonia, while dependence on the Russian natural gas and its supplier, Gazprom company, was an issue for a long time. Thanks to the opening of the Klaipėda liquefied natural gas floating storage and regasification unit terminal in 2014, also an on-going development of a pipelines from Poland and Finland, the situation changes substantially.

Today, Estonia still depends on Russia's natural gas supplied to Estonia via pipelines but it hardly can be considered a major issue. Even though Estonia imports natural gas basically only from Russia it makes only about 8 percent of its overall energy sources and is being reduced every year (see chart below). Estonia imports around one third of its energy in total. Approximately 65-70 percent of the energy Estonia uses is produced in Estonia. No Estonian energy company is legally connected to Gazprom even if buying the gas from Russians.



Somewhat different question is the electricity. Estonia is connected to the Russian North-West electricity system together with other Baltic States and the Kaliningrad enclave. Producing all electricity for the local consumption by itself Estonia profits from the connection with the Russian grid. The whole system is based on the frequency of balance of the grid, which makes the dependence on Russia actually reciprocal. While Russia is experiencing waves in its electricity system, Estonia can help to balance it and vice versa. However, Russian grids are usually much older and different unexpected blackouts or accidents are more frequent than in the Baltic States, so it is Estonia who supplies the electricity.


Nevertheless, Estonia continuously looks for alternatives to decrease the dependence on Russian gas and electric grid. Estonian ties with the Baltic Sea neighbours and generally with the EU are more important and stronger than with Russia enabling importing energy resources from other countries via terminals on the Baltic Sea. Recently, Estonia and Finland signed a contract to establish a new gas pipeline between the countries, the Balticconnector which would make the overall Baltic gas market much bigger and would give Estonia the possibility to deliver the gas from Finland.

ESTONIAN-RUSSIAN TRADE DYNAMICS 2008-2016

	EXPORT (IN EUR)	PERCENTAGE OF OVERALL EXPORT	IMPORT (IN EUR)	PERCENTAGE OF OVERALL IMPORT
2008	880 385 827	10,39	832 431 896	7,64
2009	601 131 009	9,27	597 427 223	8,22
2010	844 425 107	9,66	762 820 667	8,23
2011	1 312 322 095	10,93	1 264 577 660	9,94
2012	1 511 546 429	12,07	1 003 710 767	7,12
2013	1 411 469 426	11,49	787 188 526	5,66
2014	1 186 517 524	9,88	852 273 070	6,18
2015	771 604 513	6,67	785 467 775	5,99
2016	476 607 072	6,18	473 926 880	5,35


Source: Statistics Estonia, www.stat.ee

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS FROM THE EU AND RUSSIA



Source: <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russian-influence-fades-baltics>

NATURAL GAS IMPORTS FROM RUSSIA TO ESTONIA



Source: <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russian-influence-fades-baltics>

Estonia had been an important transit country for Russia via the railway network. Russia developed its own infrastructure and capabilities however and alternative ways for transit were established therefore Estonia's importance was reduced. The 'Bronze soldier' case also played a role here: when Russia wanted to punish Estonia it eventually limited some important cargo flows.¹

Eesti Pank, the Estonian central bank, data showed that in mid-2016 EUR 0,74 billion of direct investments were of the Russian origin, which constituted 4,2 percent of the overall foreign investments and placed Russia on the 4th place of the foreign investors list. At the same time Russia is number 6 target for Estonian foreign investments with EUR 0,23 billion sum, 4 percent of the total.

Estonia has been quite popular among Russian tourists, mainly during the Christmas and New Year season. Even though the number of Russian tourists travelling to Estonia was reduced in recent years, Russia is still among top five countries of origin of incoming tourists. •



¹ Baltic Rim Economies Review, University of Turku, May 2015

4

ATTITUDES TOWARDS RUSSIA IN ESTONIAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY



Being a member of the EU and NATO, Estonia together with its allies has constantly expressed its willingness to cooperate with Russia. The development of democracy and the rule of law in Russia are in Estonia's interest and is also a basis for better cooperation in all sectors of economy and society. After 2014, when Russia occupied and annexed the Crimea and started war in the eastern Ukraine these possibilities to cooperate were drastically reduced. Estonia strongly supports sanctions against Russia. Being experienced by a Russian occupation, Estonians do not see Russia as a trustworthy partner and latest actions and rhetoric of the Russian leadership have deepened this position.

Russia was described as the main security threat to Estonian existence in the recent report by Estonian Information Board, an intelligence service².

Estonian society however does not always see it that way. It is not visible in everyday life and more than half of the society does not recognize Russia as a threat. A recent survey carried out in spring 2016 shows 63,6 percent of respondents considering refugees as the main security threat to Estonia instead, even though there were none in Estonia at that time.³ In this respect there is a difference in attitudes towards Russia between Estonians and Russian speaking population (around one fourth of the population). Almost 90 percent of Russian-speakers does not see Russia as a threat to Estonia while only less than 30% of Estonians thinks that way.⁴ •

² Estonian Information Board, International Security and Estonia 2016, pp. 11-29.

³ See full report: <http://www.inst.ee/uuringud/eesti-inimeste-hoiakud-pagulaskriisi-suhtes>

⁴ See full report: <http://www.inst.ee/uuringud/vaartushinnangute-uuring-2016>

5

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE: HISTORICAL, CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS NARRATIVES



Even if Estonia is today seen by Russia as a part of the West and does not play an important role for Russia on its own, Russia does not recognize the Soviet rule over the Baltic States as occupation. For many members of the current Russian leadership (and substantial part of the population) the Soviet Union was a great empire and communist repressions were frequently justified and all other interpretations of history are labelled as “Nazi” or are simply wrong. History and historical narrative plays a major role in Russia’s foreign but also domestic policies. The goal is mainly to justify current Russia’s actions, for example supporting claims to another country’s territory claiming it was historically Russian.

One of the historical arguments used by Russia concerns the issue of Estonian re-independence. Russian politicians have been constantly expressing the idea that the Tartu Peace Treaty ceased to be binding by the fact of Estonia becoming a member of the USSR in 1940. According to that logic, Estonia did not restore its independence in 1991 after the unsuccessful coup in Moscow but became a newly independent state.

The mixed historical and cultural aspect can be also found in the Russian-speaking minority narrative. Russia continuously accusing Estonia of practicing the policy of creation a mono-ethnic state of double



standards, discrimination and even ethnic cleansing, apartheid, genocide. In a conflicting picture Estonia follows the logic of being occupied, colonized and accordingly attempted to be russified. The Russian politicians in turn offer an explanation of Estonia joining the USSR as a result of its free will in 1940 after which the republic became a victim not so much of the Russification but as all the Soviet nations and republics of the Sovietization.⁵ As a consequence ethnic groups gradually developed towards the formation of a new national and ideological entity. The Estonization, a term used by some Russian politicians, is an analogous characteristic of the suppression of the rights of Russians and is probably taken from the Estonian lexicon of the Soviet period.⁶ Estonization means supremacy of the Estonian language, culture,

traditions and everything connected with this ethnic group. In the early years of Estonian re-independence there were stories frequently spread by the Russian media about Estonia as culturally still a part of Russia since its culture and history had been tied to Russia.

The situation with the Russian influence in schools is somewhat different. 19 percent of Estonia’s school children attends institutions where Russian is the language of instruction. In such schools, Estonian language is mandatory to teach from the first grade. In high school, at least 60% of classes have to be in Estonian. Schools can apply for permissions to teach in some other language, however, there haven’t given any so far (except for one school to teach in German). Allegedly, it is a sign of discriminating of Russian-speaking minority and an attempt to eliminate Russian culture from Estonia. The integration of the Russian-speaking minority to the Estonian-speakers is seen as a negative process by Russia. Many Russian schoolteachers are also rather oriented to Russian information sources, which most probably influences also their pupils. Lately, the NGO Russian School in Estonia, that unites many Russian teachers, more actively started to speak about the discrimination and destruction of Russian culture. •



⁵ V.N. Yelagin, “The Non-Trivial Advice of a Russian from Tallinn”, *Diplomaticeskii Vestnik*, no 13-14, 1994, p. 66.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

6

INFLUENCE IN THE ECONOMY



In recent years Estonia has reduced its dependence on Russia in the field of economy remarkably.

Estonia, as other Baltic States, depends to some extent on Russian gas but it is hardly possible that Russia would manipulate the gas sector. Due to an old Soviet-time transmission system, Russia itself depends on Inčukalna gas storage located in Latvia. During cold winters, there is not enough gas for the North-West Russia, so Russia has to 'take it back' from the storage and, in this sense, depends on it. There is no real possibility that it can cut the Baltic States out of gas, as this would be fatal to Russia's own North-West region. Possible manipulation with the gas prices would not play a great role either thanks to Estonia's alternative supplies.

The transit sector used to be the most vulnerable to the Russian pressure but in recent years the transit via Estonia was reduced remarkably. Railway transit was an important source of income for

Estonia but due to the development of alternative means of transportation, which Russia managed to establish, it diminished. Estonia is forced to keep its prices low for Russian customers to get any transit. Russia can use it as a tool for pressure if needed, as Estonia today is rather a back-up transit route for Russia.

When it comes to the sanctions introduced in 2014 and Russian counter-sanctions, they have not had a remarkable impact on Estonia's economy in general. Mostly they hurt milk production sector but for example pork exports increased because other markets were quickly discovered.

Concerning Russian involvement in local businesses, based on the 2016 data, there were nearly 3000 businesses in Estonia where Russians were partners or owners. Russian businesses are mostly attracted by Estonian tax system, cheap labour force and people's

ability to speak Russian. It is hard to say, how many of all registered businesses are actually involved to Russia as many Russians are operating via local businessmen. Companies with strategic importance or in IT sector are under stronger control by the state because of their possible influence on national security.

The Estonian real estate market has not been very attractive to Russians as yet. In 2016, officially only 10 Russians owned real estate in Estonia. Whereas a few years ago Russians still were buying real estate mainly in the eastern part of Estonia, in 2016 this trend is almost vanished.

There is no remarkable direct footprint of Russia in the finance sector either. Most of the banks operating in Estonia are of Finnish, Danish or Swedish origin. The only bank with a majority of Russian shareholder is Krediidipank, owned by Russian government-controlled BM-Bank PJSC. Because of the sanctions imposed on Russia, Krediidipank is also being sanctioned to some extent. Tallinna äripank (Tallinn Business Bank) is also a bank with Russian roots, being also a bank for the Russian Embassy in Estonia. Both of them are small banks and do not have a remarkable impact on the market, however, they could be good places for money laundering or other activity in Russia's interests. •

7

LINKS WITH INTERNAL POLITICS AND BUSINESS

The influence of Russia-oriented politicians, officials and businessmen is not high in Estonia. The most conspicuous case was in 2009 about Herman Simm, a former Ministry of Defence high-level official, who was sentenced to prison for illegally collecting classified information and passing it to Russia. He was the first caught Russian spy in the re-independent Estonia. Fortunately, there haven't been a lot of these kind of incidents.

Regarding politics, the Centre Party, since November 2016 the senior partner in the governing coalition and second biggest party in the parliament, has its electoral base among Russian-speaking population. Majority of them have the Estonian citizenship and Russian-speakers make around 15 percent of the electorate. The party signed an official co-operation agreement with the governing Putin's party United Russia (Yedinaya Rossiya) in 2004. The idea behind the agreement is to develop long-term partnership: to meet on regular basis, share experiences, have joint committees, organize cooperation of experts, communicate with the youth.

This agreement stirred a debate in Estonia with voices that the contract should be repealed. The Centre Party itself plays the agreement down as dead but is not unified internally as far as the issue of co-operation with Russia is concerned. A long-time leader of the party, former prime minister and mayor of Tallinn Edgar Savisaar, is an iconic Estonian politician taking care of Russians for the Russian-speaking voters and he is skilled to build this image up. For instance, he organized and financed the construction of a new Russian Orthodox church in a Russian-speaking neighbourhood of Tallinn. On the other hand, the money came from sources linked to a close Putin associate Vladimir Yakunin. In order to get into power, the Centre Party distanced itself from Savisaar, who has been distanced from political life for quite a while



now, by choosing a new leader and taking much more pro-western course.

Savisaar himself has been charged with accepting bribes, money laundry, embezzlement and forbidden party donations. The Centre Party as a legal person is also suspected for taking illegal donations. Apart from Savisaar, a few other businessmen and politicians close to the party were accused of helping to get forbidden donations and falsification.

It is also worth mentioning Yana Toom, a MEP for the Centre Party. Although she is not directly linked to Russia she runs a blog frequently speaking a language different from the official Estonian policy when it comes to Russia. She also met recently Bashar al-Assad for the second time in one year term, the Russia-supported leader of Syria.

The populist movements are rising all across the Europe and Estonia is no exception. These movements are usually not against the Western values but in some cases, criticize also the EU. Especially when it comes to the refugee crisis or same-sex marriage,



Russian-style governing method is seen as a good way to protect conservative values. These movements usually do not spend much time on pondering over Russia's goals in Western societies and therefore may be easily used to expand Russian sphere of influence in Europe.⁷

A corruption-welcoming environment proved to be a good ground for an illicit Russian influence in many places of the world. In this respect, Estonia is not a typical example. Ranked on the anti-corruption index (Transparency International CPI) on the 23th-26th place out of 168 countries and improving every year, Estonia combats corruption quite effectively.

However, the corruption can always be a factor conducive to Russian influence in business and politics.

The Tallinn Harbour corruption case some years ago, where high-level employees of the harbour operator and members of the coalition parties were involved, is a good example. Even though the company was Estonian and in the corruption case no Russian money connection was detected, a corrupted person might be a possible security threat. Especially that the harbour operator owns also the Estonian Gas, a company not directly connected to Gazprom but buying the commodity from Gazprom. •

⁷ Estonian Internal Security Service Yearbook 2015.

8

RUSSIAN-SPEAKING MINORITY



Among Estonia's 1,3 million population, there are around 27 percent of Russian-speaking inhabitants, including 7 percent holding Russian citizenship. Remarkable numbers of them live in Lasnamäe (eastern part of the capital city of Tallinn) and in Narva, a city in eastern Estonia, close to the Russian border. Since the re-establishment of independence, Estonia has faced fundamental political, judicial, economic and psychological problems with the integration of the non-titular nations into the country's society. The situation of human rights in Estonia has been monitored by international organizations such as the Helsinki Watch, the Amnesty International and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, from the very beginning of the establishment of re-independence. Nevertheless, the political and economic condition of Estonia's Russian-speaking population has repeatedly been over-dramatized and politicized by the Russian government officials and parliamentarians. Their rhetoric mostly consists of the accusations of discrimination, supporting Nazi movements and pointing to Estonian failures in every aspect of life.

Large numbers of Russians in Estonia do not speak Estonian and live in the Russian information space listening to the Russian radio, watching official Russian TV channels and reading Russian news. They might actually have never been to Russia but in a broad sense are anti-Western. They might be called grey-zone people who do not want to go to live in Russia but do not cherish Estonia either. They do enjoy travelling in the EU without visas and value their living standards in Estonia, knowing that Russia would not be a better place for them as for example salaries are almost twice as high as in Russia. The young generation receives the Estonian citizenship automatic upon request and is usually bilingual, which makes entering to the labour market easier. Estonia's inhabitants without citizenship (today roughly 6 percent) and resident Russian citizens enjoy most of the rights and privileges the citizens of Estonia do. They have the social rights, the right to privatize their apartments in Estonia, buy land etc. Ethnic Russians can also participate in the elections of local governments and can carry on their national traditions. •

9

RUSSIAN COMPATRIOTS' POLICY

Out of 25 million Russians living abroad as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 1,3% live in Estonia. The aim of Russian compatriot policy is to connect the Russian diaspora with 'Mother Russia', but it is also part of wider Russia's foreign policy. This wider goal is to keep compatriots away from integrating to local societies and keep them in the Russian information space, so they could be useful for influencing Estonia and other Baltic States without noticeable Russian state interference.

In 2012, a foundation to support the rights of compatriots abroad was established. It mainly operates in the 'near abroad' i.e. in the former Soviet Union republics through local NGOs. Being financed by Russia they co-organize, participate and report on events taking place in Estonia. They gather

information used by Russia in suitable contexts but also spread the news about Russian-speaking "bad situation" on international forums, mainly in the OSCE or ODIHR.⁸

A Moscow-based institution's report from 2011 indicated that Russia is worried about the situation when the diaspora decreases in terms of numbers and people do not consume information from Russia anymore. Russia feels obliged to influence the younger generation because they are already integrated with Estonia and do not know much of Russia's history, culture or religion. The report recommended offering culture trips to Russia, organizing Russian cultural events in Russian language in Estonia and carrying out other activities to 'protect compatriots from European propaganda'. These projects should be financed by Russia.⁹ •



⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Русская диаспора Эстонии: состояние и перспективы, Moscow 2011.

10

HYBRID TACTICS



Hybrid and information warfare, disinformation and propaganda are not a novelty in Russian activities, however, due to the growing use of the internet and social media, they have gained a new dimension. Since the occupation of Crimea and war in eastern Ukraine, Russia uses messages through different channels to influence citizens of other countries. The idea behind these tactics seems to be destabilization of Western societies.

In Estonia, the message consists of the rhetoric of the violation of human rights of Russian speaking minority, anti-NATO rhetoric, peace marches but also instigating the fear of immigrants and refugees.

In on-going intense security situation between Russia and the West, the narrative by Russia has

become stronger and more aggressive towards the West and especially NATO and the US. People living in this kind of information space are therefore becoming even more anti-NATO, which makes it even harder to explain them the real situation. The information given by Russia about NATO is usually criticizing NATO being provocative and surrounding Russia with its troops. In September 2016, the peace march was held in Tallinn, where only around 40 people took part of it. However, it was organized on the same day as an annual autumn-run was organized in Tallinn, where thousands of people take part every year. Most probably Russia may have wanted to include these masses to the picture in case to show how many of Estonian people are against NATO and against the troops coming to Estonia in spring 2017. •

11

INFLUENCE IN THE MEDIA

Free media is a sign of working democracy but they can also be vulnerability when it comes to the propaganda or disinformation by outside actor. Estonia is on the 16th place out of 180 countries regarding media freedom according to the Freedom House report 2016 on press freedom, which means among other, that it is extremely easy to publish different opinions in the newspapers, blogs and internet portals in Estonia.

Sputnik and Baltnews, the well-known Russian propaganda outlets opened their branches in Estonia. The latter is not worth mentioning because of its almost non-activity in Estonia. Sputnik has been more active but it was not easy for them to open a branch in Estonia. It took a lot of effort and time to find someone who could speak Estonian and would be willing to work for that outspoken foreign interests representative.¹⁰ Still many Sputnik's articles are just translation from Russian.

In eastern Estonia, it is possible to listen to Russian radio station and watch Russian TV channels without any additional equipment. Selected Russians



channels are also available via main cable TV and telecommunication operators in Estonia (Telia, Starman, Viasat) and therefore it is possible to watch them all over Estonia.

In 2015, a new channel in Russian was started by the Estonian national broadcaster ETV. When the ETV+ was created, the Russian media welcomed it as a government propaganda channel aimed at minorities manipulation. The idea behind the channel however is to integrate Russian-speaking population to the Estonian society by giving them the same information as to Estonian-speakers but in the minority's own language. There are also Russian-language programmes on other Estonian TV channels.

According to a recent survey, Russian TV channels are still more popular among Russian speakers in Estonia, though the main Estonian news programs such as "AK" in Russian are also frequently watched. There is a major difference between Estonians and Russians in the trust in the information received. Whereas



¹⁰ Estonian Internal Security Service Yearbook 2015.

Estonians mainly trusts their Estonian information channels, Russians' trust rate is 50/50. Moreover, Russians do not trust neither Estonian nor Russian channels. The difference is also between younger and older generation of the Russian-speaking population: the older mainly watch and listen Russian channels and the younger prefer in many cases Estonian channels. Even though many Russians live in the Kremlin information space, about half of them do not trust their sources of information and compare them with the news provided by Estonian or even western channels like BBC or CNN.¹¹

In a highly digitalized society, which Estonia indeed is, social media have become a powerful tool to spread a (dis)information what Russia uses actively for its purposes. Latvian-based NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence researched a troll-farm in Russia and their activities in Latvian Media.¹² Although there is no comparable study about Estonia, one can easily notice trolls in online media outlets and Facebook commentaries.



On the Facebook, there also exist Russian-friendly communities communicating mainly in Estonian, but also in Russian. The main discussion developed there are the likes of "Putin's greatness" substantiated by his capability to deal with homosexuals and immigrants.

Even though the Facebook is popular both among Estonians and Russian-speaking population in Estonia, Russian-speakers also use Russian social media sites such as Odnoklassniki or Vkontakte where they have slightly different information.¹³ •

12

INFLUENCE IN THE CYBER SPACE



A country like Estonia where almost all services, including vital ones, are connected to the internet, is vulnerable to all kinds of cyber threats. Since the 2007 Estonia has experienced different cyber-attacks and the numbers are growing every year. According to the annual report of the Estonian Information System Authority Cyber Security Branch, the country experienced 5809 different kinds of cyber cases in 2016, out of which 402 were reported by the governmental agencies and 27 percent of them were highly critical.

In the case of cyber-attacks, it is hard to detect their real origins. For Russia, however, the cyber space is not a purely technical aspect of influence

but it is seen as part of a wider picture together with information warfare. The annual report of the main Estonian agency in charge of security concludes, that in the cyber space, Russia is the greatest threat to Estonia but also to the EU and NATO: by means of a direct cyber-attack, cyber espionage or cyber-crime.

Estonian Information System Authority Cyber Security Branch is already accustomed to the fact that Estonia's networks and information systems are regularly mapped and measured to obtain information useful for planning any kind of large-scale activities against Estonia.¹⁴ Whether it is Russia, a private actor or some other state, it is hard to say. •

¹¹ Estonian Integration Monitoring 2015, <http://www.kul.ee/sites/kulminn/files/7peatykk.pdf>

¹² See full report, <http://www.stratcomcoe.org/internet-trolling-hybrid-warfare-tool-case-latvia-0>

¹³ Estonian Integration Monitoring 2015, <http://www.kul.ee/sites/kulminn/files/7peatykk.pdf>

¹⁴ 2015 Annual Report of the Estonian Information System Authority's Cyber Security Branch: <https://www.ria.ee/public/Kuberturvalisus/2015-RIA-Annual-cyber-report.pdf>

CONCLUSIONS

Even though one fourth of Estonia's populations are Russian speakers and Estonia depends to some extent on Russian gas and electricity grid, it can be said that Estonia is not dangerously influenced by Russia. Estonia has been independent for 25 years and the social memory of the Soviet past is still there. The understanding of Russia and its capabilities by the elites and by the public is widespread and Russia is not seen as a trustworthy partner. Since re-independence, Estonia has oriented its policy strongly to the West joining the NATO and EU in 2004 and developing multi-level cooperation.

Due to the historical experience and clear understanding of the Russian threat today, the influence by Russia decreases every year. In the economy and finance sector, Estonia has always been looking for alternatives to Russian gas, electricity and money. From the society side, Estonia has developed better policies to integrate Russian-speaking population to the Estonian society more effectively. Still, the integration process takes time, especially when Russia actively opposes it. Therefore, the Russia-speaking population has remained one of the key factors for Russian influence. On political level, the understanding of Russian threat is more or less consensual among all parties but there are also politicians linked to Russia on different bases. Russia may try to influence them and/or help them to get to the power. Businesspeople in the few sectors linked to Russia are also prone to a potential influence or manipulation. Since Estonia and Russia do not have strong connections any more, it is the human factor that can be the main factor of influence. Cyber field is

also a sensitive topic as Russia is very advanced and active in that sector.

Therefore, the integration between Russian-speaking and Estonian population is an important factor for reducing the gap between two different information spaces people live in. Civil society organizations play an important role here and should be involved systematically to supplement official policies on these questions. The adequate information, both in Estonian and in Russian, should be widely available to the society to combat propaganda messages and reduce their influence.

Stronger effort should be made to decrease corruption and increase transparency in all sectors, including financing political parties and critical areas such as strategically important positions and IT sector companies.

The search for alternatives in the energy sector and new customers for the railway transit should be continued. Stronger cooperation in these questions mainly with other Baltic States and Poland would possibly be beneficial as well as stressing these questions together on the EU level.

A cooperation within and between NATO and the EU has to be promoted, recognizing, that Russia influences with its soft power not only the Baltic States or Eastern Europe but also Western European countries and even the United States. A strong united position and actions together with the EU and NATO countries should be considered, especially against hybrid tactics. •



ANNEX 1

KOMENTARZ PROF. PRZEMYSŁAWA ŻURAWSKIEGO VEL GRAJEWSKIEGO

Jaką rolę obecnie spełnia Unia Europejska i NATO w poprawie pozycji krajów bałtyckich względem Rosji? Co nie jest, a powinno być robione w kontekście polityki prowadzonej przez Federację Rosyjską?

Kluczowe dla bezpieczeństwa państw bałtyckich jest NATO jako sojusz obronny. Unia Europejska, nie będąc strukturą wojskową, ma znaczenie ograniczone. Obecnie rozmieszczane są siły wsparcia wschodniej flanki NATO w państwach bałtyckich i w Polsce, ponieważ państwa bałtyckie, z uwagi na swoją strukturę narodowościową oraz liczną mniejszość rosyjską, szczególnie na Łotwie i w Estonii, są słusznie typowane jako obszar możliwej, potencjalnej prowokacji rosyjskiej z wykorzystaniem faktu istnienia tej mniejszości, a zatem, możliwy obszar zainicjowania konfliktu, który ostatecznie może doprowadzić do starcia zbrojnego. Owo rozmieszczanie wojsk wiodących mocarstw NATO jest krokiem zmniejszającym prawdopodobieństwo wystąpienia konfliktu, albowiem przerzuca na barki potencjalnego agresora decyzję o de facto otwarciu ognia do żołnierzy największych mocarstw będących państwami członkowskimi NATO, co jest politycznie odmiennej jakości decyzją niż decyzja o otwarciu ognia do żołnierzy estońskich, litewskich czy łotewskich. Jest to decyzja o wojnie z Wielką Brytanią, Kanadą i Stanami Zjednoczonymi. Jest zatem zarazem mniej prawdopodobną decyzją. Pomimo, że rozmieszczane siły w sensie liczebnym, wojskowym, nie zmieniają w sposób zasadniczy sytuacji wojskowej w regionie, to sytuację polityczną zmieniają jednak w sposób absolutnie zasadniczy.

Wielokrotnie to robiłem, więc i teraz użyję tego porównania: jest to powtórzenie sytuacji z okresu zimnej wojny, w jakiej funkcjonował Berlin Zachodni, gdzie fakt stacjonowania garnizonów alianckich (amerykańskiego,

brytyjskiego i francuskiego) nie był wyzwaniem wojskowym dla północnej grupy armii sowieckiej, tylko właśnie wyzwaniem politycznym. Czym innym byłaby operacja złamania oporu policji zachodniobermberskiej, a czym innym otwarcie ognia do żołnierzy owych głównych mocarstw nuklearnych NATO.

Tu jest powtórzenie tej sytuacji. Niedostatek, na który można wskazać to fakt, że o ile w okresie zimnej wojny całą konstrukcją wysuniętej obecności odstraszania przez ukaranie (deterrence by punishment), a zatem wytworzenie sytuacji, w której potencjalny agresor nie tyle ma uniemożliwione zajęcie danego terytorium – to wojskowo jest możliwe – tyle, że jest postawiony wobec perspektywy srożej kary za podjęcie takiej próby poprzez wejście w konflikt zbrojny z wiodącymi mocarstwami. Cała ta konstrukcja nosiła w okresie zimnej wojny nazwę wiretrap, czyli rodzaj potykacza, drutu, który jest rozciągnięty od zapalnika miny. Jeśli biegnący zawadzi o ten drut, spowoduje wybuch. Państwa bałtyckie są obecnie takim drutem. Problem polega na tym, że wtedy istniała mina, czyli potężne zgrupowanie wojsk NATO na terenie RFN. Obecność amerykańska, bo to głównie o nią chodzi, jest w Europie ograniczona. Zainicjowana przez pociągnięcie zawleczonej eksplozji będzie znacznie mniejsza niż poprzednio. Ale też i Rosja nie jest Związkiem Sowieckim, jej potencjał jest wielokrotnie mniejszy, możliwości również.

Problemem w razie zaistnienia takiej sytuacji jest czas potrzebny na przetrucie do naszego regionu wojsk amerykańskich czy sił innych wiodących państw NATO. Ten czas trzeba kupić obroną własną, czyli wojska państw bałtyckich i Polski będą musiały wytrzymać w obronie około dwóch tygodni do momentu pojawienia się przetrucanych sił.



Czy w obliczu zapowiadanej zmiany linii polityki amerykańskiej względem Rosji, kraje bałtyckie, a zwłaszcza Estonia czy Łotwa mogą czuć się zagrożone?

Każdy z prezydentów amerykańskich obejmujący urząd zapowiada podjęcie próby poprawy, wyrównania relacji z Rosją. To wszystko zależy de facto od Rosji, jak ona się będzie zachowywała. Natura interesów amerykańskich i rosyjskich, tak jak są postrzegane przez elity przywódcze, jest absolutnie sprzeczna i nawet jeśli takie próby ocieplenia relacji są podejmowane, to szybko się kończą w świetle realiów i faktów. Jakkolwiek, przy braku przychylności mediów, także amerykańskich w stosunku do nowego prezydenta, trzeba pamiętać, że Stany Zjednoczone nie są Rosją, nie są państwem samodzielnym, który jednoosobowo podejmuje decyzje, gdy wszyscy inni stoją na baczność i wykonują, tylko są strukturą opartą na zasadzie check and balance poważnych instytucji, zakorzenionych w wieloletniej tradycji, stabilnych instytucji państwowych osadzonych w tradycji demokratycznej, z potężną doświadczoną klasą polityczną, w tym także wojskową, której głos nie może być lekceważony, z bardzo doświadczonymi wojskowymi.

Miałem okazję w ubiegłym roku rozmawiać w Waszyngtonie z kilkunastoma ośrodkami analitycznymi i, poza jednym przypadkiem, wszyscy mają bardzo trzeźwy stosunek do Rosji, wiedzą czym ona jest i jakie zagrożenie stwarza. Amerykańska klasa polityczna wszelkich opcji jest jak najbardziej świadoma zagrożenia płynącego z Rosji.

Jakkolwiek, zapewne nastąpi próba ocieplenia, to będzie ograniczana realiami polityki rosyjskiej. Nie przewiduję, żeby odniosła sukces. Obama i wcześniejsi prezydenci też zapowiadali ocieplenie relacji z Rosją. Bush nawet widział w oczach Putina szczerą demokratę, Obama rozpoczął od resetu, Bush senior wygłaszał przemówienie w Kijowie, zwane chicken speech, czyli

mowę kurczaczą, w języku polskim nazywaną zajęczą, w sensie zajęczego serca namawiającego Ukraińców do pozostania w Związku Sowieckim. Pomysły były absolutnie szalone w przeszłości i nic z tego nie wyszło. Z umiarkowanymi obawami bym podchodził do tego typu czarnych scenariuszy. Nie będą cofnięte decyzje warszawskiego szczytu NATO, realia wojskowe będą zmieniane – nowy prezydent Stanów Zjednoczonych obiecuje podniesienie wydatków zbrojeniowych, liczebności armii i to są twarde fakty. Lepiej mówić miękko, a budować wojskowo, niż odwrotnie, mówić twardo, a redukować armię.

Obawy są przesadne, co nie znaczy, że żadnych zawirowań nie należy się spodziewać, ale bardziej obawiał bym się rozwoju sytuacji w Europie w perspektywie wyborów francuskich czy niemieckich.

Jak państwa bałtyckie wykorzystywały i nadal wykorzystują członkostwo w Unii Europejskiej w swoich relacjach z Rosją czy względem Rosji i jaki wpływ ma na to kryzys Unii Europejskiej?

Unia Europejska nie jest strukturą w oparciu, o którą można prowadzić politykę strategiczną w wymiarze bezpieczeństwa. Oczywiście przejawiała czasem takie ambicje. Teraz nastąpił powrót deklaracyjny do tego wymiaru, przez czym wybór Donalda Trumpa jest jednym z argumentów na rzecz tworzenia takiej struktury, która w razie czego by ubezpieczała dodatkowo te państwa, ale to nie ma odzwierciedlenia w rzeczywistej wydolności i możliwości Unii Europejskiej w tym zakresie.


Relacje z Rosją nie są prowadzone przez przewidziane do tego struktury unijne. W formacie normandzkim nie jest znana publicznie, bo jej nie ma po prostu, rola szefowej dyplomacji UE, Federici Mogherini. Wydolność wojskowa Unii Europejskiej jest dosyć symboliczna. Lepiej z perspektywy państw bałtyckich, jest być w tej strukturze, niż nie być, jednak podstawowym instrumentem bezpieczeństwa wojskowego w regionie jest NATO. Trudno wskazać

na jakiś sposób wsparcia bezpieczeństwa państw bałtyckich, który otrzymałyby od Unii Europejskiej, nie otrzymując go od NATO. To wszystko, w wymiarze bezpieczeństwa szczególnie, są konstrukcje oparte ostatecznie na decyzjach rządów narodowych. To państwa członkowskie będą wydzyślały swoje zasoby do reakcji w sytuacji kryzysu.

Oczywiście są elementy uzupełniające dodatkowo, jak sankcje ekonomiczne Unii Europejskiej. W tym zakresie Bałtowie korzystają ze swojej niewielkiej wagi głosów na rzecz podtrzymania sankcji, które stanowią element politycznego odstraszenia przez uświadamianie Rosji kosztów kolejnych agresji. Stąd, znaczenie tych sankcji, pomijając wymiar gospodarczy, mają znaczenie jako instrument przesłania politycznego wobec decydentów na Kremlu, które musi być wystosowane, żebyśmy uniknęli kolejnej agresji, musi łamać przeświadczenie, które istnieje w Moskwie i któremu Rosjanie dali wyraz 1 marca 2014 roku, kiedy to w czasie dyskusji w Radzie Federacji, izbie wyższej parlamentu rosyjskiego, panowała opinia na temat oczekiwanej reakcji Zachodu na wprowadzenie wojsk rosyjskich na Ukrainę, sformułowana zdaniem „trochę się poawanturują i przestaną”, reakcja będzie słowna i będzie krótka. Utrzymanie tych sankcji unijnych jak najdłużej jest elementem łamania owego przekonania, że reakcja Zachodu będzie symboliczna i krótkotrwała. A takie przekonanie zachęca oczywiście do kolejnych agresji. W tym wymiarze Unia ma znaczenie, a państwa bałtyckie w miarę swoich możliwości, dodając Polskę, Skandynawów, Niemcy – jak długo kanclerz Merkel stoi na czele tego państwa – ten blok jest zwolennikami sankcji przeciwko Rosji, w związku z wojną na Ukrainie. Jak długo on będzie utrzymany, istotne tu są wybory, które nas czekają we wrześniu tego roku, tak długo obecna linia będzie utrzymana.

Co jeszcze Unia Europejska mogłaby zrobić, aby politycznie zapewnić bezpieczeństwo krajom bałtyckim, które są najbardziej narażone na agresywną politykę Rosji?

Nie wydaje mi się, aby Unia miała jeszcze jakieś istotne instrumenty poza sankcjami ekonomicznymi. Należy pamiętać, że bez względu na to, jakie są realia, decydenci na Kremlu nie szanują Unii Europejskiej, nie ma czegoś takiego jak prestiż Unii w oczach rosyjskich, a w związku z tym, wola brania pod uwagę jej zdania politycznego. Unia w relacjach z Rosją, nie tylko teraz, ale i w okresie swojej świetności, miała dosyć ograniczone instrumenty działania i trzeba rozumieć, na jakich polach Unia może działać skutecznie, a na jakich nie może. Unia mogła skutecznie wprowadzić strefę Schengen, opartą na swoich granicach zewnętrznych, które w wymiarze granic państw bałtyckich czy polskich, są granicami z Rosją. Unia może wprowadzać regulacje antydumpingowe np. na eksport rosyjskich wyrobów metalowych, dotowanych przez niskie ceny energii w Rosji. Unia może zakazywać używania starych, rosyjskich samolotów do komunikacji na lotniskach na terytorium Unii Europejskiej, z uwagi na generowanie poziomu hałasu wyższego niż zezwalają na to przepisy unijne. Ale to nie jest polityka strategiczna. To jest tzw. niska polityka, a nie gra o bezpieczeństwo państw bałtyckich. Tam gdzie dorobek prawny Wspólnot Europejskich rozstrzyga o jakiś normach działania na terytorium Unii, jest ona twardym graczem, bo zmiany tych reguł wymagałyby renegocjacji w gronie wszystkich państw członkowskich. Żaden, nawet najbardziej prorosyjski polityk Unii nie jest w stanie samodzielnie podjąć decyzji o ustępstwie. Tam, gdzie mamy do czynienia z dyplomacją na wysokim poziomie strategicznym, tam de facto grają mocarstwa unijne, Niemcy i Francja w formacie normandzkim, a nie Unia Europejska. W tym sensie, odpowiedź na pytanie o poczynania Unii Europejskiej, jest faktycznie odpowiedzią na pytanie o decyzje polityczne, w tej chwili przede wszystkim Berlina. Reszta państw podąży za tymi decyzjami. Perspektywa wyborów na razie pozwala jakieś przewidywania czynić tylko do września. •



ANNEX 2

POMNIK NIEZGODY

Agata Supinska

W marcu 2007 roku w Estonii odbyły się wybory parlamentarne, w których zwyciężyły ugrupowania: liberalna Partia Reform i centrolewicowa Partia Centrum. Przed koalicją rządzącą stanęło wyzwanie uregulowania ochładzających się relacji z Rosją, a przede wszystkim ratyfikacja traktatu granicznego. Nowy parlament uchwalił jednak ustawę zezwalającą na przenoszenie cmentarzy żołnierzy radzieckich z II wojny światowej i usuwanie pomników „wyzwolicieli”. W kwietniu podjęto decyzję o zdemontowaniu Pomnika Wyzwolicieli Tallina, upamiętniającego żołnierzy radzieckich poległych w Estonii podczas II wojny światowej. Pomnik został odsłonięty 22 września 1947 roku, w trzecią rocznicę wyzwolenia Tallina od okupacji niemieckiej przez wojsko Armii Czerwonej. Zlokalizowany był na Wzgórzu św. Antoniego Tõnismägi. Obok niego znajdowała się zbiorowa mogiła, zawierająca szczątki sowieckich żołnierzy poległych w 1944 roku.

Usunięciu pomnika z centrum Tallina sprzeciwiali się działacze mniejszości rosyjskiej, którzy przez kilka miesięcy stróżowali przy „Brazowym Żołnierzu”, aby zapobiec jego zniszczeniu. Przyjęta przez parlament ustawa okazała się łagodniejszym rozwiązaniem, gdyż prezydent Estonii zawetował projekt zakładający całkowitą likwidację Brazowego Żołnierza jako „zakazanego obiektu” symbolizującego radziecką okupację Estonii. Szczątki żołnierzy miały być ekshumowane i przeniesione na cmentarz wojskowy pod Tallinem. Dla Estończyków „Brazowy Żołnierz” to symbol początku radzieckiej okupacji Estonii, zaś dla mniejszości rosyjskiej to pamiątka po żołnierzach poległych w walce z niemieckimi faszystami.

Przeniesienie pomnika wyznaczono na dzień 26 kwietnia 2007 roku. Pomnik został otoczony przez milicję, która miała za zadanie nie dopuścić demonstrantów rosyjskich do mogił znajdujących się przy monumencie. Kiedy grupa demonstrujących się przy monumencie, policja była zmuszona

użyć gazu łzawiącego. Podczas zamieszek zginął 20-letni Rosjanin. Według doniesień estońskich mediów, mężczyzna zmarł od dźgnięcia nożem przez innego mężczyznę, z którym wspólnie plądrowali estoński sklep. W oczach Rosjan ich rodak był jednak ofiarą zamieszek, ginąc z rąk estońskiej policji. Ponadto, około 44 osób zostało rannych, a aresztowanych zostało ok. 300 uczestników zajścia. Za inicjatorów zamieszek zostali uznani członkowie organizacji Nocna Straż, którzy jednocześnie byli ich najaktywniejszymi uczestnikami. Zamieszki miały miejsce nie tylko w samym Tallinie, ale również w kilku miastach okręgu Idu-Virumaa, w północno-wschodniej części kraju, zamieszkiwanej w większości przez Rosjan. O rozruchy oskarżano lokalnych rosyjskich radykałów oraz rosyjskich dyplomatów, którym zarzucano liczne spotkania z liderami Partii Konstytucyjnej i młodzieżowej organizacji Nocna Straż.

Przewodniczący Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych Dumy Konstantin Kosaczow ocenił postępowanie władz Estonii jako „barbarzyństwo” i „błuznierstwo”. Rosyjski wicepremier Siergiej Iwanow wzywał Rosjan do bojkotowania towarów z Estonii. Rosyjski parlament apelował do Władimira Putina o nałożenie sankcji gospodarczych na Estonię, a nawet zerwanie stosunków dyplomatycznych. Putin ostro skrytykował decyzję władz Estonii, potępiając „bezcieszczenie pomników” i „sianie waśni” między narodami. Rosyjskie media, relacjonując zamieszki w Tallinie, zarzucały estońskiej policji brutalność, nazywając mniejszość rosyjską biorącą udział w zamieszkach „obrońcami pomnika” i „antyfaszystami”. W rosyjskiej prasie zaczęto pisać o „SS-toni” jako państwie faszystowskim. W swoim oświadczeniu, rosyjskie MSZ poinformowało: „Dziesiątki cywilów padły ofiarą nadmiernego użycia siły przez władze estońskie przeciwko manifestantom. Mamy nadzieję, że postępowanie władz estońskich zostanie odpowiednio ocenione przez społeczność międzynarodową, a zwłaszcza sojuszników Estonii w Unii Europejskiej i



NATO, oraz w Radzie Europy i OBWE”. Do wystąpień rosyjskich polityków odniosła się ambasador Estonii w Moskwie, Marina Kaljurand: „Nie będziemy wysłuchiwać szantażu i gróźb innych krajów”.

Wbrew zobowiązaniom wynikającym z konwencji wiedeńskiej o stosunkach dyplomatycznych, rosyjskie służby nie zapewniły odpowiedniego bezpieczeństwa Ambasadzie Estonii w Moskwie, w związku z czym w nocy z 26 na 27 kwietnia 2007 roku, nazwanej „Brazową Nocą” doszło do ataku prokremlowskich młodzieżówek. Protestujący wtargnęli bezprawnie na teren placówki, obrzucili ją kamieniami i fekaliami, zerwali z masztu flagę Estonii i spalili ją, ostatecznie atakując bezpośrednio ambasador Estonii Marinę Kaljurand.

27 kwietnia o godzinie 22.30 zauważono tzw. ataki denial of services (DoS) na internetowe serwisy rządu Estonii. W ciągu kolejnych dni nasilała się fala

cyberataków na infrastrukturę informatyczną Estonii. Unieruchomiono strony internetowe parlamentu, ministerstw obrony i sprawiedliwości, partii politycznych, policji, a nawet szkół publicznych. W końcu, przy rządzie estońskim utworzono jednostkę Estonian Computer Emergency Response Team, kierowaną przez Hillara Aarelaida, która miała prowadzić improwizowaną obronę systemów. Apogeum nastąpiło 9 maja (rosyjski Dzień Zwycięstwa), kiedy to atakami dotknięty został także sektor prywatny, zaś 18 maja ataki nagle przerwano. Ich cel jednak został spełniony: w ciągu zaledwie trzech tygodni małe, europejskie państwo zostało całkowicie sparaliżowane. Gadi Evron, izraelski ekspert ds. bezpieczeństwa, który był w tym czasie w Estonii, stwierdził że „za pomocą cyberbomby Estonia została niemal zepchnięta do epoki kamiennej”.

W toku śledztwa ustalono, że hakerzy atakowali z komputerów należących do administracji rządowej

Rosji. 24 stycznia 2008 roku w Estonii zapadł pierwszy wyrok w sprawie cyberataków. Dmitrij Gałuszkiewicz, który przyznał się do winy, został ukarany grzywną ok. 1,1 tys. euro za atakowanie strony Partii Reform. Atak na estońskie sieci informatyczne był o tyle niebezpieczny, że państwo to jest zaawansowane technologicznie i wszystkie rejestry państwowe są prowadzone w formie elektronicznej, całkowicie zastępując papierowe archiwum. Wydarzenia wiosny 2007 roku, zapoczątkowane konfliktem o pomnik „Brązowego Żołnierza”, rozpoczęły zupełnie nowy wyścig zbrojeń, prowadzony w cyberprzestrzeni. Reakcja ówczesnego prezydenta Estonii, Toomasa Hendrika Ilves była bardzo emocjonalna. Nawoływał on, aby Rosja, sąsiad Estonii, starała się pozostać cywilizowanym państwem, w których nieporozumienia rozwiązywane są przez dyplomatów i polityków, a nie poprzez spór ludności i ataki komputerowe. Trivimi Velliste, były minister spraw zagranicznych Estonii, w rozmowie z Piotrem Falkowskim stanowczo powiedział: „Tallin jest w Estonii. A Estonia jest niepodległym państwem i my nie pytamy się Rosji o jej punkt widzenia. Pomniki w Estonii podlegają całkowicie suwerennej decyzji władz estońskich wybranych przez naród”.

Pomnik Brązowego Żołnierza, dzięki prowadzonej przez Rosję narracji, nazywany był w światowych mediach pomnikiem „Żołnierza Wyzwoliciele”, symbol wyzwolenia Estonii przez Armię Czerwoną spod okupacji niemieckiej. Według Estończyków historia wyzwolenia wyglądała nieco inaczej. 17 września 1944 roku Estończycy dowiedzieli się o planie ewakuacji wojsk niemieckich z ich terytorium. Dzień później, 18 września, pełniący obowiązki prezydenta, prof. Juri Uluots, ostatni premier niepodległej Estonii, powołał rząd Republiki Estońskiej, który ogłosił neutralność Estonii w wojnie niemiecko-sowieckiej. „22 września, kiedy Rosjanie opanowali Tallinn, na wieży Pikk Hermann powiewała niebiesko-biało-czarna (estońska) flaga, a estońska władza była już przywrócona. Flaga Estonii została sponiewierana kulami i zerwana. Zamiast wyzwolenia Armia Czerwona okupowała Estonię przez kolejne 50 lat” – mówi wiceprzewodniczący Estońskiej Konserwatywnej Partii Ludowej. Nieliczny oddział uzbrojonych Estończyków bronił swoich rodaków, umożliwiając im ucieczkę przed „wyzwoleńcą” Armią Czerwoną.

Na cmentarzu wojennym w Tallinnie, przy pomniku „Brązowego Żołnierza” zamieszczono tablicę, na


której pomnik określono jako „monument żołnierzy armii sowieckiej okupujących Tallin od 22 września 1944 roku”. Pracownik Ministerstwa Obrony, pod którego zarządem znajduje się cmentarz wojskowy, powiedział, że tablica „odzwierciedla historyczny fakt okupacji Estonii od 1940 po 1991 rok”. Zamieszczenie podpisu tej treści wywołało sprzeciw weteranów Armii Czerwonej. Przewodniczący Tallińskiego Stowarzyszenia Weteranów Drugiej Wojny Światowej, Władimir Metelica, wyraził swoje oburzenie, podkreślając, że dla weteranów pomnik jest symbolem oswobodzenia Tallina od faszystów. Jeszcze radykalniej wypowiedział się przewodniczący organizacji społecznej „Nocna Straż”, Dmitrij Linter, którego zdaniem takie działania władz estońskich jest przepisywaniem historii, prześladowaniem żołnierzy koalicji antyhitlerowskiej i antyfaszystowskiej.

Próba wznowienia dialogu między Moskwą a Tallinem została podjęta 28 czerwca 2008 roku, kiedy to prezydent Estonii Toomas Hendrik Ilves przybył na zaproszenie prezydenta Dmitrija Miedwiediewa na odbywający się w Chanty-Mansyjsku Kongres Narodów Ugrofińskich. Dwa lata po zamieszkach Brązowej Nocy, Kristina Norman, artystka estońsko-rosyjskiego pochodzenia w miejscu lokalizacji starego pomnika Brązowego Żołnierza postawiła jego złotą replikę. Wśród społeczeństwa zapanowało zdezorientowanie, a w mediach gorące polemiki. Estońscy intelektualiści uznali pomnik za obraźliwy, zaś artystka została zatrzymana przez policję. Zarzucono jej prowokację, marnowanie publicznych pieniędzy i atak na instytucje państwowe. Złotą replikę pomnika Brązowego Żołnierza odkupiło ostatecznie Muzeum Sztuki Współczesnej w Helsinkach, włączając go do wystawy prezentującej narrację post-radziecką.

W 2016 roku Centralny Bank Rosji wydał serię pamiątkowych 5-rublowych monet z pomnikami „wyzwoliciele”, które znajdują się w stolicach krajów wyzwolonych przez wojska sowieckie spod okupacji nazistowskiej. Wśród nich jest moneta z „Brązowym Żołnierzem”, czyli „Pomnikiem Wyzwoliciele” z Tallina. Rzecznik prasowy Banku Centralnego Rosji oświadczył, że puszczona w obieg seria monet upamiętnia zwycięstwo nad faszyzmem. Estońska Konserwatywna Partia Ludowa wystąpiła do rządu, by ten zmusił Moskwę do przeprosin i wycofania pieniędzy z obrotu. Jednak rząd, na czele z minister spraw zagranicznych Mariną Kaljurand, pomimo ożywionej reakcji Litwy, nie wydał w tej sprawie żadnego oświadczenia. •

ANNEX 3

RUSSIA AS A THREAT TO THE STATES BEING IN THE ZONE OF INFLUENCE




Source: gallup.com (est. 2015)

ANNEX 4

POPULATION AND LANGUAGES IN THE ESTONIA, INCLUDING RUSSIAN MINORITY AND RUSSIAN LANGUAGE

POPULATION: **1,258,545** (JULY 2016 EST.)


RUSSIANS IN ESTONIA 2012-2016




BIRTHS IN ESTONIA 1990-2015

YEAR	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2012	2013	2014	2015
TOTAL	18 522	9 040	9 771	8 771	11 698	11 698	8 779	11 377	11 576
ESTONIAN	13 918	2 059	7 706	2 040	9 155	9 155	2 412	8 897	8 973
RUSSIAN	4 196	60	1 978	24	2 472	2 472	30	2 406	2 511
UKRAINIAN	217	11	38	4	21	21	6	22	37
BELORUSIAN	74	1	9	0	2	2	1	3	3
FINN	7	2	4	1	5	5	5	0	2
JEW	7	2	2	2	5	5	3	5	5
TATAR	19	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	4
GERMAN	9	0	5	0	0	0	4	0	2
LATVIAN	3	0	0	0	3	3	0	1	1
POLE	2	2	0	0	2	2	2	3	0
LITHUANIAN	2	8	0	7	1	1	7	0	1
ARMENIAN	15	22	1	13	4	4	27	7	0

BIRTHS OF RUSSIANS 1990-2015




POPULATION (%) 2011 EST.



- ESTONIAN 68.7%
- RUSSIAN 24.8%
- UKRAINIAN 1.7%
- BELARUSIAN 1%
- FINN 0.6%
- OTHER 1.6%
- UNSPECIFIED 1.6%

LANGUAGES (%) 2011 EST.



- ESTONIAN (OFFICIAL) 68.5%
- RUSSIAN 29.6%
- UKRAINIAN 0.6%
- OTHER 1.2%
- UNSPECIFIED 0.1%

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>

Source: pub.stat.ee

ANNEX 5

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS



2007

PARTY	ELECTION RESULT (%)	MANDATES
ESTONIAN REFORM PARTY	27,8	31
ESTONIAN CENTRE PARTY	26,1	29
UNION OF PRO PATRIA AND RES PUBLICA	17,9	19
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY	10,6	10
ESTONIAN GREENS	7,1	6
PEOPLE'S UNION OF ESTONIA	7,1	6
ESTONIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS	1,7	0
CONSTITUTION PARTY	1	0
ESTONIAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY	0,2	0
RUSSIAN PARTY IN ESTONIA	0,2	0
ESTONIAN LEFT PARTY	0,1	0

COALITION: Estonian Reform Party, Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica, Social Democratic Party (left the coalition in 2009)

PRIME MINISTER: Andrus Ansip

Source: <http://www.vtk.ee/past-elections/riigikogu-parliament-elections/riigikogu-elections-2007/>

2011

PARTY	NUMBER OF VOTES	ELECTION RESULT (%)	MANDATES
ESTONIAN REFORM PARTY	164 255	28,56	33
ESTONIAN CENTRE PARTY	134 124	23,32	26
UNION OF PRO PATRIA AND RES PUBLICA	118 023	20,52	23
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY	98 307	17,09	19
ESTONIAN GREENS	21 824	3,80	0
PEOPLE'S UNION OF ESTONIA	12 184	2,12	0
RUSSIAN PARTY IN ESTONIA	5 029	0,9	0
ESTONIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS	2 934	0,5	0
ESTONIAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY	2 571	0,4	0
INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES	15 882	2,8	0

COALITION: Estonian Reform Party, Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica

PRIME MINISTER: Andrus Ansip

2015

PARTY	NUMBER OF VOTES	ELECTION RESULT (%)	MANDATES
ESTONIAN REFORM PARTY	158 965	27,7	30
ESTONIAN CENTRE PARTY	142 438	24,8	27
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY	87 186	15,2	15
UNION OF PRO PATRIA AND RES PUBLICA	78 707	13,7	14
ESTONIAN FREE PARTY	49 885	8,7	8
CONSERVATIVE PEOPLE'S PARTY OF ESTONIA	46 772	8,1	7
ESTONIAN GREENS	5 193	0,9	0
PARTY OF PEOPLE'S UNITY	2 289	0,4	0
ESTONIAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY	1 046	0,2	0
ESTONIAN UNITED LEFT PARTY	764	0,1	0
INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES	887	0,2	0

COALITION: Estonian Reform Party, Social Democratic Party, Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica

PRIME MINISTER: Taavie Rõivas (since 23rd November listopada Jüri Ratas government from Estonian Centre Party who joined coalition for Estonian Reform Party)



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